Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

Rimarlo Antonio Ragland appeals the district court’s order adopting in part the magistrate judge’s recommendation, dismissing Ragland’s civil complaint, and denying appointment of counsel. We conclude that the district court próperly dismissed Ragland’s claim pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (West 2012 & Supp. 2017), because the Defendants did not employ Rag-land, as required for an action under Title VII. The district court also appropriately dismissed Ragland’s claims for monetary relief under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985 (2012) because Defendants were immune from suit. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) (2012). We further conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in abstaining from exercising jurisdiction, pursuant to Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), over Ragland’s 18 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985 claims for injunctive relief. Finally, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to appoint counsel or exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Ragland’s state law claims.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. Ragland v. N.C. State Bd. of Educ., No. 5:16-cv-00288-FL (E.D.N.C. July 11, 2017). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED