USCA4 Appeal: 21-1085 Doc: 50 Filed: 04/19/2023 Pg: 1 of 30

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 21-1085

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA; SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL; SAVANNAH RIVER MARITIME COMMISSION; AUGUSTA, GEORGIA,

Plaintiffs − Appellees,

and

SAVANNAH RIVERKEEPER, INC.,

Intervenor/Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS; UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS SAVANNAH DISTRICT; CHRISTINE WORMUTH, in her official capacity as Secretary of the Army; LIEUTENANT GENERAL TODD T. SEMONITE, in his official capacity as Commanding General and Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; MAJOR GENERAL DIANA M. HOLLAND, in her official capacity as Commanding General, South Atlantic Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; COLONEL DANIEL H. HIBNER, in his official capacity as District Engineer, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Savannah District,

Defendants – Appellants,

and

GEORGIA PORTS AUTHORITY,

Intervenor/Defendant.

------------------------------ USCA4 Appeal: 21-1085 Doc: 50 Filed: 04/19/2023 Pg: 2 of 30

CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF GREATER AUGUSTA, GEORGIA, INCORPORATED; PCS NITROGEN FERTILIZER, L.P.,

Amici Supporting Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Aiken. Richard M. Gergel, District Judge. (1:19−cv−03132−RMG)

Argued: January 27, 2023 Decided: April 19, 2023

Before NIEMEYER, KING, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Vacated and remanded by published opinion. Judge Diaz wrote the opinion, in which Judge King joined. Judge Niemeyer wrote a dissenting opinion.

ARGUED: Michael Thomas Gray, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Jacksonville, Florida, for Appellants. Chad Nicholas Johnston, BURR & FORMAN LLP, Columbia, South Carolina; David Montgomery Moore, EARTH & WATER LAW, LLC, Atlanta, Georgia, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Todd Kim, Assistant Attorney General, Robert P. Stockman, Environment and Natural Resources Division, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Jacksonville, Florida; Erica Zilioli, Phillip Paradise, UNITED STATES CORPS OF ENGINEERS, Washington, D.C., for Appellants. Randolph R. Lowell, BURR & FORMAN LLP, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellees. Susan Bodine, EARTH & WATER LAW, Atlanta, Georgia, for Intervenor/Appellee. Brian C. Lea, Atlanta, Georgia, Megan Lacy Owen, JONES DAY, Washington, D.C., for Amici Curiae.

2 USCA4 Appeal: 21-1085 Doc: 50 Filed: 04/19/2023 Pg: 3 of 30

DIAZ, Circuit Judge:

The New Savannah Bluff Lock and Dam sits on the Savannah River near Augusta,

Georgia. For over 80 years, the Dam has raised the height of the Savannah River around

it, creating a “pool” of water at the Augusta riverfront. The Augusta community uses the

pool for water supply and recreation. Locals dock their boats in the pool and fish from the

Dam, and crowds converge at the riverfront for an annual triathlon and regatta.

While popular with humans, the Dam has been less well received by the endangered

Atlantic and shortnose sturgeon that populate the Savannah River. Because the sturgeon

can’t pass through or over the dam, they aren’t able to migrate upstream to their historic

spawning grounds.

In passing the Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation Act (“WIIN Act”),

Congress directed the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to design a fish-passage structure for

the New Savannah Bluff Lock and Dam “that is able to maintain the pool for water supply

and recreational activities, as in existence on the date of enactment.” The Corps settled on

a design that would lower the pool of water by about three feet.

On appeal, we’re asked to interpret that provision of the WIIN Act. The district

court held that the Corps’ plan didn’t “maintain the pool” since it would lower it from its

height on the date of the Act’s enactment. But the Corps argues that this reading ignores

the clause “for water supply and recreational activities,” and that a lowered pool that still

fulfills these functions would comply with the Act.

Finding the Corps’ reading more persuasive, we vacate the judgment of the district

court and remand for further proceedings.

3 USCA4 Appeal: 21-1085 Doc: 50 Filed: 04/19/2023 Pg: 4 of 30

I.

A.

In 1999, Congress authorized the Savannah Harbor Expansion Project, a billion-

dollar undertaking to deepen and widen the Savannah River navigation channel. An

environmental impact study found that the project would adversely impact the ability of

Atlantic and shortnose sturgeon to reach their spawning grounds. To mitigate these effects

and bring the Project into compliance with the Endangered Species Act, 1 the federal

agencies decided to build a fish passage around the Dam that would allow the sturgeon to

migrate farther upstream.

But Congress upended the agencies’ plans for the fish-passage structure when it

passed the WIIN Act—a broad-ranging bill authorizing water projects across the country—

in 2016. See WIIN Act,

(b)(1)(A),

, 1703

(2016). The Act gave the Corps only two options for the planned fish-passage structure:

The Corps could repair the Dam and modify it to allow fish to pass over it.

§ 1319(c)(1)(A)(i). Or it could construct a fish-passage structure across the Savannah

River and demolish the Dam. Id. § 1319(c)(1)(A)(ii).

The Corps chose the latter option after conducting the required environmental

analyses and evaluating various designs and locations. The Corps’ design envisioned

removal of the Dam and construction of a 500-foot-wide in-channel rock weir—“a water

1 See

, which requires agencies to determine whether their actions may adversely impact an endangered or threatened species (and if so, to consult the National Marine Fisheries Service about mitigation measures). See also App. 270, 289.

4 USCA4 Appeal: 21-1085 Doc: 50 Filed: 04/19/2023 Pg: 5 of 30

damming and control structure that allows water to flow over its top”—in its place.

Appellants’ Br. at 13. The Corps projected that this structure would lower the pool about

three feet in normal conditions while allowing fish to pass over it and migrate upstream.

The Corps also modeled the effects of its design on the riverfront community,

concluding it wouldn’t adversely impact the water supply, fishing, large events, or the

“continued general use of boat docks.” App. 185. But a simulation the Corps ran in 2019

proved disastrous. During the simulation, the Corps drew the water level in the pool down

several feet, exposing mudflats for miles along the Savannah River. The drawdown test

ran docks aground and threatened Augusta’s water intake. The Corps ultimately had to

halt the test. 2

Undaunted, the Corps pressed ahead with its proposed design.

B.

The State of South Carolina and several of its agencies responded by suing the Corps

and various federal officials. Their complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief,

alleging that the Corps’ design violated the WIIN Act, the National Environmental Policy

Act, the Administrative Procedure Act, state law, a previous settlement agreement, and

2 The Corps blames the low water levels on unusual circumstances that day, to include a nearby dam undergoing maintenance and high recent rainfall that made the drop “appear more dramatic by comparison.” App. 748.

5 USCA4 Appeal: 21-1085 Doc: 50 Filed: 04/19/2023 Pg: 6 of 30

certain easements. The City of Augusta intervened as a plaintiff and the Georgia Ports

Authority intervened as a defendant. 3

The Corps moved to dismiss almost all the claims, including the WIIN Act claim,

for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. Plaintiffs moved for partial summary

judgment and for a preliminary injunction.

As relevant here, Plaintiffs charged that the WIIN Act “requires that any repair or

replacement structure of the [Dam] must maintain the pool at the same elevation as it was

on December 16, 2016,” when the Act was enacted—specifically, 114.76 feet NGVD29 4

at the gage immediately upstream of the Dam.

. Plaintiffs claimed that the Corps’

design would “dramatically lower the water elevation from the conditions that existed” on

that date. App. 60. And pointing to the failed drawdown test, Plaintiffs argued that the

“simulation did not maintain the pool for navigation, water supply, and recreational

activities, as in existence on December 16, 2016.”

3 We refer to Appellees South Carolina, the state agencies, and Augusta as “Plaintiffs,” and Appellants the Corps and related federal individual defendants as “the Corps.”

This unit, “National Geodetic Vertical Datum of 1929,” measures elevation above 4

mean sea level. 5 The U.S. Geological Survey operates a network of more than 11,000 gages that monitor the water levels of rivers and streams across the country. See Water Resources Mission Area, USGS Streamgaging Network, U.S. Geological Surv. (Apr. 27, 2021), www.usgs.gov/mission-areas/water-resources/science/usgs-streamgaging-network (last visited March 28, 2023). The district court relied on a daily average measurement taken at Gage 02196999, which sits just above the Dam.

6 USCA4 Appeal: 21-1085 Doc: 50 Filed: 04/19/2023 Pg: 7 of 30

The Corps responded that the WIIN Act didn’t require them to “maintain the pool”

at a specific level, but to preserve its use “for water supply and recreational activities” as

it existed on the day of enactment. Its chosen design satisfied this functionality

requirement, the Corps argued, because it wouldn’t affect the water supply and would

provide water sufficient for recreational activities.

The district court consolidated a hearing on the Corps’ motion to dismiss and

Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction with a trial on the merits of Plaintiffs’ WIIN

Act claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a)(2). Following the hearing, the court

entered judgment for Plaintiffs on their WIIN Act claim.

The WIIN Act, the court reasoned, “unambiguously requires the agency to construct

‘a structure that is able to maintain the pool for water supply and recreational activities’ at

a very precise level—that level existing on the date of the adoption of the Act.” App. 2592.

And there was “no dispute” that the Corps design couldn’t maintain that level.

The court found that the agency’s interpretation read the word “sufficient” into the

statute: i.e., “a structure that is able to maintain the pool sufficient for water supply and

recreational activities.”

But this concept of “functionality” was nowhere in the statute.

So the district court held that the Corps’ chosen design had exceeded its statutory authority.

The court also entered a permanent injunction barring the Corps “from

implementing [its design] and any other plan involving the removal of the Savannah Bluff

Lock and Dam if the proposal does not ‘maintain the pool’ that was in existence on the

date of the Act’s enactment, which was 114.76 feet NGVD29.” App. 2596.

This appeal followed.

7 USCA4 Appeal: 21-1085 Doc: 50 Filed: 04/19/2023 Pg: 8 of 30

II.

The issue before us is this: Did the district court err in concluding that, as a matter

of law, the Corps’ chosen design for the Savannah River project wasn’t “able to maintain

the pool for water supply and recreational activities, as in existence on the date of

enactment” of the WIIN Act?

We review questions of statutory interpretation and challenges to an agency’s

statutory authority de novo. Stone v. Instrumentation Lab’y Co.,

, 242–43

(4th Cir. 2009); Outdoor Amusement Bus. Ass’n v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,

,

679–80 (4th Cir. 2020). And we conclude that—by focusing solely on the water level in

the pool—the district court erred.

A.

At the outset, the parties dispute how to frame the district court’s order. According

to the Corps, the district court “concluded that any project that the Corps builds must keep

the pool at precisely 114.76 feet NGVD29” to avoid violating the WIIN Act. Appellants’

Br. at 23. But Plaintiffs say this is a strawman. They say that the court didn’t require the

Corps “to maintain a static pool, frozen at a precise water level”—rather, its references to

114.76 feet NGVD29 were just a “benchmark” against which to evaluate the Corps’ chosen

alternative. Appellees’ Br. at 26–27.

The Corps’ view finds some support in the district court’s order. The court found

as a fact that the Corps’ chosen design “does not maintain the pool that existed on

December 16, 2016, 114.76 feet NGVD29.” App. 2591. And the injunction the court

entered bars the Corps from adopting any proposal that doesn’t “‘maintain the pool’ that

8 USCA4 Appeal: 21-1085 Doc: 50 Filed: 04/19/2023 Pg: 9 of 30

was in existence on the date of the Act’s enactment, which was 114.76 feet NGVD29.”

App. 2596. Even still, we decline to read this language literally, for such an order would

be absurd. (As our dissenting colleague notes, even Plaintiffs don’t advance this reading.

See Dissent at 29.)

Ultimately, however, the dispute is auxiliary. The Corps hangs its hat on the

argument that “any interpretation of the WIIN Act that focuses on water elevations

inevitably leads to absurd results and cannot be correct, whether the elevation is a static

requirement or a malleable ‘benchmark.’” Reply Br. at 9. And the Corps admits that

“under normal conditions,” its design “would reduce the elevation of the pool by about

three feet immediately upstream of the Dam.” Appellants’ Br. at 1. So our inquiry is: Did

the district court err in finding that the Corps’ design violated the WIIN Act because it

doesn’t “meet the 114.76 standard . . . by at least 3 feet”? App. 2588 n.2. In other words,

should the court have looked instead at whether the pool would be maintained “for water

supply and recreational activities,” its precise elevation notwithstanding?

B.

To answer that question, the parties offer competing readings of the statutory text:

“a structure that is able to maintain the pool for water supply and recreational activities, as

in existence on the date of enactment of this Act.” WIIN Act § 1319(c)(1)(A)(ii). The

Corps contends that the clause beginning “as in existence” applies to “water supply and

recreational activities,” so the Corps “must maintain the pool for those purposes as they

existed when Congress passed the WIIN Act.” Appellants’ Br. at 32. Plaintiffs respond

that the statute “clearly requires that the pool itself be ‘maintain[ed]’ as in existence on the

9 USCA4 Appeal: 21-1085 Doc: 50 Filed: 04/19/2023 Pg: 10 of 30

date of the enactment,” and that the Corps’ interpretation imports a “functionality”

requirement not found in the statute. Appellees’ Br. at 31 (emphasis added). We think the

Corps has the better reading.

Before explaining why, we address a preliminary issue. The parties disagree

whether the Corps’ interpretation is entitled to Skidmore deference. See Skidmore v. Swift

& Co.,

(1944) (explaining that courts will give weight to an agency’s

interpretation “depend[ing] upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity

of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors

which give it power to persuade”). Because we find that Congress’s intent in the WIIN

Act was plain, however, we “need not explore that issue”; “If the intent of Congress is

clear, that is the end of the matter.” Power Fuels, LLC v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Rev.

Comm’n,

(4th Cir. 2015) (cleaned up).

1.

With Skidmore behind us, we turn to the text. To interpret a statute, “we look first

to its language, giving the words used their ordinary meaning.” Dwoskin v. Bank of Am.,

N.A.,

(4th Cir. 2018) (cleaned up). “We are [loath] to contradict the

established principle that statutes must be interpreted to give each word some operative

effect.” Crespo v. Holder,

(4th Cir. 2011) (cleaned up).

The district court found that the statute’s plain meaning was unambiguous: It

required the Corps to construct “a structure that is able to maintain the pool for water supply

and recreational activities” at “that level existing on the date of the adoption of the Act.”

App. 2592. But the Corps offers several reasons why we should doubt that reading.

10 USCA4 Appeal: 21-1085 Doc: 50 Filed: 04/19/2023 Pg: 11 of 30

First, the Corps invokes the canon against surplusage, which prescribes that “[a]

statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause,

sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.” Duncan v. Walker,

(2001) (cleaned up). As the Corps argues, the clause “for water supply and

recreational activities” is doing no work in the district court’s reading: The statute could

simply read “maintain the pool at that level existing on the date of the adoption of the Act”

and have the same meaning.

The Corps also points out that Congress phrased the other project option slightly

differently. If the Corps chose to repair and modify the existing Dam, the modified

structure would have “to maintain the pool for navigation, water supply, and recreational

activities, as in existence on the date of enactment of this Act.” WIIN Act

§ 1319(c)(1)(A)(i)(I) (emphasis added). The district court’s reading would ignore this

distinction—again, only the resulting height of the pool would matter.

Plaintiffs respond (and our friend in dissent agrees) that “for navigation, water

supply, and recreational activities” is a prepositional phrase whose only function is to

“add[] project purposes.” Appellees’ Br. at 33–34. In other words, the phrases in the

statute are merely “descriptive.” Id. at 40. But that verges on making them

“insignificant”—the statute would have “precisely the same content” if they were struck.

See Duncan,

. In the Corps’ reading, the prepositional phrases do real work.

The Corps would also have us apply the “rule of the last antecedent,” under which

“a limiting clause or phrase . . . should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or

phrase that it immediately follows.” Barnhart v. Thomas,

(2003). The

11 USCA4 Appeal: 21-1085 Doc: 50 Filed: 04/19/2023 Pg: 12 of 30

Corps argues the limiting clause “as in existence on the date of enactment of this Act”

immediately follows “water supply and recreational activities”—indicating that Congress

meant for the Corps to preserve the existing water supply and recreational functions.

Appellants’ Br. at 32–33. Or in the alternative, the Corps argues, the limiting clause

modifies the entire phrase “the pool for water supply and recreational activities.”

We find that the Corps’ alternative reading best aligns with Supreme Court

precedent. The rule of the last antecedent typically applies when a modifier is asked to

qualify “a remote or otherwise disconnected phrase,” so it would take “more than a little

mental energy” to stretch the modifier back. Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver Cnty. Emps. Ret. Fund,

(2018) (cleaned up). But when a modifier “directly follows a concise

and ‘integrated’ clause,” the Supreme Court has more often declined to apply the rule.

For example, in the phrase “The woman dressed to the nines carrying an umbrella, as

shown in the picture,” few would assume that only the umbrella is pictured.

Here, we likewise find that the “as in existence” clause modifies the entire integrated

phrase “the pool for water supply and recreational activities.” This reading gives effect to

every word in the statute.

The district court found the Corps’ interpretation flawed because it added the word

“sufficient”—i.e., the Corps must build a structure “able to maintain the pool [sufficient]

for water supply and recreational activities.” App. 2592. But “sufficient” is suggested by

the word “for,” which Merriam-Webster defines as “a function word to indicate purpose”

12 USCA4 Appeal: 21-1085 Doc: 50 Filed: 04/19/2023 Pg: 13 of 30

or an “intended goal.” 6 The purpose of “maintain[ing] the pool” was “for” the water supply

and recreational activities. Implicit in the word “for” is that the maintenance of the pool

will be “sufficient” to meet these purposes.

We conclude that the “as in existence” clause modifies “the pool for water supply

and recreational activities.” And to give effect to the “for” clause, the benchmark for

whether the Corps has “maintain[ed]” the pool is whether the pool supports the water-

supply and recreational uses in existence when Congress enacted the Act.

2.

There’s still more to commend the Corps’ reading of the Act. Because statutory

language “cannot be construed in a vacuum[,] [i]t is a fundamental canon of statutory

construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to

their place in the overall statutory scheme.” Roberts v. Sea-Land Servs., Inc.,

(2012) (cleaned up). Reasoning from context, the Corps makes a persuasive case that

the district court’s water level-based interpretation is unlikely and unworkable.

First, the Corps argues, Congress opted not to specify a water level in the text,

despite mentioning specific water levels in at least two other provisions of the WIIN Act.

See WIIN Act § 1307(a) (flowage easements at another project are “extinguished above

elevation 82.2 feet (NGVD29), the ordinary high water line”); id. § 3608(b)(11) (defining

“conservation storage capacity” at another project with a range of surface elevations). And

6 For, Merriam-Webster.com, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/for (last visited March 28, 2023).

13 USCA4 Appeal: 21-1085 Doc: 50 Filed: 04/19/2023 Pg: 14 of 30

in other statutes, Congress has ordered the Corps to maintain specific water levels. See,

e.g., Water Resources Development Act of 1988,

(a) (directing the

Secretary of the Army to “maintain water levels in the Mississippi River headwaters

reservoirs within [specific] operating limits[.]”). We think it reasonable to infer that, had

Congress intended to require a specific water level for the pool, it would have “used

language similar to what it used” in other parts of the WIIN Act and other statutes.

Boumediene v. Bush,

(2008).

Plaintiffs respond that each Corps project requires its own Congressional

authorization, so there’s “no overall statutory scheme” for us to examine. Appellees’ Br.

at 28. But as the Corps argues, it’s at least “relevant that in authorizing thousands of

projects nationwide in Water Resources Development Acts and similar Acts passed every

couple of years for more than a century, Congress has never done anything like what the

Plaintiffs argue it did here.” Reply Br. at 8.

We also agree with the Corps that pinning the required pool height to the “arbitrary

and unknowable-to-Congress date that the President signed the legislation” leads to

“absurd results.” Reply Br. at 9. Had the elevation of the pool been exceptionally low or

high on December 16, 2016, the district court’s interpretation would have held the Corps

to that level regardless. In response, Plaintiffs suggest that the statute only obligates the

Corps to maintain the pool at its “normal operating range.” Appellees’ Br. at 27. But

neither the statute nor the district court’s order makes clear this permissible “range.”

Finally, the Corps argues that requiring it to maintain the water level at 114.76

NGVD29 at the gage above the existing Dam undermines its ability to construct the fish-

14 USCA4 Appeal: 21-1085 Doc: 50 Filed: 04/19/2023 Pg: 15 of 30

passage structure “at an appropriate location” of its choosing. WIIN Act

§ 1319(c)(1)(A)(ii). Had the Corps opted to build the structure a few miles upstream

(instead of at the site of the existing dam), it argues, the resulting “pool” would inevitably

have a different size and other characteristics—so “the pool” as it then existed wouldn’t be

“maintain[ed].” Reply Br. at 10–11. Plaintiffs respond that the Corps could “pick a

different location, as long as the project is able to maintain the pool as it existed on the date

of enactment.” Appellees’ Br. at 41.

