Charles Henry Robinson appeals from the judgment of the district court convicting him of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B) (2000); possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2000); and being a felon in possession of firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Robinson claims that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. Finding no error, we affirm. *

*155 We review legal conclusions de novo, while reviewing factual findings for clear error. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996); United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868, 873 (4th Cir. 1992). When a suppression motion has been denied, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. See United States v. Seidman, 156 F.3d 542, 547 (4th Cir. 1998).

Robinson first claims that the district court erred in finding that he was advised of his constitutional rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Detective L.T. Seals testified that he recited the Miranda warnings twice to Robinson, first on a neighbor’s porch and then in Robinson’s living room. Moreover, Detective Seals, Detective Matt Knight, and Sergeant A. J. Bickauskus testified that Robinson was given Miranda warnings inside the living room, and that he acknowledged his understanding of those warnings. Further, Robinson’s witnesses, Stacie Nelson and Wendell Woodard, Jr., provided contradictory testimony as to whether the officers advised Robinson of his Miranda rights. The district court found the officers’ testimony credible, and such credibility findings are not generally reviewable. See United States v. Saunders, 886 F.2d 56, 60 (4th Cir. 1989). Therefore, the district court did not clearly err in finding that Robinson received the Miranda warnings.

Next, Robinson claims that even if he was provided with the Miranda rights, his statements following the warnings were coerced because he did not freely and voluntarily waive his right to silence. We have reviewed the record and conclude that under the totality of the circumstances the incriminating statements Robinson made after waiving his Miranda rights were voluntary. See United States v. Cristobal, 293 F.3d 134, 139-40 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 963, 123 S.Ct. 396, 154 L.Ed.2d 319 (2002).

Accordingly, we affirm Robinson’s conviction. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED