Jerris Leon Markham pled guilty to one count of possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924 (2000). Markham was sentenced to thirty-two months’ imprisonment. Finding no error, we affirm.

Markham contends that his predicate state conviction did not satisfy § 922(g)(1) as a matter of law. He reasons that, under North Carolina law, his maximum sentence was twelve months because no aggravating factors were admitted to or found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. See North Carolina v. Allen, 359 N.C. 425, 615 S.E.2d 256, 265 (2005) (holding, after Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), statutory maximum is the maximum that a particular defendant can face in light of his criminal history and the facts found by a jury or admitted by defendant). However, Markham concedes that his argument is foreclosed by United States v. Harp, 406 F.3d 242, 246-47 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 297, 163 L.Ed.2d 259 (2005), which holds that United States v. Jones, 195 F.3d 205 (4th Cir. 1999), is still viable after Blakely and United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), and reaffirms that a prior North Carolina conviction satisfies § 922(g)(1) if any defendant charged with that crime could receive a sentence in excess of one year. Thus, because it is undisputed that a sentence of over twelve months could be imposed on a defendant convicted of felony possession of a stolen automobile in North Carolina, Markham’s prior conviction was properly considered a predicate felony under § 922(g)(1).

Accordingly, we affirm Markham’s conviction and sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED.