UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-4629

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. DARRELL ALAN PELL, Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen, Jr., District Judge. (1:19-cr-00023-WO-9)

Submitted: February 18, 2020 Decided: February 20, 2020

Before MOTZ, HARRIS, and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

George E. Crump, III, Rockingham, North Carolina, for Appellant.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM: Darrell Alan Pell pled guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), 846 (2018).

Pell’s counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning whether Pell’s 50-month sentence was reasonable. We affirm.

We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying “a deferential abuse-of- discretion standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). This review entails appellate consideration of both the procedural and substantive reasonableness of the sentence. Id. at 51. In assessing procedural reasonableness, we consider whether the district court properly calculated the defendant’s advisory Sentencing Guidelines range, gave the parties an opportunity to argue for an appropriate sentence, considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2018) factors, and sufficiently explained the selected sentence. Id. at 49-51. “Under the law of this circuit a district court must address or consider all non- frivolous reasons presented for imposing a different sentence and explain why he has rejected those arguments.” United States v. Ross, 912 F.3d 740, 744 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 206 (2019).

If there are no procedural errors, then we consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, evaluating “the totality of the circumstances.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. A sentence is presumptively reasonable if it is within or below the defendant’s Guidelines range, and this “presumption can only be rebutted by showing that the sentence is

unreasonable when measured against the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir. 2014).

The district court properly calculated Pell’s Guidelines range as 57 to 71 months and granted in part Pell’s motion for a downward variance, appropriately addressing the parties’ arguments and explaining, in light of the § 3553(a) factors, the court’s conclusion that a sentence of 50 months, rather than 24 to 36 months as requested by Pell, was the proper sentence. Moreover, nothing in the record rebuts the presumption of reasonableness attached to Pell’s below-Guidelines sentence.

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have found no meritorious grounds for appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.

This court requires that counsel inform Pell, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Pell requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Pell.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED