Stephen Nivens v. J. Morgan
Stephen Nivens v. J. Morgan
Opinion
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 19-7790
STEPHEN NIVENS,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v.
J. PHILLIP MORGAN, Warden; ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND,
Respondents - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt. Theodore D. Chuang, District Judge. (8:16-cv-02648-TDC)
Submitted: November 30, 2020 Decided: December 14, 2020
Before WYNN, DIAZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part, dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Stephen Nivens, Appellant Pro Se. Jer Welter, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM:
Stephen Nivens appeals the district court’s order denying relief on his
28 U.S.C. § 2254petition. Due in part to the record’s omission of Nivens’ charging instrument, we
granted a partial certificate of appealability on Nivens’ claim that, in violation of the
Double Jeopardy Clause, the prosecution charged and obtained a conviction for an offense
that it had previously abandoned at trial. Now, with the benefit of a supplemented record,
we affirm in part and dismiss in part.
To appeal the denial of a § 2254 petition, a petitioner must obtain a certificate of
appealability from a circuit justice or judge.
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). For claims on
which a certificate of appealability has been granted, we review the denial of habeas relief
de novo. Grueninger v. Dir., Va. Dep’t of Corr.,
813 F.3d 517, 523(4th Cir. 2016).
Nivens’ indictment—included as part of the supplemental record—confirms that no
double jeopardy violation occurred. At trial, the prosecution abandoned a charge of
breaking and entering with the intent to commit a theft of less than $300 (Count 6), and the
jury found Nivens guilty of burglary with intent to commit a sex offense (Count 5). Due
to an evidentiary error, the conviction on Count 5 was vacated on appeal. Thereafter,
Nivens entered an Alford * plea to Count 5—the conviction he challenges here.
Throughout his state and federal postconviction proceedings, Nivens has argued that
Counts 5 and 6 were the same, so the prosecution’s abandonment of Count 6 precluded his
subsequent Alford plea to Count 5. See United States v. Schnittker,
807 F.3d 77, 81(4th
* North Carolina v. Alford,
400 U.S. 25(1970).
2 Cir. 2015) (noting that prohibition against double jeopardy protects a defendant from being
convicted of two charges that “are in law and in fact the same offense” (internal quotation
marks omitted)). However, the record now makes clear that Count 6 was markedly
different from Count 5, as the former involved the intent to commit a petty theft while the
latter involved the intent to commit a sex offense. Accordingly, we affirm the part of the
district court’s order denying relief on this claim.
Turning to Nivens’ other habeas claims, a certificate of appealability will not issue
absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.”
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this
standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists could find the district court’s assessment
of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong. See Buck v. Davis,
137 S. Ct. 759, 773-74(2017). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must
demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable and that the petition
states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Gonzalez v. Thaler,
565 U.S. 134, 140-41(2012) (citing Slack v. McDaniel,
529 U.S. 473, 484(2000)).
We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Nivens has not made
the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny Nivens’ motion for a certificate of
appealability and dismiss the remainder of the appeal. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART, DISMISSED IN PART
3
Reference
- Status
- Unpublished