United States v. Kwame Crawford
United States v. Kwame Crawford
Opinion
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 19-4615
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
KWAME HAKEEM CRAWFORD,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Max O. Cogburn, Jr., District Judge. (3:18-cr-00262-MOC-DSC-1)
Submitted: December 22, 2020 Decided: January 4, 2021
Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and AGEE and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Anthony Martinez, Federal Public Defender, Ann L. Hester, Assistant Federal Public Defender, FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA, INC., Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. R. Andrew Murray, United States Attorney, Anthony J. Enright, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM:
Kwame Hakeem Crawford appeals the 100-month sentence that the district court
imposed following Crawford’s guilty plea to possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation
of
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Crawford contends that the district court erroneously applied a
four-level Sentencing Guidelines enhancement for possession of a firearm in connection
with another felony offense and a two-level enhancement for reckless endangerment during
flight. Finding no error, we affirm.
We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying “a deferential abuse-of-
discretion standard.” Gall v. United States,
552 U.S. 38, 41(2007). This review entails
appellate consideration of both the procedural and substantive reasonableness of the
sentence.
Id. at 51. In assessing procedural reasonableness, we consider whether the
district court properly calculated the defendant’s advisory Guidelines range, gave the
parties an opportunity to argue for an appropriate sentence, considered the
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, and sufficiently explained the selected sentence.
Id. at 49-51. “In
assessing the district court’s calculation of the Guidelines range, we review its legal
conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error.” United States v. Cox,
744 F.3d 305, 308(4th Cir. 2014). The Government must show by a preponderance of the
evidence that a Guidelines enhancement applies. United States v. Blauvelt,
638 F.3d 281, 293(4th Cir. 2011).
A defendant who “used or possessed any firearm or ammunition in connection with
another felony offense” is subject to a four-level enhancement in offense level. U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) (2018). This enhancement “appl[ies] if
2 the firearm or ammunition facilitated, or had the potential of facilitating, another felony
offense.” USSG § 2K2.1 cmt. n.14(A). “This requirement is satisfied if the firearm had
some purpose or effect with respect to the other offense, including if the firearm was
present for protection or to embolden the actor.” United States v. Jenkins,
566 F.3d 160, 162(4th Cir. 2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The district court found that the Government satisfied its burden of establishing that
Crawford discharged a firearm into an occupied vehicle, in violation of N.C. Gen Stat.
§ 14-34.1(a). Crawford does not contest that he fired shots into an occupied vehicle but
asserts that the district court should not have applied the enhancement because Crawford
acted in self-defense under North Carolina law. We have reviewed the record and conclude
that the district court did not err in rejecting Crawford’s assertion of self-defense and
concluding that Crawford possessed the firearm in connection with the felony offense of
discharging a firearm into an occupied vehicle.
Crawford also contends that the district court improperly applied a two-level
enhancement for reckless endangerment. The reckless endangerment Guideline states: “If
the defendant recklessly created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to
another person in the course of fleeing from a law enforcement officer, increase [the
offense level] by [two] levels.” USSG § 3C1.2. This “Guideline is based on the risk
created by the defendant’s conduct and does not require that his conduct actually caused
physical harm.” United States v. Dennings,
922 F.3d 232, 236(4th Cir. 2019). We
conclude that the district court did not err in applying the reckless endangerment
enhancement, given that, after police officers witnessed Crawford open fire at an occupied
3 automobile, Crawford fled from the officers while carrying a firearm, ignored the officers’
commands to stop, dropped the firearm, picked it up again, and later threw it over a fence
in a residential neighborhood. See
id. at 237.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this
court and argument would not aid in the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
4
Reference
- Status
- Unpublished