UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4103

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

STEPHANIE CHAPMAN,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Liam O’Grady, District Judge. (1:13-cr-00298-LO-1)

Submitted: December 19, 2014 Decided: January 7, 2015

Amended: January 8, 2015

Before NIEMEYER and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Alfred L. Robertson, Jr., ROBERTSON LAW OFFICE, PLLC, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Dana J. Boente, United States Attorney, Michael J. Frank, Assistant United States Attorney, Stacey K. Luck, Special Assistant United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM:

A federal jury convicted Stephanie Chapman of

conspiracy to commit sex trafficking of a child, sex trafficking

of a child, and interstate transportation of a minor for

purposes of prostitution, in violation of

,

1591(a)(1), 1594(c), 2423 (2012). The district court sentenced

Chapman to a total of eleven years’ imprisonment, and she now

appeals. Finding no error, we affirm.

Chapman first argues that insufficient evidence

supported the jury’s finding of guilt. Specifically, Chapman

contends that the Government failed to prove that (1) she

benefitted financially; (2) she had knowledge or reckless

disregard of Jane Doe’s age; and (3) violence, threats of

violence, or coercion were used to engage Jane Doe in

prostitution. By these assertions, Chapman challenges the

Government’s proof of the elements of sex trafficking of a

child, in violation of

(a). She does not

however, address elements of the other charges against her in

the indictment. See

, 2423, 1594. By failing to

brief these issues, Chapman has waived review of them. See

United States v. Al-Hamdi,

, 571 n.8 (4th Cir. 2004)

(“It is a well settled rule that contentions not raised in the

argument section of the opening brief are abandoned.”).

2 We review challenges to the sufficiency of evidence de

novo. United States v. Roe,

(4th Cir. 2010).

“The standard for reversing a jury verdict of guilty is a high

one: the Court does so only where the prosecution’s failure is

clear.” United States v. Perry,

(4th Cir.

2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The jury’s verdict

must be upheld on appeal if there is substantial evidence in the

record to support it, where substantial evidence is evidence

that a reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and

sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond

a reasonable doubt.”

(internal quotation marks omitted).

In assessing evidentiary sufficiency, the evidence and

reasonable inferences drawn therefrom are viewed in the light

most favorable to the Government.

We do not reassess the

jury’s determinations of witness credibility. United States v.

Kelly,

(4th Cir. 2007).

In order to convict a defendant of a violation of

§ 1591(a)(1), the government must prove that the defendant:

(1) knowingly recruited, transported, harbored, maintained,

obtained, or enticed a person, (2) in or affecting interstate

commerce, (3) knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that

the victim had not attained the age of eighteen years and would

be made to engage in a commercial sex act. United States v.

Garcia–Gonzalez,

(5th Cir. 2013). However,

3 “[i]n a prosecution under subsection (a)(1) in which the

defendant had a reasonable opportunity to observe the person so

recruited, enticed, harbored, transported, provided, obtained or

maintained, the Government need not prove that the defendant

knew that the person had not attained the age of 18 years.”

(c). We have thoroughly reviewed the record and

conclude that there was substantial evidence of Chapman’s guilt

of the offenses.

Chapman also argues that the district court erred by

denying her request to issue a jury instruction on mistake of

fact. We review for abuse of discretion the district court’s

refusal to give a particular jury instruction. United States v.

Shrader,

(4th Cir. 2012). The district

court’s refusal to grant a requested jury instruction is

reversible error only if the proffered instruction was

“(1) correct; (2) not substantially covered by the court’s

charge; and (3) dealing with some point in the trial so

important, that failure to give the requested instruction

seriously impaired the defendant’s ability to conduct [her]

defense.”

When jury instructions are challenged on appeal,

the issue is whether “the instructions, taken as a whole,

adequately state the controlling law.” United States v. Bolden,

(4th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks

omitted). We have thoroughly reviewed the record and conclude

4 that the district court did not abuse its discretion in

declining to give Chapman’s proposed jury instruction.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district

court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional

process.

AFFIRMED

5