Rudy Hicks appeals from the district court’s order determining that he still meets the criteria for civil commitment under 18 U.S.C. § 4246 (2000). Under § 4246, if, after a hearing, a district court determines by clear and convincing evidence that a person is suffering from a mental disease or defect that would create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to the property of another, the court shall commit the person to the custody of the Attorney General. Once committed, an individual may periodically move for a hearing under 18 U.S.C. § 4247(h) (2000) to determine whether the committed person should be discharged from commitment under § 4246. To obtain his release from commitment, the district court must find by a preponderance of the evidence that the committed person has recovered from his mental disease or defect to such an extent that his release would no longer pose a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to the property of another. See 18 U.S.C. § 4246(e) (2000).

This court will overturn a district court’s finding that a substantial risk of harm exists only if the finding is clearly erroneous. United States v. Cox, 964 F.2d 1431, 1433 (4th Cir. 1992). A finding is clearly erroneous when “the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a *74 mistake has been committed.” Faulconer v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 748 F.2d 890, 895 (4th Cir. 1984).

We have thoroughly reviewed the materials submitted by the parties in this matter and conclude that the district court’s determination that Hicks still meets the requirements for commitment under § 4246 was not clearly erroneous. We therefore affirm the order of the district court continuing Hicks’ commitment under § 4246. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED