Gary Niel Hood pled guilty to carjacking, 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (2006); using a firearm in commission of a carjacking, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2006); and possessing a firearm after having been convicted of a felony, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006). On appeal, he argues that the district court imposed improper conditions of supervised release. We affirm.

The contested conditions of supervised release include psycho-sexual evaluations, psychological testing, possible sex-offender treatment, and a ban against possessing child pornography and simulated child pornography. Because “[district courts have broad latitude to impose conditions on supervised release,” we review such conditions only for abuse of discretion. United States v. Armel, 585 F.3d 182, 186 (4th Cir. 2009). The sentencing court may impose any condition that is reasonably related to the relevant statutory sentencing factors. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006); Armel, 585 F.3d at 186.

*118 In light of the broad discretion afforded district courts in the imposition of supervised release conditions and in light of Hood’s particular criminal history, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the challenged conditions of supervised release.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED.