United States v. Manuel Page

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

United States v. Manuel Page

Opinion

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-4013

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

MANUEL L. PAGE,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Beckley. David A. Faber, Senior District Judge. (5:04-cr-00155-1)

Submitted: October 11, 2011 Decided: October 27, 2011

Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Mary Lou Newberger, Federal Public Defender, Jonathan D. Byrne, Appellate Counsel, Christian M. Capece, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. John Lanier File, Assistant United States Attorney, Beckley, West Virginia; Monica Kaminski Schwartz, Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM:

Following the revocation of his supervised release,

Manuel Page was sentenced to sixty days of incarceration,

followed by six months of community confinement, followed by

twenty-four months’ supervised release. Page did not object to

this sentence. On appeal, Page’s counsel filed a brief pursuant

to Anders v. California,

386 U.S. 738

(1967), stating that there

are no meritorious issues for appeal but questioning whether

Page’s sentence was plainly unreasonable. Page was notified of

his right to file a pro se supplemental brief, but has not filed

a brief. The Government has declined to file a responsive

brief. We affirm.

In reviewing a sentence imposed upon revocation of

supervised release, this court “takes a more ‘deferential

appellate posture concerning issues of fact and the exercise of

discretion’ than reasonableness review for [G]uidelines

sentences.” United States v. Moulden,

478 F.3d 652, 656

(4th

Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Crudup,

461 F.3d 433, 439

(4th Cir. 2006)). We will affirm a sentence imposed after

revocation of supervised release if it is not plainly

unreasonable. United States v. Thompson,

595 F.3d 544, 546

(4th

Cir. 2010). The first step in this review requires a

determination of whether the sentence is unreasonable. Crudup,

461 F.3d at 438

. Only if the sentence is procedurally or

2 substantively unreasonable does the inquiry proceed to the

second step of the analysis to determine whether the sentence is

plainly unreasonable.

Id. at 438-39

.

A supervised release revocation sentence is

procedurally reasonable if the district court considered the

advisory policy statement range based upon Chapter Seven of the

Sentencing Guidelines and the

18 U.S.C. § 3553

(a) (2006) factors

applicable to supervised release revocation. See

18 U.S.C. § 3583

(e) (2006); Crudup,

461 F.3d at 438-40

. A sentence is

substantively reasonable if the district court stated a proper

basis for concluding the defendant should receive the sentence

imposed, up to the statutory maximum. Crudup,

461 F.3d at 440

.

“A court need not be as detailed or specific when imposing a

revocation sentence as it must be when imposing a post-

conviction sentence, but it still must provide a statement of

reasons for the sentence imposed.” Thompson,

595 F.3d at 547

(internal quotation marks omitted).

Page argues that his sentence is greater than

necessary to accomplish the goals of supervised release. We

disagree. The district court adequately explained the sentence

imposed, and we do not find that the sentence was any greater

than necessary.

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record

in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.

3 Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. This

court requires that counsel inform Page, in writing, of the

right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for

further review. If Page requests that a petition be filed, but

counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then

counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof

was served on Page.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional

process.

AFFIRMED

4

Reference

Status
Unpublished