USCA4 Appeal: 22-4229 Doc: 23 Filed: 12/15/2022 Pg: 1 of 5

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 22-4229

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

TRACEY LAMONT COAD,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen, Jr., District Judge. (1:13-cr-00300-WO-1)

Submitted: December 9, 2022 Decided: December 15, 2022

Before WYNN and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: William Stimson Trivette, WILLIAM S. TRIVETTE, ATTORNEY AT LAW, PLLC, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Sandra J. Hairston, United States Attorney, Frank J. Chut, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 22-4229 Doc: 23 Filed: 12/15/2022 Pg: 2 of 5

PER CURIAM:

After serving a 97-month prison term following his conviction for possession of a

firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of

(g)(1), Tracey Lamont Coad

began service of a 3-year term of supervised release. Before expiration of that term, Coad’s

probation officer petitioned the district court to revoke his supervised release, alleging he

had violated the conditions of supervision by (1) testing positive for marijuana eight times

in 2020 and 2021 and testing positive for methamphetamine once in 2021 and (2) failing

to notify the probation officer ten days before moving from his approved residence.

Following a hearing at which Coad testified and admitted he had not been in contact with

his probation officer after August 21, 2021, and had tested positive for marijuana and

methamphetamine as alleged in the petition but denied any willful use of

methamphetamine, the district court found he had committed both violations and revoked

his supervised release. The court sentenced Coad to 14 months’ imprisonment. On appeal,

Coad argues that this sentence is plainly unreasonable. We affirm.

“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a sentence upon revocation of

supervised release.” United States v. Patterson,

(4th Cir. 2020). We will

affirm a revocation sentence “if it is within the statutory maximum and is not plainly

unreasonable.”

In determining whether a revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable,

we must first determine whether the sentence is procedurally or substantively

unreasonable. United States v. Slappy,

(4th Cir. 2017). In making this

determination, we are guided by “the same procedural and substantive considerations that

guide our review of original sentences,” but take “a more deferential appellate posture than

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we do when reviewing original sentences.” United States v. Padgett,

(4th Cir. 2015) (cleaned up).

“A [supervised release] revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district

court adequately explains the chosen sentence after considering the Sentencing Guidelines’

nonbinding Chapter Seven policy statements and the applicable

(a)

factors.” United States v. Coston,

(4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation

marks omitted); see

(e) (listing applicable factors). “[A]lthough the court

need not be as detailed or specific when imposing a revocation sentence as it must be when

imposing a post-conviction sentence, it still must provide a statement of reasons for the

sentence imposed.” Slappy,

(cleaned up). The court’s explanation also

must provide us assurance that it considered any potentially meritorious arguments raised

by the parties as to the appropriate sentence to be imposed. United States v. Gibbs,

(4th Cir. 2018). “A revocation sentence is substantively reasonable if,

in light of the totality of the circumstances, the [district] court states an appropriate basis

for concluding that the defendant should receive the sentence imposed.” Coston,

(internal quotation marks omitted). A revocation sentence falling within the

recommended policy statement range under the Guidelines is presumed reasonable. Gibbs,

.

Only if we find a revocation sentence unreasonable do we consider whether the

sentence “is plainly so, relying on the definition of plain used in our plain error analysis-that

is, clear or obvious.” Slappy,

(cleaned up). “If a revocation sentence-even

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an unreasonable one-is not plainly unreasonable, we will affirm it.”

(internal quotation

marks omitted).

We find no unreasonableness in Coad’s revocation sentence. The 14-month prison

term does not exceed the applicable statutory maximum, and Coad agrees the district court

properly calculated his advisory policy statement range under the Guidelines at 8 to 14

months’ imprisonment. The district court heard Coad’s testimony and allocution and

argument from defense counsel and, after considering these matters and the policy

statement range, explained its reasons for imposing sentence. Although not couched in the

precise language of applicable § 3553(a) sentencing factors and factors applicable for

consideration under the Guidelines, the district court’s reasons for imposing sentence are

easily matched to factors appropriate for consideration in the revocation sentencing context

and tied to Coad’s particular situation, namely, the nature and circumstances of his

violative conduct, his history and characteristics, and the sanctioning of his acts in

breaching trust while on release, see

(a)(1), 3583(e); U.S. Sentencing

Guidelines Manual ch. 7, pt. A, introductory cmt. 3(b) (“[A]t revocation the [district] court

should sanction primarily the defendant’s breach of trust.”). Coad’s appellate contention

that the term is too severe because the district court did not credit his explanation for his

violative conduct does not overcome the presumption of reasonableness afforded to his

within-policy-statement-range prison term. The term is not unreasonable and therefore is

not plainly unreasonable.

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We thus affirm the revocation judgment. We dispense with oral argument because

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court

and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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