Gerald M. Scott appeals his conviction and forty-six month prison sentence for possession of a firearm by a felon, and a user of controlled substances, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and (3) (2000). Scott entered a guilty plea conditioned on his ability to appeal the district court’s *911 order denying Scott’s motion to suppress evidence. Finding no error, we affirm.

Scott argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. This court reviews the factual findings underlying a motion to suppress for clear error, and the district court’s legal determinations de novo. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996). When a suppression motion has been denied, this court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government. See United States v. Seidman, 156 F.3d 542, 547 (4th Cir. 1998).

With these standards in mind, and having reviewed the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the officer who seized Scott did so based on a reasonable articulable suspicion that Scott was engaged in criminal activity. “An officer may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articula-ble suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). We find that, given the totality of the circumstances, see United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989), Scott’s suspicious and evasive behavior justified the officer’s actions. See United States v. Mayo, 361 F.3d 802, 807-08 (4th Cir . 2004).

Accordingly, we affirm Scott’s conviction and sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED