Tyrone Henderson was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of cocaine base (crack), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2000), and distribution of fifty grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(a), (b)(1)(A) (West 1999 & Supp. 2006). Henderson was sentenced to 360 months imprisonment. He appeals his sentence, arguing that the district court erred under United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), in determining, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he was responsible for more than fifty grams of *186 crack for sentencing purposes. * We affirm.

Henderson incorrectly maintains that, following Booker, facts that increase the offense level must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The remedial portion of Booker specifically rejected this approach. Booker, 543 U.S. at 246, 125 S.Ct. 738. After Booker, the sentencing court continues to make factual findings concerning sentencing factors by a preponderance of the evidence. See United, States v. Morris, 429 F.3d 65, 72 (4th Cir.) (remedial portion of Booker ensures that determination of sentencing factors will continue to be made by sentencing judge by preponderance of evidence) (internal quotation and citation omitted), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 121, 166 L.Ed.2d 91 (2006) (No. 05-11378). In imposing a sentence post-Booker, courts still must calculate the applicable guideline range after making the appropriate findings of fact and consider the range in conjunction with other relevant factors under the guidelines and 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2006). United States v. Moreland, 437 F.3d 424, 432 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 2054, 164 L.Ed.2d 804 (2006). The sentence must be within the statutorily prescribed range and reasonable. United States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 547 (4th Cir. 2005).

Although Henderson acknowledges that the district court treated the guidelines as advisory, he argues that the court effectively treated them as mandatory because it did not make a detailed analysis of the factors set out in § 3553(a). This argument is without merit. The court need not “robotically tick through § 3553(a)’s every subsection” or “explicitly discuss every § 3553(a) factor on the record.” United States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir . 2006).

We therefore affirm the sentence imposed by the district court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED.