Lenard A. Footland appeals the district court’s order granting summary judgment to Defendant on Footland’s claims of race and sex discrimination, as well as retaliation.

We review an order granting summary judgment de novo. Higgins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 863 F.2d 1162, 1167 (4th Cir. 1988). Summary judgment is appropriate only when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A mere scintilla of proof, however, will not suffice to prevent summary judgment; the question is “not whether there is literally no evidence, but whether there is any upon which a jury could properly proceed to find *313 a verdict for the party” resisting summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted).

We agree with the district court that Footland failed to demonstrate a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination. See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 505-06, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). We further agree that Foot-land failed to satisfy the three elements of a prima facie case of retaliation. See Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 754 (4th Cir. 1996). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED