UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-4124

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

DANIEL EDUARDO PINEDA-ZELAYA, a/k/a Daniel Edgardo Rodriquez, a/k/a Sarco,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever III, District Judge. (7:09-cr-00100-D-5)

Submitted: October 25, 2011 Decided: November 4, 2011

Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Mark E. Edwards, EDWARDS & TRENKLE, PLLC, Durham, North Carolina, for Appellant. George E. B. Holding, United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Ethan A. Ontjes, Assistant United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM:

Daniel Eduardo Pineda-Zelaya appeals his conviction

for robbery, in violation of

(2006); conspiracy

to commit robbery, using and carrying a firearm during and in

relation to a crime of violence, in violation of

(c)(1)(A) (2006); aiding and abetting, in violation of

(2006); and illegal entry, in violation of

(a) (2006). On appeal, Pineda-Zelaya argues that the

district court erred in excluding testimony from both his gang

expert and a co-conspirator. Finding no error, we affirm.

Federal Rule of Evidence 702 permits expert witness

testimony if the expert’s “specialized knowledge will assist the

trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact

in issue.” “Rule 702 is broadly interpreted, and helpfulness to

the trier of fact is its touchstone. Testimony from an expert

is presumed to be helpful unless it concerns matters within the

everyday knowledge and experience of a lay juror.” Kopf v.

Skyrm,

(4th Cir. 1993) (internal citation and

quotation marks omitted). However, expert witnesses may not

“state an opinion or inference as to whether the defendant did

or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an

element of the crime charged or of a defense thereto.” Fed. R.

Evid. 704(b). Applying these standards, we conclude that the

district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding

2 testimony from the expert witness. See United States v. Wilson,

(4th Cir. 2007) (stating standard of review

for district court’s ruling on admissibility of expert witness

testimony).

Turning to the co-conspirator’s testimony, Federal

Rule of Evidence 608(b) allows cross-examination regarding

“[s]pecific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the

purpose of attacking or supporting the witness’ character for

truthfulness . . . in the discretion of the court, if probative

of truthfulness or untruthfulness.” See United States v. Leake,

(4th Cir. 1981) (“Rule 608 authorizes inquiry

only into instances of misconduct that are clearly probative of

truthfulness or untruthfulness, such as perjury, fraud,

swindling, forgery, bribery, and embezzlement.”). However, even

if testimony is relevant and admissible, “the probative value of

the evidence must not be substantially outweighed by its

prejudicial effect.” United States v. Wilson,

(4th Cir. 2010), petition for cert. filed, ___ S. Ct. __ (Feb.

4, 2011) (No. 10-8807); see Fed. R. Evid. 403 (“Although

relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,

confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury . . . .”).

“[I]n reviewing the trial court’s decision, [this court] must

look at the evidence in a light most favorable to its proponent,

3 maximizing its probative value and minimizing its prejudicial

effect.” United States v. Simpson,

(4th Cir.

1990) (internal quotation marks omitted). Upon a thorough

review of the record, we cannot conclude that the district court

abused its discretion in excluding testimony from the co-

conspirator. See United States v. Perkins,

(4th Cir. 2006) (discussing standard of review for district

court’s evidentiary rulings).

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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