Windell Long appeals from his 252-month sentence entered pursuant to his guilty plea to being a felon in possession of a firearm and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. Long contends that his designation for sentencing purposes as an armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1)(2000) is precluded by the Supreme Court’s decision in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2581, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004).

Long’s claim is foreclosed by circuit precedent. See United States v. Thompson, 421 F.3d 278, 286 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding that Blakely’s requirement that facts extraneous to a prior conviction be found by a jury does not cover the essential components of a conviction, including integral facts such as the statutory violation and date of offense), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 1463, 164 L.Ed.2d 250 (2006); United States v. Cheek, 415 F.3d 349, 350 (4th Cir.) (holding that defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to trial by a jury was not violated by district court’s reliance on his prior convictions for purposes of sentencing under the Armed Career Criminal Act), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 640, 163 L.Ed.2d 518 (2005). Moreover, on appeal, Long does not challenge any factual findings regarding the prior convictions, and he does not dispute the factual basis for the district court’s conclusions that he was an armed career criminal. Accordingly, Long’s assertion that his sentence violated the Sixth Amendment is without merit. See United States v. Collins, 412 F.3d 515, 523 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding that, where defendant did not dispute any of the facts supporting the career offender status in district court, there is no constitutional violation in relying on defendant’s prior convictions).

Accordingly, we affirm Long’s sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED