Certiorari granted, October 17, 2011 Vacated by Supreme Court, October 17, 2011

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-4338

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

MICHAEL DENNIS OLDS,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. James C. Fox, Senior District Judge. (7:96-cr-00030-F-2)

Submitted: January 28, 2011 Decided: February 15, 2011

Before NIEMEYER, GREGORY, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. George E. B. Holding, United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM:

Following a hearing, the district court revoked

Michael Olds’ supervised release and sentenced him to thirty

months in prison. Olds now appeals, claiming that his sentence

is plainly unreasonable. We affirm.

At his revocation hearing, the district court found

that Olds had committed five Grade C release violations as

charged. Olds’ criminal history category was III, and his

recommended Guidelines range upon revocation of release was 5-11

months. After hearing from counsel and Olds, the court imposed

a thirty-month sentence based on the need to protect society

from Olds’ ongoing drug use and his need for intensive drug

therapy.

We will affirm a sentence imposed following revocation

of supervised release if it is within the prescribed statutory

range and is not plainly unreasonable. United States v. Crudup,

(4th Cir 2006). Here, our review of the

record reveals that the sentence falls within the statutory

maximum of five years. See

(e)(3) (West 2000

& Supp. 2010). Further, the sentence is procedurally reasonable:

in sentencing Olds, the district court considered both the

Chapter 7 policy statements and the

(a) (2006)

factors that it was permitted to consider. See Crudup,

;

(e). Notably, two of those factors

2 (the need to protect society and his need for intensive drug

therapy, see

(a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D)) were the

court’s stated reasons for imposing a sentence above the

recommended range. Finally, the sentence is substantively

reasonable, for the court adequately explained the sentence.

See Crudup,

.

We therefore affirm. We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented

in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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