James R. Strong, who is an inmate in the maximum security unit of Kirkland Correctional Institution in Columbia, South Carolina, initiated a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) action in which he challenged various conditions of his confinement. In the course of that proceeding, Strong filed the following motions, the denial of which is the subject of this appeal: (1) For declaratory judgment and/or preliminary injunction to prevent defendants from cutting his hair and beard; (2) For a temporary restraining order to restrain the defendants from denying him “incoming publications, periodicals, renewal of subscriptions, religious literature, magazines, books, etc.”; and (3) For a preliminary injunction for removal of restraints during outdoor exercise. Those motions, along with several others, were referred to a magistrate judge for a recommendation. The magistrate judge recommended that all of the motions be denied. After considering Strong’s objections, the district court adopted the report and recommendation and denied all of Strong’s motions, and Strong timely appealed. We dismiss in part and affirm in part.

To the extent that Strong appeals the denial of temporary restraining orders, such orders are generally not appealable. See Virginia v. Tenneco, Inc., 538 F.2d 1026, 1029-30 (4th Cir. 1976). We therefore dismiss the appeal insofar as Strong is appealing the denial of temporary restraining orders. We review the denial of preliminary injunctive relief, which is appeal-able under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a), for abuse of discretion “only in order to determine ‘whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding the presence or absence of irreparable harm and a probability that the plaintiffs would succeed on the merits.’ ” See Planned Parenthood of Blue Ridge v. Camblos, 155 F.3d 352, 359 (4th *838 Cir. 1998) (en banc). We find no such abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of preliminary injunctive relief. Thus, to the extent that Strong appeals the denial of preliminary injunctive relief, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. See Strong v. Ozmint, No. CA-03-2256 (D.S.C. Mar. 23, 2004).

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED IN PART; AFFIRMED IN PART