UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-4025

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

CLEVELAND KILGORE,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt. Richard D. Bennett, District Judge. (8:06-cr-00115-RDB)

Submitted: October 31, 2007 Decided: November 15, 2007

Before WILKINSON, TRAXLER, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Cleveland Kilgore, Appellant Pro Se. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Barbara Suzanne Skalla, Assistant United States Attorney, Michele Walls Sartori, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM:

Cleveland Kilgore was convicted by a jury on four counts

of bank fraud,

(2000), four counts of aggravated

identity theft, 18 U.S.C. § 1028A (2000), and aiding and abetting

those offenses,

(2000). He was sentenced to 149

months of imprisonment. On direct appeal, Kilgore has chosen to

proceed pro se. Although Kilgore’s arguments on appeal are largely

indecipherable, construing his claims broadly, Kilgore appears to

challenge the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction and the

sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions.

As recently noted by this court, “[s]ubject-matter

jurisdiction (in the sense of judicial power) over federal criminal

prosecutions is conferred on district courts by

.”

United States v. Hartwell,

(4th Cir.), cert.

denied,

(2006). Accordingly, a federal district

court has jurisdiction over “all offenses against the laws of the

United States.” See

(2000). Moreover, “there can

be no doubt that Article III permits Congress to assign federal

criminal prosecutions to federal courts. That’s the beginning and

the end of the ‘jurisdictional’ inquiry.” Hartwell,

(quoting Hugi v. United States,

(7th Cir.

1999)).

Kilgore does not dispute that his criminal prosecution

involved the laws of the United States. Relying on commercial law,

- 2 - he provides no valid authority for the proposition that the

district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. To the extent

that Kilgore argues in his informal brief that he is a “Foreign

Nation (not a person) who rules autonomously and [is] not subject

to any entity or jurisdiction anywhere,” his claim is patently

meritless. Accordingly, we find that the district court properly

exercised subject matter jurisdiction over Kilgore’s criminal

prosecution under

.

A jury’s verdict must be sustained if there is

substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to the

Government, to support it. Glasser v. United States,

(1942). This court has “defined ‘substantial evidence’ as

‘evidence that a reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate

and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt.’” United States v. Smith,

,

216 (4th Cir.) (quoting United States v. Burgos,

(4th Cir. 1996) (en banc)), cert. denied,

(2006).

This court “must consider circumstantial as well as direct

evidence, and allow the government the benefit of all reasonable

inferences from the facts proven to those sought to be

established.” United States v. Tresvant,

(4th

Cir. 1982). In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, this

court does not review the credibility of the witnesses and assumes

that the jury resolved all contradictions in the testimony in favor

- 3 - of the Government. United States v. Romer,

(4th

Cir. 1998). Moreover, the uncorroborated testimony of one witness

or an accomplice may be sufficient to sustain a conviction. United

States v. Wilson,

(4th Cir. 1997). This court

“can reverse a conviction on insufficiency grounds only when the

prosecution’s failure is clear.” United States v. Moye,

(4th Cir.) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted), cert. denied,

(2006).

To prove bank fraud, the Government had to establish

beyond a reasonable doubt that Kilgore

knowingly execute[d], or attempt[ed] to execute, a scheme or artifice (1) to defraud a financial institution; or (2) to obtain any of the moneys, funds, credits, assets, securities, or other property owned by, or under the custody or control of, a financial institution, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.

. The elements of aggravated identity theft, 18

U.S.C. § 1028A, are: (1) knowing use, possession, or transfer,

without lawful authority, of the means of identification of another

person and (2) that such conduct occurred during and in relation to

a felony enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(c). See United States v.

Montejo,

(4th Cir.), cert. denied,

(2006). In turn, § 1028A(c)(5) defines an enumerated felony to

include “any provision contained in chapter 63 (relating to mail,

bank, and wire fraud).”

- 4 - We have reviewed the transcripts of the trial and find

sufficient evidence to sustain the jury’s verdict. Accordingly, we

affirm Kilgore’s convictions and sentence. We deny Kilgore’s

motion for release pending appeal as moot and we further deny the

“Motion to Grant Settlement.” We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in

the materials before the court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

AFFIRMED

- 5 -