United States v. Howard

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

United States v. Howard

Opinion

FILED: January 14, 2011

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 04-4487 (CR-03-141)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

QUANTAS LEE HOWARD,

Defendant - Appellant.

O R D E R

Upon consideration of the submissions filed relative to the

motion to amend the opinion, the Court grants the motion. The

opinion filed March 28, 2005, is modified by replacing the name

of the driver of the vehicle mentioned in the opinion with her

initials.

For the Court – By Direction

/s/ Patricia S. Connor

Clerk UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT _______________

No. 04-4487 _______________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

QUANTAS LEE HOWARD,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Roanoke. James C. Turk, Senior District Judge. (CR-03-141)

_______________

Submitted: February 18, 2005 Decided: March 28, 2005 _______________

Before LUTTIG and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. _______________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. _______________

Gary L. Lumsden, Rhonda Lee Overstreet, LUMSDEN, OVERSTREET & HANSEN, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellant. John L. Brownlee, United States Attorney, R. Andrew Bassford, Assistant United States Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee. _______________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c). PER CURIAM:

Quantas Lee Howard appeals the denial of a motion to

suppress evidence obtained in a search of a vehicle in which he

was a passenger. Finding no error, we affirm.

I.

On September 19, 2003, government agents and local

police were conducting an interdiction operation at the Roanoke

City bus terminal. During this operation, officers observed a

car driven by J.Y., in which Howard was a passenger, enter the

parking area of the bus terminal. The car pulled alongside a

red minivan while the occupants of both cars engaged in

conversation. One individual gestured toward the police and

then both cars prepared to leave. At this time, an individual,

later identified as Shawn Collins, was seen exiting the van and

walking away from the bus terminal with his luggage. The

officers thought this behavior was suspicious so they pursued

him and eventually found a concealed weapon in Collins=s

possession. Howard, who was also observed exiting J.Y.=s car and

walking away from the station, approached the area of Collins=s

detention. Howard stood next to a plain clothes officer, Agent

Bonaventura, and appeared interested in Collins=s detention and

nervous. Howard admitted to Bonaventura that he and Collins

- 3 - were friends. When Collins=s weapon was discovered, Howard

expressed surprise, stating AOh, damn!,@ and then began walking

away.

At this time, Bonaventura identified himself as a DEA

agent and asked to speak with Howard. Howard denied having any

identification and reported his name to be AGregory Omar Thomas.@

He then produced a school transcript bearing that same name.

However, the social security number Howard told police did not

match the number listed on the transcript.* Both Bonaventura and

another officer reported that Howard appeared nervous and had a

change in breathing rate while talking to the officers.

Bonaventura concluded that Howard was trying to conceal his

identity and proceeded to pat him down for weapons. Bonaventura

felt a hard object in Howard=s front pants pocket. The item

turned out to be a marijuana pipe. At this point, Bonaventura

turned Howard over to the local police, who transported him to

* Howard further asserts that the Government=s evidence regarding the identifying information Howard allegedly gave to police and how it appeared suspicious is in conflict. He appears to be attacking the credibility of the officers for giving conflicting testimony. However, the court specifically stated that its determination of reasonable suspicion was based on Bonaventura=s testimony. A review of the testimony offered at the suppression hearing does not support a conclusion that the district court=s credibility finding was clearly erroneous.

- 4 - the police station. While at the station, the police determined

Howard=s actual identity and that he was a convicted felon wanted

on state probation violation warrants.

While agents were dealing with Howard, ATF Agent

Whorley observed J.Y.=s car parked across the street from the bus

terminal. He approached J.Y. and asked for permission to search

her car. J.Y. consented. When Whorley asked about the luggage

and book bag in the back seat, J.Y. indicated that the items

belonged to Howard. Whorley then proceeded to search the book

bag and found a handgun and notebook inside. The notebook

contained Howard=s actual name.

Howard was subsequently indicted for one count of

possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

' 922(g)(1) (2000). Howard moved unsuccessfully to suppress the

gun both on the grounds that police lacked reasonable suspicion

to stop Howard originally and that the search of his book bag

was unconstitutional. The court ruled that Howard was properly

seized and searched because Bonaventura had articulable

reasonable suspicion to believe that Howard was involved in

criminal activity. The court further held that Howard did not

have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his book bag, which

was left in J.Y.=s car, and therefore had no standing to

- 5 - challenge the search. Following the denial of his motion to

suppress, Howard entered a conditional plea of guilty to

possession of a firearm by a felon and was sentenced to forty-

six months incarceration.

