UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-4523

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

CHRISTOPHER ALLEN HUNTER,

Defendant – Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Asheville. Lacy H. Thornburg, District Judge. (1:06-cr-00251-LHT-DLH-2)

Submitted: November 24, 2008 Decided: December 19, 2008

Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Sue Genrich Berry, BOWEN AND BERRY, PLLC, Wilmington, North Carolina, for Appellant. Amy Elizabeth Ray, Assistant United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM:

Christopher Allen Hunter entered a straight-up guilty

plea to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine

base, in violation of

, 846 (2006), and was

sentenced to 200 months in prison. Counsel for Hunter has filed

a brief pursuant to Anders v. California,

(1967),

alleging that she has found no meritorious issues for appeal but

asserting that Hunter did not receive effective assistance of

counsel from his original trial counsel because he was not

informed of a proposed plea agreement. Although Hunter was

provided notice of his right to file a supplemental pro se

brief, he has not done so, and the Government has declined to

file a responsive brief. Finding no error, we affirm the

district court’s judgment.

In accordance with Anders, we have thoroughly reviewed

the record and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We

find that the district court complied with the requirements of

Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 when it accepted Hunter’s guilty plea,

ensuring that his plea was knowing and voluntary, that he

understood the rights he was giving up by pleading guilty and

the sentence he faced, and that he committed the offense to

which he was pleading guilty. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b).

We also conclude that Hunter’s 200-month sentence is

reasonable. See United States v. Hughes,

, 546-47

2 (4th Cir. 2005). We find that the district court correctly

calculated Hunter’s Guidelines range and that it was reasonable

for the district court to depart downward from that range. See

United States v. Moreland,

(4th Cir. 2006)

(holding that to determine an appropriate sentence, the district

court should first calculate the appropriate Guidelines range

and then determine “whether a departure is appropriate based on

the Guidelines Manual or relevant case law”); United States

v. Davenport,

(4th Cir. 2006) (“When we

review a sentence outside the advisory guideline range--whether

as a product of a departure or a variance--we consider both

whether the district court acted reasonably with respect to its

decision to impose such a sentence and with respect to the

extent of the divergence from the guideline range.”). Because

the district court considered the

(a) (2006)

factors and sentenced Hunter to a sentence in the middle of the

departed Guidelines range, we find Hunter’s sentence to be

reasonable.

Although Hunter contends he was denied effective

assistance of counsel because he was never presented with a

proposed plea agreement that would have resulted in a lower

sentencing guidelines range, see United States v. Blaylock,

(9th Cir. 1994) (failing to inform defendant

of plea offer was unreasonable assistance), because it does not

3 “conclusively appear on the record” that Hunter was denied

effective assistance, this claim should be asserted by Hunter in

a post-conviction motion under

(2000) rather

than on direct appeal. See United States v. Richardson,

(4th Cir. 1999) (“A claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel should be raised by a habeas corpus motion

under

in the district court and not on direct

appeal.”) (internal quotation marks, brackets and citation

omitted). During the plea colloquy, Hunter informed the

district court that he discussed possible defenses with trial

counsel and that he was entirely satisfied with his attorney’s

services. These declarations “carry a strong presumption of

verity.” Blackledge v. Allison,

(1977); see

United States v. DeFusco,

(4th Cir. 1991)

(holding that defendant’s statement at Rule 11 hearing that he

was neither coerced nor threatened was “strong evidence of the

voluntariness of his plea”).

Moreover, although the Government indicated at

sentencing that a plea agreement was sent to trial counsel prior

to the Rule 11 hearing, a proposed plea agreement was never

mentioned by the Government at the Rule 11 hearing, the

Government could not produce a copy of the proposed plea

agreement at sentencing, and it is unclear whether trial counsel

ever received a plea agreement--assuming one existed--from the

4 Government. Without evidence from trial counsel regarding his

failure to present the proposed plea agreement to Hunter,

consideration of this issue is premature. See DeFusco,

(“[I]t would be unfair to adjudicate [an ineffective

assistance claim] without any statement from counsel on the

record.”).

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.

This court requires that counsel inform Hunter in writing of his

right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for

further review. If Hunter requests that a petition be filed,

but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,

then counsel may move this court for leave to withdraw from

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof

was served on Hunter. We dispense with oral argument because

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the

materials before the court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

AFFIRMED

5