But any location other than the current Dam site will change some physical aspect

of the pool, “with the size of the pool being most obvious.” Reply Br. at 11. Looking to

the pool’s ability to support its water-supply and recreation functions—instead of narrowly

focusing on its physical characteristics—best avoids making “at an appropriate location”

surplusage.

III.

Our friend in dissent would affirm the district court, finding that the Corps’

proposed weir “would not be able to maintain the pool at the level as it existed” when the

WIIN Act was enacted. Dissent at 30. In his view, the Corps’ “rationalization that the

weir would nonetheless serve the statutory purposes of the pool” doesn’t absolve its

“noncompliance.” Id.

First, the dissent suggests that our interpretation “ignores entirely the historical and

statutory context of the WIIN Act.” Id. at 20. Of course, we don’t “resort to legislative

history to cloud a statutory text that is clear.” Ratzlaf v. United States,

, 147–

15 USCA4 Appeal: 21-1085 Doc: 50 Filed: 04/19/2023 Pg: 16 of 30

48 (1994). But even if the WIIN Act isn’t pellucid, general “historical context” about the

Savannah River Dam doesn’t settle the debate. It’s true that the Corps has at times

“describe[d] the pool in terms of its elevation in feet NGVD29.” Dissent at 23. But the

Corps doesn’t contend that the water level is irrelevant—only that the WIIN Act doesn’t

pin them to a specific water level (or range of levels).

Moreover, the post-drawdown concerns of area legislators three years after the Act’s

passage don’t shed much light on Congressional intent. Id.; see Se. Cmty. Coll. v. Davis,

, 412 n.11 (1979) (“[I]solated statements by individual Members of

Congress . . . , all made after the enactment of the statute under consideration, cannot

substitute for a clear expression of legislative intent at the time of enactment.”). And even

if we did weigh these comments, they arguably support the Corps’ interpretation: The

legislators were alarmed about the pool “becoming useless for recreational activities,” after

all. Dissent at 23.

Our colleague claims that measuring the pool by its elevation is “a rational

approach, if not the necessary one,” because a pool’s depth can change with the

“aggregation of silt or the removal of silt from dredging.” Dissent at 24. But insistence

upon a specific water level at the expense of other considerations could lead to unintended

results. If the Corps largely filled in the pool with silt but left a foot of water on top, for

example, the elevation of the pool might technically be “maintained.” But surely Plaintiffs

wouldn’t be satisfied with that result.

Next, our dissenting colleague suggests that our interpretation of the WIIN Act

“sidesteps the natural reading of the statutory text based on grammar and word usage.”

16 USCA4 Appeal: 21-1085 Doc: 50 Filed: 04/19/2023 Pg: 17 of 30

at 20. In his view, the comma in the text stands for a suppressed “and,” so the statute really

reads “for water supply and recreational activities and as in existence . . . .” See

at 26–

27.

But we don’t typically read so much into a comma. Nor is it clear how our colleague

divines what word the comma supplants—that is, why the comma (as used here) is a stand-

in for “and,” not “but” or “or.” According to the Government Publishing Office manual

our colleague cites, “omission of a word” is just one of sixteen potential uses of a comma.

See U.S. Government Publishing Office, Style Manual, 130 (2000) (offering the example

“Then we had much; now, nothing.”). Our reading, in which a comma sets off a modifying

clause, follows familiar drafting conventions and requires far less guesswork. See, e.g.,

Bloate v. United States,

, 206 n.10 (2010); Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid,

(2021).

IV.

In all, we are persuaded by the Corps’ interpretation of the WIIN Act. We therefore

vacate the district court’s judgment for Plaintiffs on their WIIN Act claim, as well as the

resulting permanent injunction against the Corps. We leave it to the district court to decide

whether the Corps’ chosen design can maintain the pool’s then-extant water-supply and

recreational purposes.

VACATED AND REMANDED

17 USCA4 Appeal: 21-1085 Doc: 50 Filed: 04/19/2023 Pg: 18 of 30

NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

In connection with its authorization to deepen the harbor at the Port of Savannah,

Georgia, Congress directed the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to either repair or replace,

at the Corps’ election, the New Savannah Bluff Lock and Dam (“the Savannah River

Dam”), which is upriver from the Port, in a manner that would allow shortnose and Atlantic

sturgeon swimming upriver from the Port to bypass the dam. The Army Corps elected to

replace the dam with a rock weir that would function as a dam but have no lock and that

would allow the sturgeon to pass over it.

