OPINION

Sterling Acceptance Corporation appeals from the summary judgment entered against it on its federal and state trademark infringement and unfair competition claims. 1 The pertinent underlying facts are adequately set forth in the district court’s order, see Sterling Acceptance Corp. v. Tommark, Inc., 227 F.Supp.2d 454 (D.Md. 2002), which we now affirm. 2

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that a summary judgment “shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing all facts and inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 283 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc).

In ruling on Tommark’s summary judgment motion, the district court recognized that likelihood of confusion is a necessary element of each of Sterling’s claims, and it evaluated the seven factors commonly utilized in this circuit for determining likelihood of confusion. 227 F.Supp.2d at 460 65. The district court found on the record presented that although three of these factors favored Sterling, the other four factors favored Tommark. Id. The district court further found that the four factors that favored Tommark were entitled to *881 more weight than the three factors that favored Sterling and that “[t]he cumulative weight of all seven factors favors [Tom-mark].” Id. at 466. In light of these findings, the district court concluded that “a reasonable jury could not on the record [presented] find that there exists a likelihood of confusion between [Sterling’s] registered trademark and [Tommark’s] mark,” and it accordingly granted Tom-mark’s summary judgment motion. Id. at 461. 3

We have carefully considered the district court’s order in light of the record, the controlling law, and the parties’ briefs and oral arguments. For the reasons set forth in the district court’s order, we conclude that the district court correctly determined that Sterling failed to present sufficient evidence on the issue of likelihood of confusion to withstand Tommark’s summary judgment motion. Because likelihood of confusion is a necessary element of each of plaintiffs causes of action, the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Tommark. We therefore affirm.

AFFIRMED.