United States v. James Bostic

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

United States v. James Bostic

Opinion

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-4256

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JAMES BOSTIC,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Malcolm J. Howard, Senior District Judge. (5:17-cr-00093-H-1)

Submitted: November 30, 2018 Decided: December 26, 2018

Before KING, HARRIS, and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Rudolph A. Ashton, III, DUNN PITTMAN SKINNER & CUSHMAN, PLLC, New Bern, North Carolina, for Appellant. Robert J. Higdon, Jr., United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States Attorney, Seth M. Wood, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM:

Pursuant to his plea of guilty, a magistrate judge convicted James Bostic of

knowingly possessing a prohibited item in federal prison, in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 1791

(a)(2), (b)(2) (2012). The magistrate judge sentenced Bostic to 3 months of

incarceration, to be served consecutively to his previously-imposed 168-month sentence,

and 1 year of supervised release, to be run concurrently with his previously-imposed term

of supervised release. Bostic appealed to the district court, and the district court affirmed

the criminal judgment. Bostic now appeals the district court’s order. We affirm.

On appeal, Bostic claims that the Bureau of Prisons failed to follow its own

regulations by not suspending its investigation of Bostic when it became clear that the

matter would be referred for criminal prosecution. Bostic contends that, by continuing its

investigation, the Bureau of Prisons obtained admissions from him that were later used to

support his criminal prosecution. Bostic further argues that the Government’s use of

admissions obtained in the administrative proceedings violated his Fifth Amendment

right against self-incrimination.

“It is the general rule that when a defendant pleads guilty, he waives all

nonjurisdictional defects in the proceedings conducted prior to entry of the plea.” United

States v. Fitzgerald,

820 F.3d 107, 110

(4th Cir. 2016) (alterations and internal quotation

marks omitted); see Tollett v. Henderson,

411 U.S. 258, 267

(1973) (“When a criminal

defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with

which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the

deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.”).

2 “A valid guilty plea . . . renders irrelevant—and thereby prevents the defendant from

appealing—the constitutionality of case-related government conduct that takes place

before the plea is entered.” Class v. United States,

138 S. Ct. 798, 805

(2018). A

defendant’s guilty plea “represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in

the criminal process.” Tollett,

411 U.S. at 267

. “Thus, the defendant who has pled guilty

has no non-jurisdictional ground upon which to attack [a] judgment except the

inadequacy of the plea or the [G]overnment’s power to bring any indictment at all.”

United States v. Moussaoui,

591 F.3d 263, 279

(4th Cir. 2010) (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted).

Bostic pled guilty to the single count in the indictment without reserving his right

to appeal under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2). Thus, Bostic is foreclosed from appealing

nonjurisdictional defects, including allegations that evidence was obtained illegally.

Bostic’s attempt to characterize his claim as a challenge to the process by which the

Government sought the indictment is unpersuasive.

Even if Bostic’s claims were not foreclosed by his unconditional guilty plea, we

would find them to be meritless. Utilizing the same standard of review employed by the

district court, our review is for plain error. See United States v. Bursey,

416 F.3d 301, 305-06

(4th Cir. 2005). To establish plain error, “there must be an error . . . , the error

must be plain—that is to say, clear or obvious . . . , the error must have affected the

defendant’s substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means he . . . must show a

reasonable probability that, but for the error, the outcome of the proceeding would have

been different, [and] . . . the error [must] seriously affect[] the fairness, integrity or public

3 reputation of judicial proceedings.” Molina-Martinez v. United States,

136 S. Ct. 1338, 1343

(2016) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, given the

uncontested evidence of a prison official’s eyewitness account, we conclude that Bostic

fails to establish that any purported error affected his substantial rights or seriously

affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.

Accordingly, we affirm the criminal judgment. We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

4

Reference

Status
Unpublished