United States v. Tucker

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

United States v. Tucker

Opinion

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 04-4666

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

JAMES SILAS TUCKER, III,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert E. Payne, District Judge. (CR-01-252)

Submitted: January 7, 2005 Decided: January 25, 2005

Before KING, SHEDD, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Frank W. Dunham, Jr., Federal Public Defender, Robert J. Wagner, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Paul J. McNulty, United States Attorney, Peter S. Duffey, Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c). PER CURIAM:

James Silas Tucker, III appeals the district court’s

order revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to twelve

months and one day of imprisonment. We affirm.

We review a district court’s order imposing a sentence

after revocation of supervised release for abuse of discretion.

United States v. Davis,

53 F.3d 638, 642-43

(4th Cir. 1995). The

district court abuses its discretion when it fails or refuses to

exercise its discretion or when its exercise of discretion is

flawed by an erroneous legal or factual premise. See James v.

Jacobson,

6 F.3d 233, 239

(4th Cir. 1993). The district court need

only find a violation of a condition of supervised release by a

preponderance of the evidence. See

18 U.S.C.A. § 3583

(e)(3) (West

2000 & Supp. 2004). Moreover, because Tucker’s sentence does not

exceed the statutory maximum sentence under § 3583(e)(3), we review

the sentence only to determine whether it is “plainly

unreasonable.” See

18 U.S.C. § 3742

(a)(4) (2000).

On appeal, Tucker argues that the district court abused

its discretion in determining his sentence because it failed to

consider numerous mitigating factors. We have held that, in a

sentencing hearing, “[a] court need not engage in a ritualistic

incantation in order to establish its consideration of a legal

issue. It is sufficient if . . . the district court rules on

issues that have been fully presented for determination.

- 2 - Consideration is implicit in the court’s ultimate ruling.” Davis,

53 F.3d at 642

. Our review of the record of the revocation hearing

leads us to conclude that the district court did not abuse its

discretion, and that Tucker’s sentence is not plainly unreasonable.

We accordingly affirm the order of the district court

revoking Tucker’s supervised release and imposing a term of

imprisonment of twelve months and one day. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would not

aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

- 3 -

Reference

Status
Unpublished