Cecile M. Lescs appeals the district court’s order dismissing her civil action alleging claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), the Privacy Act, the Freedom of Information Act, and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971). Lescs asserts the dis *564 trict court erred by granting dismissal or summary judgment to all Defendants without granting her motion for class action certification, allowing her to proceed to discovery, or “hearing evidence about the TIPS Program.” Because our review of the record convinces us there is no reversible error, we affirm.

Leses, proceeding pro se, sought certification for the class of all plaintiffs in court cases against Dow Chemical Company who were harassed by federal and state action in violation of RICO. A refusal to certify a class is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Stott v. Haworth, 916 F.2d 134, 139 (4th Cir. 1990). Moreover, it is plain error to certify a class when a pro se litigant seeks to represent the class. Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir. 1975). We find the district court did not abuse its discretion by failing to certify the class.

We likewise find the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to allow discovery, see Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214, 245-16 (4th Cir. 2002), or otherwise err by dismissing this action prior to discovery or trial. The district court was required to rule on Defendants’ dispositive motion to dismiss or for summary judgment raising sovereign and qualified immunity issues prior to allowing any discovery. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817-18, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). Moreover, we find Defendants’ motion was properly granted prior to trial. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

Accordingly, we deny the motion of the Martinsburg Defendants to dismiss them as parties as moot and affirm the judgment of the district court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED