United States v. Hargrove

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

United States v. Hargrove

Opinion

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-4666

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

CURTIS MARCUS HARGROVE,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen, Jr., District Judge. (1:01-cr-00298-WO-1)

Submitted: February 1, 2011 Decided: March 1, 2011

Before GREGORY, SHEDD, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Louis C. Allen, III, Federal Public Defender, William S. Trivette, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Angela Hewlett Miller, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM:

Curtis Marcus Hargrove received an aggregate

thirty-seven month term of imprisonment following the revocation

of his supervised release. Hargrove’s counsel filed a brief

pursuant to Anders v. California,

386 U.S. 738

(1967), stating

his opinion that there are no meritorious issue for appeal but

raising the issue of whether Hargrove’s consecutive terms of

imprisonment were reasonable. Hargrove was notified of his

right to file a pro se supplemental brief, but has not filed a

brief. The Government has declined to file a responsive brief.

We affirm.

We will affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of

supervised release if it is not plainly unreasonable. United

States v. Thompson,

595 F.3d 544, 546

(4th Cir. 2010). The

first step in this review requires a determination of whether

the sentence is unreasonable. United States v. Crudup,

461 F.3d 433, 438

(4th Cir. 2006). “This initial inquiry takes a more

‘deferential appellate posture concerning issues of fact and the

exercise of discretion’ than reasonableness review for

[G]uidelines sentences.” United States v. Moulden,

478 F.3d 652, 656

(4th Cir. 2007) (quoting Crudup,

461 F.3d at 439

)

(applying “plainly unreasonable” standard of review for

probation revocation). Only if the sentence is procedurally or

substantively unreasonable does the inquiry proceed to the

2 second step of the analysis to determine whether the sentence is

plainly unreasonable. Crudup,

461 F.3d at 438-39

.

Here, counsel questions whether the sentence was

unreasonable because Hargrove was sentenced to multiple terms of

imprisonment that were to run consecutively instead of

concurrently. However, counsel correctly notes that where, as

here, a defendant is sentenced to multiple terms of imprisonment

at the same time, the district court may order that the

sentences be run concurrently or consecutively.

18 U.S.C. § 3584

(a) (2006); see also United States v. Johnson,

138 F.3d 115, 118-19

(4th Cir. 1998) (“[W]e hold that the district court

had the authority to impose consecutive sentences upon Johnson

when it revoked his supervised release.”). In determining

whether the terms will run concurrently or consecutively, the

court must consider the § 3553(a) factors.

18 U.S.C. § 3584

(b)

(2006).

In Hargrove’s case, the court considered all of the

requisite statutory and Guidelines factors. The court cited the

seriousness of Hargrove’s violations and the proximity to his

release as its reasons for imposing its chosen sentence. We

conclude that this reasoning is sound and that the sentence was

both procedurally and substantively reasonable. Accordingly, we

affirm the district court’s judgment.

3 In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record

in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.

This court requires that counsel inform Hargrove, in writing, of

the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for

further review. If Hargrove requests that a petition be filed,

but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,

then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof

was served on Hargrove.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional

process.

AFFIRMED

4

Reference

Status
Unpublished