OPINION

The plaintiffs, two Virginia wine and beer consumers and wineries based in Texas, California, and Oregon, commenced this action against officials of the Commonwealth of Virginia, challenging the constitutionality of Virginia’s Alcoholic Beverage Control (“ABC”) laws, Va.Code § 4.1-100 et seq., which prohibit the importation of wine and beer into Virginia except through a regulated, multi-tiered structure. The plaintiffs alleged that portions of these laws, even though adopted ostensibly pursuant to the Twenty-first Amendment, are unconstitutional by virtue of the dormant Commerce Clause, principally because they favor local wine and beer manufacturers, who are permitted to sell directly to consumers, and discriminate against out-of-state wine and beer manufacturers, who must sell through the more costly multi-tiered structure. The plaintiffs also alleged that the Virginia law allowing State-run ABC stores to sell only Virginia farm wines similarly violated the dormant Commerce Clause. The plaintiffs sought a declaration of unconstitutionality and prospective injunctive relief.

The district court held that Virginia’s ABC laws unconstitutionally discriminated against out-of-state wine and beer manufacturers and sellers and were not saved by the Twenty-first Amendment. Bolick v. Roberts, 199 F.Supp.2d 397, 417 (E.D.Va. 2002). Accordingly, the court declared unconstitutional, and enjoined the enforcement of, Virginia Code §§ 4.1-103(1); 4.1-119(A); 4.1-207(2), (4), (5); 4.1-208(3), (6), (7), (8); 4.1-209(A)(2), (5); 4.1-302; 4.1-303; and 4.1-310(B), (C), which functioned together to prohibit the direct shipment of wine and beer from out-of-state sellers while simultaneously authorizing the direct shipment to consumers of in-state wine and beer and allowing State-run ABC stores to sell only Virginia farm wines. Id.

Since this case was argued, the Virginia legislature enacted bills H.B. 1652 and S.B. 1117, which the governor signed into law on April 9, 2003. These statutes modify portions of some of the statutes that are subject to this appeal and, therefore, as Virginia contends, render moot portions of this case. Virginia also points out that these new statutes alter the arguments and analysis necessary for the disposition of the remainder of the case.

*277 Because the relief that plaintiffs seek is only prospective, the recent statutory enactments change the circumstances on which the district court’s opinion was based and therefore alter the issues presented to us for decision on appeal. Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s order and remand this case for reconsideration of plaintiffs’ challenges in light of the recent statutory enactments and in light of Beskind v. Easley, 325 F.3d 506 (4th Cir. 2003), which we decided recently.

VACATED AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.