Travis Lee Ferguson challenges his 46-month sentence entered pursuant to his guilty plea to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. 1 On appeal, Ferguson argues that his sentence was unconstitutional under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004). We find no plain error, and thus, we affirm.

In United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), the Supreme Court held that Blakely applies to the federal sentencing guidelines and that the mandatory guidelines scheme that provided for sentence enhancements based on facts found by the court violated the Sixth Amendment. 125 S.Ct. at 746-48, 755-56. Ferguson contends that his sentence runs afoul of Blakely for two reasons: (1) his base offense level was *282 calculated on the basis of a prior controlled substance offense, while the indictment charged only a prior felony, and (2) the court enhanced his sentence for possession of the firearm in connection with another felony, facts that were neither charged nor admitted. Because Ferguson did not raise these claims below, review is for plain error. United States v. Harp, 406 F.3d 242, 247 (4th Cir. 2005).

Regarding the prior controlled substance offense, under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), a sentence may be enhanced based on the fact of a prior conviction. However, when the sentencing court looks “beyond the charging document, the terms of a plea agreement, the plea colloquy, the statutory definition, or any explicit finding of the trial court to determine a fact about a prior conviction,” then the finding has gone too far afield from the prior judicial record and falls outside the Apprendi exception to the Booker holding. United States v. Collins, 412 F.3d 515, 521-22 (4th Cir. 2005). Ferguson was previously convicted of possession with intent to sell and deliver cocaine. The district court did not need to make any factual findings about this conviction to conclude that it was a controlled substance offense, within the definition of U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1(a)(4) (2003). See Collins, 412 F.3d at 515. Therefore, the enhancement of Ferguson’s offense level under § 2K2.1 was within the Apprendi exception and did not violate the Sixth Amendment.

Turning to the firearm enhancement, Ferguson’s offense level would have been 20 without the enhancement. Because Ferguson was in criminal history category III, his guideline range would have been 41 to 51 months. 2 Thus, Ferguson’s 46-month sentence did not exceed the maximum sentence allowed based on the facts he admitted. Therefore, Ferguson has failed to show plain error. See United States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 546-47 (4th Cir. 2005) (outlining requirements for showing plain error in Booker context).

Accordingly, we affirm Ferguson’s sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED