Appellant Concepcion Garcia-Uribe pled guilty pursuant to a written plea agreement to one count of violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), possession with intent to distribute more than five kilograms of a mixture and substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine. Garcia-Uribe also agreed in his plea agreement that the quantity of drugs attributable to him was “at least 50 kilograms, but less than 150 kilograms.” Defense counsel agreed at the sentencing hearing that the applicable sentencing guidelines range was 135 to 168 months, and Garcia-Uribe does not dispute that range on appeal. His counsel’s only claim on appeal is that the court’s 160-month sentence was too high. * We affirm.

After United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), a sentencing court is no longer bound by the range prescribed by the federal sentencing guidelines. United States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 546 (4th Cir. 2005). In determining a sentence post-Booker, however, sentencing courts are still required to calculate and to consider the federal sentencing guidelines range and the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2005). Id. This court will affirm a post-Booker sentence if it is both reasonable and within the statutorily prescribed range. Id. at 546-47; see also United States v. Green, 436 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 2006) (discussing extent to which sentencing court is guided by the guidelines and meaning of appellate review for “unreasonableness”).

The district court stated at sentencing that it “entered this prison sentence after giving consideration to the Sentencing Guidelines as they exist in a recommendatory condition. The Court has also considered 3553 under Title 18 in arriving at this decision, which it believes to be a reasonable sentence.” (JA 19). Because the district court’s sentencing did not violate Booker and because the sentence was within an unchallenged sentencing guidelines range, we conclude Garcia-Uribe’s 160-month sentence was reasonable. We therefore affirm his sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions of the parties are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED