Thornton v. Mukasey
Opinion
In these consolidated appeals, * Johnny D. Thornton appeals the district court’s *35 order granting summary judgment to his former employer in his action alleging violations of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000), and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e—2000e-17 (2000). This court reviews a district court’s order granting summary judgment de novo, viewing the facts and drawing reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Doe v. Kidd, 501 F.3d 348, 353 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 1483, 170 L.Ed.2d 297 (2008). Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). With these standards in mind, we have thoroughly reviewed the briefs and the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court Thornton v. Mukasey, No. 1:06-cv-00397-GBL (E.D. Va. filed Aug. 27, 2007; entered Aug. 29, 2007). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED.
The multiple appeals result from the fact that Thornton and his counsel each filed a separate notice of appeal from the final order of the district court.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- Johnny D. THORNTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Michael B. MUKASEY, Attorney General, Defendant—Appellee; Johnny D. Thornton, Plaintiff—Appellant, v. Michael B. Mukasey, Attorney General, Defendant—Appellee
- Status
- Unpublished