Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

Steven Michael Hawley pled guilty, without the benefit of a plea agreement, to possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2) (2012). The district court imposed a sentence of 60 months’ imprisonment, 14 months above the top of the Sentencing Guidelines range established by the district court, and he now appeals. On appeal, Hawley argues that the district court failed to adequately explain the sentence imposed, failed to consider all of the relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors, and failed to address Hawley’s nonfrivo-lous arguments in favor of a lower sentence. We affirm.

We review the reasonableness of a sentence “under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). This entails review of the procedural and substantive reasonableness of the sentence. * Id. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586. “Procedural errors include ‘... improperly calculating[ ] the Guidelines range, ... failing *330 to consider the § 3558(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence—including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.’ ” United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586). If the district court “decides that an outside-Guidelines sentence is warranted, [it] must consider the extent of the deviation and ensure that the justification is sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the variance.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 50, 128 S.Ct. 586. When departing from the Guidelines range, “a major departure should be supported by a more significant justification than a minor one.” Id.

Our review of the record confirms that the district court adequately explained the sentence imposed with reference to the relevant § 3553(a) factors. In rendering its sentence, the court focused in part on Hawley's purchase of the firearms to obtain drugs and on the discovery of one firearm at a drug-related crime scene in Maryland. It may be inferred that, when an individual sells firearms illegally with the specific intent of obtaining drugs in exchange, he reasonably understands that the firearms may end up being used in connection with drug offenses. Furthermore, as the district court noted, although Hawley was not charged with firearm trafficking, he did resell the firearms he purchased. Thus, the circumstances of Haw-ley’s crime could reasonably warrant an above-Guidelines sentence, as they reflect a more serious crime than a typical felon-in-possession case.

The district court also noted that Haw-ley habitually violated the terms of his release while awaiting sentencing. These repeated violations are indicative of an inability to comport his behavior with the expectations of society, and therefore reflect a greater risk of recidivism and potentially a need for greater deterrence. Finally, the district court cited one of Hawley’s previous crimes, the severe attack of two individuals that left one permanently blind in one eye, as a significant reason for the upward variance. Certainly, the fact that Hawley had a lengthy criminal history, including one crime that involved brutal violence, is a reasonable factor to consider when imposing a sentence.

Although the court did not explicitly delineate which § 3553(a) factors it was considering, the reasons that the court provided for imposing its sentence fit within several of the factors listed in § 3553(a), including the need for deterrence, to reflect the seriousness of the crime, and to protect the public. The court’s explanation was therefore sufficient for us to conclude that it considered the appropriate factors. See United States v. Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 381 (4th Cir. 2006) (“The context surrounding a district court’s explanation may imbue it with enough content for us to evaluate both whether the court considered the § 3553(a) factors and whether it did so properly.”).

Finally, Hawley argues that the sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the district court failed to account for counsel’s nonfrivolous arguments in favor of a sentence at the low end of the Guidelines range. In particular, Hawley contends that his substance abuse is a mitigating factor that the district court failed to appropriately consider. We have previously noted that “a district court’s explanation should provide some indication .., that it has also considered the potentially meritorious arguments raised by both parties about sentencing.” Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d at 380.

Despite the district court’s failure to explicitly address Hawley’s substance abuse, the record does not establish that the district court ignored that argument altogether. Hawley discussed his difficulty *331 with substance abuse during his allocution, and counsel likewise urged a low-Guidelines sentence based, in part, on Hawley’s struggle with substance abuse issues. The presentence report, which the court adopted in its entirety, discussed Hawley’s substance abuse at length and its relationship to his criminal history.

Significantly, the court included in its recommendation to the Bureau of Prisons that Hawley be placed in a facility that provides substance abuse treatment programs. Thus, the record sufficiently establishes that the court considered Hawley’s substance abuse but rejected the notion that such mitigating evidence should result in a within-Guidelines sentence. See Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d at 381. We therefore conclude that the sentence is procedurally sound.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED