Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

Randy McRae appeals from the district court’s order denying his Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), 60(b)(1), (6) motion to vacate the court’s prior order disbarring him from the practice of law before that court. We have reviewed the record and McRae’s corrected brief and find no reversible error. *

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying McRae’s request for relief under Rule 59(e). See Mayfield v. Nat’l Ass’n for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc., 674 F.3d 369, 378 (4th Cir. 2012) (stating standard of review). The request was not timely filed under the rule, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), and did not invoke an intervening change in controlling law, new evidence not available prior to the entry of the disbarment order, or a clear legal error. See Mayfield, 674 F.3d at 378 (setting forth grounds for granting a Rule 59(e) motion). We further conclude that McRae has not established a manifest injustice warranting the granting of Rule 59(e) relief. See id.; Robinson v. Wix Filtration Corp. LLC, 599 F.3d 403, 408-09 (4th Cir. 2010).

The district court also did not abuse its discretion in denying McRae’s request for relief under Rule 60(b)(1) and (6). See MLC Auto., LLC v. Town of S. Pines, 532 F.3d 269, 277 (4th Cir. 2008) (stating standard of review). The request did not establish excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)(1), see Robinson, 599 F.3d at 413, or extraordinary circumstances warranting relief under Rule 60(b)(6). See Buck v. Davis, — U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 759, 777-78, 197 L.Ed.2d 1 (2017). McRae’s arguments on appeal do not alter these conclusions.- Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order. In re McRae, No. 1:16-mc-00011 (D. Md. Apr. 12, 2017). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED