UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-2069

RICHARD MARTIN,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

BALTIMORE CITY POLICE,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt. George Jarrod Hazel, District Judge. (8:15-cv-02430-GJH)

Submitted: December 15, 2015 Decided: December 17, 2015

Before GREGORY and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Richard Martin, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM:

Richard Martin appeals the district court’s order

dismissing his civil action pursuant to

(e)(2)

(2012). For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

On appeal, Martin challenges the district court’s

conclusion that his claims were untimely. Martin’s claims,

whether brought under state law or

(2012), were

subject to, at longest, a three-year statute of limitations.

See

(2013) (general

civil statute of limitations);

(2013) (actions for assault and defamation); Owens v.

Balt. City State’s Attorneys Office,

(4th Cir.

2014) (§ 1983 claims), cert. denied,

(2015).

While Martin’s malicious prosecution claim has not yet accrued,

this claim is barred by his inability to meet the favorable

termination requirement. See Heron v. Strader,

(Md. 2000). Contrary to Martin’s assertions, the facts alleged

in the complaint demonstrate that his remaining claims accrued,

at the latest, by the time he was released from prison, and the

limitations period was not subject to tolling. See A Soc’y

Without a Name v. Virginia,

(4th Cir. 2011)

(accrual under § 1983); Shailendra Kumar, P.A. v. Dhanda,

(Md. 2012) (discussing accrual and

tolling under state law); see also Nat’l Advert. Co. v. Raleigh,

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(4th Cir. 1991) (describing continuing

violations doctrine). Finally, because Martin’s claims were

properly dismissed, the district court committed no error in

denying as moot Martin’s request to file electronically.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We

deny Martin’s motions to seal and to compel. We dispense with

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the materials before this court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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