Ivan Copeland v. S. Kassell
Ivan Copeland v. S. Kassell
Opinion
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 18-6274
IVAN A. COPELAND,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v.
S. KASSELL, Warden,
Respondent - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Clarksburg. Irene M. Keeley, Senior District Judge. (1:17-cv-00078-IMK)
Submitted: July 5, 2018 Decided: August 8, 2018
Before DUNCAN, KEENAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Ivan Alexander Copeland, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM:
Ivan Alexander Copeland, a federal prisoner, appeals the district court’s order
accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying relief on his
28 U.S.C. § 2241(2012) petition. Copeland sought to challenge his sentence as a career
offender based on Mathis v. United States,
136 S. Ct. 2243(2016). A federal defendant
must seek habeas relief under
28 U.S.C. § 2255(2012) and may only seek relief under
§ 2241 if a § 2255 motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.
See
28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (2012); United States v. Wheeler,
886 F.3d 415, 419(4th Cir.
2018); Fontanez v. O’Brien,
807 F.3d 84, 86(4th Cir. 2015); Prousalis v. Moore,
751 F.3d 272, 275(4th Cir. 2014); Rice v. Rivera,
617 F.3d 802, 807(4th Cir. 2010). The
requirements of the savings clause are jurisdictional. Wheeler,
886 F.3d at 424-26.
The district court determined that Copeland did not establish his entitlement to
application of the savings clause. After the district court’s decision issued, we held that
§ 2255 is inadequate and ineffective to test the legality of a sentence when:
(1) at the time of sentencing, settled law of this circuit or the Supreme Court established the legality of the sentence; (2) subsequent to the prisoner’s direct appeal and first § 2255 motion, the aforementioned settled substantive law changed and was deemed to apply retroactively on collateral review; (3) the prisoner is unable to meet the gatekeeping provisions of § 2255(h)(2) for second or successive motions; and (4) due to this retroactive change, the sentence now presents an error sufficiently grave to be deemed a fundamental defect.
Id. at 429. We have reviewed the record and conclude that Copeland fails to satisfy the
test in Wheeler, because Mathis has not been deemed to apply retroactively on collateral
review. See, e.g., Dimott v. United States,
881 F.3d 232, 234(1st Cir. 2018).
2 Accordingly, although we grant Copeland leave to proceed in forma pauperis, we
affirm the district court’s order. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
3
Reference
- Status
- Unpublished