II.

Howard first argues that the district court erred in

ruling that his initial detention by Bonaventura was

constitutionally permissible. We disagree.

A police officer may stop and briefly detain a person

for investigative purposes provided that there is reasonable

suspicion, based on articulable facts and in light of his

experience, that criminal activity may be afoot. Terry v. Ohio,

392 U.S. 1, 30

(1968). In reviewing rulings on suppression

motions, we review fact findings, including credibility

determinations, for clear error and the application of the law

to those facts de novo. See Ornelas v. United States,

517 U.S. 690, 699

(1996); United States v. Simons,

206 F.3d 392, 398

(4th

Cir. 2000).

In challenging the determination of the district court

that there was reasonable suspicion, Howard argues that his

behavior prior to his detention was insufficient to create a

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Various officers

- 6 - testified that the following behaviors were suspicious: (1)

driving into a bus terminal and exiting quickly once uniformed

police were spotted; (2) nervous concern for Collins; (3)

Howard=s exclamation when the police found Collins=s gun; (4)

walking away from the bus station at which he had just arrived;

and (5) Howard=s inability to confirm elements of his own

identity. The district court found these facts to be true based

on the credibility of Bonaventura. It is the role of the fact

finder to observe witnesses and weigh their credibility during a

pretrial motion to suppress, and this court accords great

deference to those findings. United States v. Murray,

65 F.3d 1161, 1169

(4th Cir. 1995). A thorough review of the testimony

offered at the suppression hearing does not support a conclusion

that the district court=s credibility finding was clearly

erroneous. Furthermore, we find that the behavior described in

these circumstances is sufficient to meet the reasonable

suspicion standard. Accordingly, we find that Howard=s initial

seizure and search were proper.

III.

Howard next contends that the search of his book bag,

located in J.Y.=s car, was unconstitutional because he had a

reasonable expectation of privacy in his belongings. We

- 7 - disagree. The privacy interest that must be established to

support standing is an interest in the area searched, not just

an interest in the items found. United States v. Manbeck,

744 F.2d 360, 374

(4th Cir. 1984). Ownership of the seized items is

by itself insufficient to confer a privacy interest in the area

searched.

Id.

In challenging the determination of the district court

that there was no privacy interest, Howard relies on this court=s

holdings in United States v. Rusher,

966 F.2d 868

(4th Cir.

1992) and United States v. Block,

590 F.2d 535

(4th Cir. 1978).

Howard asserts that under Rusher, an individual can have a

reasonable expectation of privacy in goods found in a vehicle if

he asserts a right of ownership to those goods. However, in

Rusher, only the driver, who presumably had legitimate

possession of the vehicle, was found to have a privacy interest

in the goods found in the vehicle. Id. at 877. We held that the

passengers in the vehicle did not have a reasonable expectation

of privacy in the vehicle or its contents. Id. Furthermore, an

ownership or possessory interest in seized goods is not

dispositive as to whether there is a reasonable expectation of

privacy. Id. The privacy interest that must be established to

support standing is an interest in the area searched, not just

- 8 - an interest in the items found. Manbeck,

744 F.2d at 374

. This

court has held that a Aperson who cannot assert a legitimate

claim to a vehicle cannot reasonably expect that the vehicle is

a private repository for his personal effects, whether or not

they are enclosed in some sort of a container . . . .@ United

States v. Hargrove,

647 F.2d 411, 412

(4th Cir. 1981). We find

that Howard, as a passenger in J.Y.’s car, cannot assert a

legitimate claim to the vehicle. Therefore, we find that Howard

did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his

belongings left behind in J.Y.=s car. Accordingly, the search

and seizure was proper.

IV.

In sum, we affirm the district court order denying

suppression of the evidence recovered because (1) Howard=s

initial detention was permissible; and (2) Howard lacks standing

to challenge the search of goods found in J.Y.=s car. We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

- 9 -

Reference

Status
Unpublished