Filed: December 6, 2012

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-4953 (4:11-cr-00416-TLW-5)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

SHAWN JERMAINE DAVIS, a/k/a Big Boy,

Defendant - Appellant.

O R D E R

The Court amends its opinion filed October 2, 2012, as

follows:

On page 5, section IV, first paragraph, lines 3 and 4,

-- the sentence “Counsel’s motion to withdraw is denied at this

time” is deleted; and the name “Pratt” in the final line is

corrected to read “Davis.”

For the Court – By Direction

/s/ Patricia S. Connor Clerk UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-4953

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

SHAWN JERMAINE DAVIS, a/k/a Big Boy,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Florence. Terry L. Wooten, District Judge. (4:11-cr-00416-TLW-5)

Submitted: September 17, 2012 Decided: October 2, 2012

Before MOTZ, WYNN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

John M. Ervin, III, Darlington, South Carolina, for Appellant. Alfred William Walker Bethea, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM:

Shawn Jermaine Davis pled guilty in accordance with a

written plea agreement to conspiracy to distribute five

kilograms or more of cocaine, 280 grams or more of cocaine base,

fifty kilograms or more of marijuana, and a quantity of

methamphetamine, in violation of

(2006). He was

sentenced to 264 months in prison. Davis now appeals. His

attorney has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v.

California,

(1967), raising two issues but

concluding that there are no meritorious issues for appeal.

Davis has filed a pro se supplemental brief raising an

additional issue. We affirm.

I

In the Anders brief, counsel questions whether the

district court complied with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11. Our review of

the transcript of the Rule 11 proceeding discloses full

compliance with the Rule. Further, the record reflects that

Davis’ plea was knowing and voluntary and that there was a

factual basis for the plea. We therefore affirm the conviction.

II

Counsel next questions whether the sentence is

reasonable. Davis’ advisory Guidelines range was 262-327

2 months. There were no objections to the presentence

investigation report, which the court adopted. In imposing

sentence, the district court considered the Guidelines range,

the

(a) (West Supp. 2011) factors, and the

arguments of counsel. * Further, the court mentioned that: Davis’

offense was both significant and serious; he had an extensive

criminal history, including several drug convictions and a

conviction for a violent offense; he had served little time for

his past offenses; and he had shown no respect for the law.

Weighing in Davis’ favor was the fact that he had cooperated

with the United States.

We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying an

abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States,

(2007). This review requires consideration of both the

procedural and substantive reasonableness of the sentence.

We first determine whether the district court correctly

calculated the defendant’s advisory Guidelines range, considered

the applicable § 3553(a) factors, analyzed the arguments

presented by the parties, and sufficiently explained the

selected sentence. United States v. Lynn,

(4th Cir. 2010). With respect to the explanation of the

sentence, the court “must place on the record an individualized

* Davis declined allocution.

3 assessment based on the particular facts of the case before it.”

United States v. Carter,

(4th Cir. 2009). If

the sentence is free of procedural error, we then review the

substantive reasonableness of the sentence. Lynn,

. This review requires us to consider the totality of the

circumstances and to decide “whether the sentence was

reasonable—i.e., whether the [d]istrict [j]udge abused his

discretion in determining that the § 3553(a) factors supported”

the selected sentence. Gall,

.

We conclude that the district court did not abuse its

discretion in imposing the 264-month sentence. The court fully

complied with the required procedures, properly calculating the

Guidelines range, considering the arguments presented, providing

an individualized assessment, and taking into account the

§ 3553(a) factors. The sentence, which falls within the

Guidelines range, is presumptively reasonable, see United

States v. Go,

(4th Cir. 2008), and Davis did

not rebut this presumption.

III

In his pro se brief, Davis claims that his attorney

was ineffective. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel

generally are not cognizable on direct appeal unless the record

conclusively establishes counsel’s “objectively unreasonable

4 performance” and resulting prejudice. United States v. Benton,

(4th Cir. 2008). Rather, to allow for

adequate development of the record, a defendant ordinarily must

bring an ineffectiveness claim in a

(West

Supp. 2011) motion. United States v. Baptiste,

,

216 n.1 (4th Cir. 2010). After reviewing the record, especially

the transcript of sentencing, we conclude that ineffectiveness

does not conclusively appear on the record. We therefore

decline to address the merits of the claim.

IV

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record

in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.

We therefore affirm Davis’ conviction and sentence. This court

requires that counsel inform Davis, in writing, of the right to

petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further

review. If Davis requests that a petition be filed, but counsel

believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel

may move in this court for leave to withdraw from

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof

was served on Davis.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

5 before the court and argument would not aid the decisional

process.

AFFIRMED

6