United States v. Walter Boyd

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

United States v. Walter Boyd

Opinion

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-4416

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

WALTER EUBAKA BOYD,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder, Chief District Judge. (1:17-cr-00278-TDS-1)

Submitted: December 20, 2018 Decided: December 26, 2018

Before DIAZ and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North Carolina, Mireille P. Clough, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant. Matthew G.T. Martin, United States Attorney, Kyle D. Pousson, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM:

Walter Eubaka Boyd appeals the 120-month sentence imposed following his guilty

plea to possession of firearms and ammunition by a convicted felon, in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 922

(g) (2012). On appeal, Boyd raises two claims for relief: (1) that the

district court erred in imposing a Sentencing Guidelines enhancement for possessing a

firearm in connection with another felony offense, see U.S. Sentencing Guidelines

Manual § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) (2016); and (2) that the district court imposed a substantively

unreasonable sentence. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

We review a sentence for reasonableness, “appl[ying] a deferential abuse-of-

discretion standard.” United States v. Ketter,

908 F.3d 61, 67

(4th Cir. 2018) (internal

quotation marks omitted). We first must “ensure that the district court committed no

significant procedural error,” such as improperly calculating the Guidelines range, failing

to consider the

18 U.S.C. § 3553

(a) (2012) sentencing factors, or inadequately explaining

the sentence imposed. Gall v. United States,

552 U.S. 38, 51

(2007). If the sentence is

free from significant procedural error, we review it for substantive reasonableness,

“tak[ing] into account the totality of the circumstances.”

Id.

“Federal sentencing law

requires the district judge in every case to impose ‘a sentence sufficient, but not greater

than necessary, to comply with’ the purposes of federal sentencing, in light of the

Guidelines and other [sentencing] factors.” Freeman v. United States,

564 U.S. 522, 529

(2011) (quoting

18 U.S.C. § 3553

(a)).

With respect to Boyd’s Guidelines challenge, “it is unnecessary to vacate a

sentence based on an asserted [G]uidelines calculation error if we can determine from the

2 record that the asserted error is harmless.” United States v. McDonald,

850 F.3d 640, 643

(4th Cir.), cert. denied,

138 S. Ct. 208

(2017). Under this “assumed error harmlessness

inquiry,” “[a] Guidelines error is considered harmless if we determine that (1) the district

court would have reached the same result even if it had decided the [G]uidelines issue the

other way, and (2) the sentence would be reasonable even if the [G]uidelines issue had

been decided in the defendant’s favor.” United States v. Gomez-Jimenez,

750 F.3d 370, 382

(4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Our review of the record reveals that any error in Boyd’s USSG § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B)

enhancement is harmless. The district court clearly and expressly stated that it would

have varied upward to impose the same sentence, even if it had sustained Boyd’s

Guidelines objections. This alternative variant sentence readily satisfies the first prong of

the assumed error harmlessness inquiry.

Turning to the second prong, we conclude that Boyd’s 120-month sentence is

substantively reasonable. The district court provided a thorough explanation for the

sentence it imposed, grounded in the relevant § 3553(a) factors. The court acknowledged

Boyd’s argument in mitigation, particularly his mental health history, but declined his

invitation to vary downward, instead relying largely on his offense conduct and criminal

history to conclude that a statutory maximum sentence was warranted. The court detailed

the dangerous nature of Boyd’s offense and his lengthy history of numerous prior

convictions, many of which were for weapons offenses. Concluding that Boyd had not

been deterred by multiple prior firearm convictions, the court grounded its sentence in the

need to impose just punishment, to promote respect for the law, and to protect the public

3 from future crimes Boyd might commit. Because we conclude that these compelling

considerations support the sentence Boyd received, notwithstanding his arguments in

mitigation, we conclude that any error in the Guidelines calculation was harmless. For

the same reason, we reject Boyd’s challenge to the substantive reasonableness of his

sentence.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the

materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

4

Reference

Status
Unpublished