This case presents the question of whether the Army Corps’ proposed weir satisfies

Congress’s authorization, as contained in the Water Infrastructure Improvements for the

Nation (“WIIN”) Act,

,

, 1703 (2016).

Particularly with respect to the construction of a replacement structure, Congress required

that it “[be] able to maintain the pool for water supply and recreational activities, as in

existence on the date of enactment of this Act.”

§ 1319(c)(1)(A)(ii)(I) (emphasis

added). The inclusion of this language was the product of years of engagement between

the State of South Carolina, the City of Augusta, Georgia, and the Georgia Ports Authority

(hereinafter “the States”) and the Army Corps, effectively amounting to a resolution of

their differences, especially over the potential disturbance of the existing water supply and

recreational activities.

The record shows that the Army Corps’ proposed weir will undisputedly be unable

to maintain the pool behind the weir at the levels that existed when the WIIN Act was

enacted. But the Corps argues that, under its posited interpretation of the Act, the water

18 USCA4 Appeal: 21-1085 Doc: 50 Filed: 04/19/2023 Pg: 19 of 30

level of the pool is irrelevant to the requirement to maintain a pool as in existence at the

Act’s enactment because the proposed structure would still allow “for water supply and

recreational activities” as they existed at the time of the Act’s enactment. As the Corps

contends:

It makes no difference textually if “the pool” is a slightly lower water elevation after Alternative 2-6d [the weir]; it remains “the pool” because it is still “a body of water forming above a dam” serving the same functions. A pool remains a pool when it continues to serve the same functions. . . .

The States contend that the correct reading of the applicable provisions of the WIIN

Act requires that the Army Corps maintain the pool as it existed on December 16, 2016,

when the Act was enacted, and that such a pool was historically defined and understood by

both the Army Corps and the States to be one maintained within the range of 114.5 to 115

feet NGVD29 and that, in fact, the pool level on the Act’s enactment date was within that

range at 114.76 feet NGVD29. (“NGVD29” refers to the “National Geodetic Vertical

Datum of 1929,” which uses the “mean sea level” datum of 1929 as a constant reference

point.) The States note that it is undisputed by the parties that the pool that would be

created by the proposed weir could not achieve those levels but would be approximately

3.5 feet lower. They contend that, for a pool that is 15 feet at its deepest, such a drop in

water level would have a materially adverse effect on water supply and recreational

activities upriver from the weir.

The district court, in ruling on the States’ motion for an injunction, found as fact

that the Army Corps’ proposed weir would not be able to maintain the pool as it existed on

December 16, 2016, when the WIIN Act was enacted. Accordingly, the court entered a

19 USCA4 Appeal: 21-1085 Doc: 50 Filed: 04/19/2023 Pg: 20 of 30

permanent injunction prohibiting the Army Corps from “implementing Alternative 2-6d

[the weir] . . . if the proposal does not ‘maintain the pool’ that was in existence [on] the

date of the Act’s enactment, which was 114.76 feet NGVD29.”

The majority opinion, however, reverses the district court and agrees with the

Corps’ interpretation of the Act — that the Act does not require the maintenance of a

specific pool, but rather authorizes any pool that functions to support the water supply and

recreational activities as they existed at the time of the WIIN Act’s enactment. It also

concludes that “had Congress intended to require a specific water level for the pool,” it

would have done so, as it had in other parts of the WIIN Act and in other statutes. Supra

at 14. Thus, the majority concludes, even though the weir would be unable to achieve the

level of the pool that existed on the Act’s date of enactment, the weir nonetheless could

comply with the Act’s requirements if it would still “support” the water supply and

recreational activities.

I submit that the majority’s interpretation ignores entirely the historical and statutory

context of the WIIN Act, which makes clear what “maintain[ing] the pool” means.

Moreover, the majority’s interpretation also sidesteps the natural reading of the statutory

text based on grammar and word usage.

