UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-7321

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

LLOYD GEORGE MAXWELL,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. Marvin J. Garbis, Senior District Judge. (1:87-cr-00371-MJG-2; 1:09-cv-00114-MJG)

Submitted: December 17, 2009 Decided: December 29, 2009

Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Lloyd George Maxwell, Appellant Pro Se. Richard Charles Kay, Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM:

Lloyd George Maxwell seeks to appeal the district

court’s order denying his Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion. Because

that motion directly attacked his conviction, the motion should

have been characterized as a successive and unauthorized

(West Supp. 2009) motion under United States v.

Winestock,

(4th Cir. 2003).

The district court’s order is not appealable unless a

circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability.

(c)(1) (2006); Reid v. Angelone,

(4th Cir. 2004). A certificate of appealability will not

issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right.”

(c)(2) (2006). A

prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that

reasonable jurists would find that any assessment of the

constitutional claims by the district court is debatable or

wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by the district

court is likewise debatable. Miller-El v. Cockrell,

(2003); Slack v. McDaniel,

(2000);

Rose v. Lee,

(4th Cir. 2001). We have

independently reviewed the record and conclude that Maxwell has

not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a

certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal.

2 To the extent that Maxwell’s notice of appeal and

informal brief could be construed as a motion for authorization

to file a successive § 2255 motion, we deny such authorization.

See Winestock,

. We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented

in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

DISMISSED

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