20 USCA4 Appeal: 21-1085 Doc: 50 Filed: 04/19/2023 Pg: 21 of 30

I

The historical, judicial, and legislative context of the WIIN Act is important to a

proper understanding of its meaning and purpose. See Roberts v. Sea-Land Servs., Inc.,

(2012). This is because the WIIN Act was the culmination of a long

process of litigation, negotiations, and legislation among the States, the Army Corps, the

relevant communities, and Congress.

In 1932, South Carolina created the Savannah River Navigation Commission and

empowered it to secure the land and easement rights for the United States’ construction of

the Savannah River Dam. And as stated in the language of the easements that the

Commission obtained, the rights received to erect and operate the Savannah River Dam

defined the dam “with crest control gates so operated as to maintain a pool elevation at said

dam of 114.5 feet mean sea level.” (In 1973, the “mean sea level” data set was

redenominated NGVD29.) After the Commission obtained those easements, it conveyed

them to the United States by means of recorded deeds, each of which included the pool

elevation requirements. Accordingly, when the Army Corps took title to the lands for the

construction of the Savannah River Dam, it did so subject to the express condition that the

pool be at 114.5 feet NGVD29.

Then, in 1937, the Army Corps constructed the Savannah River Dam, which

contained both a lock to enable navigation and gates to maintain the pool at the level

specified. Over the years, the Army Corps maintained the pool by adjusting the gates

throughout each day to keep the pool within its normal operating range, targeted to be

between 114.5 and 115 feet NGVD29. While there were periods of water shortage when

21 USCA4 Appeal: 21-1085 Doc: 50 Filed: 04/19/2023 Pg: 22 of 30

the pool level fell to 113.2 feet or lower, those periods occurred less than 5 percent of the

time during a sample period of four years from March 2015 to March 2019. And it is

undisputed that the pool level was targeted at 114.5 to 115 feet NGVD29 and that the pool

level on the date of the WIIN Act’s enactment was within that range, at 114.76 feet

NGVD29.

The WIIN Act was the product of a long period of negotiations and legal

proceedings. Initially, in 2000, the Army Corps proposed removing the Savannah River

Dam altogether, which provoked litigation initiated by the States. But in the final

Environmental Impact Statement for that proposal, the Corps stated that removing the dam

was “infeasible” and “unacceptable due to the development that now occurs upstream

along the pool created by the dam.” Thereafter, the Corps and the States entered into a

settlement agreement that provided that the dam would remain in place, and that agreement

was incorporated into the court’s order dismissing the case and ending the litigation.

Thereafter, Congress enacted the Water Resources Reform and Development Act

of 2014, which implemented the settlement, retaining the dam and authorizing a fish

passage around the dam. But two years later, it enacted the WIIN Act, providing the Army

Corps with authority to either repair or replace the dam, so long as the existing pool was

maintained, which had been the States’ concern from the beginning.

Moreover, during the Army Corps’ development of a plan to implement the WIIN

Act by either repairing or replacing the Savannah River Dam, the pool was one of the main

concerns, and it was always defined in terms of the water level, expressed in feet NGVD29,

i.e., the level above mean sea level. Virtually all of the Corps’ documents relating to the

22 USCA4 Appeal: 21-1085 Doc: 50 Filed: 04/19/2023 Pg: 23 of 30

Savannah River Dam, the Corps’ maintenance of it, and the Corps’ adoption of the weir

proposal describe the pool in terms of its elevation in feet NGVD29. For example, in its

notice of the decision to implement Alternative 2-6d, the weir proposal, the Army Corps

described the structure as “a 500 foot width weir with an average crest elevation of . . .

109.0 feet NGVD29.” And in the Army Corps’ Supplemental Environmental Assessment,

which the Corps recommended that the district court view as the “primary document in the

administrative record that should guide the Court’s review and analysis of these claims,”

the Army Corps acknowledged that “currently, under normal project operations, the pool

upstream of [the Savannah River Dam] is maintained by Corps personnel between

elevations 112.5 and 114.5 ft NGVD29 by adjusting the gate settings as specified in the

1996 Savannah River Basin Water Control Manual. Typically, under low and average flow

conditions, the target pool elevation is between 114 and 114.5 ft NGVD29 . . . .” The

document explained that the pool was “managed by adjusting the gates at the dam . . .

throughout the day to keep the pool within its normal operating range.” And when a test

that was conducted to simulate the pool that would be created by the proposed weir failed,

the U.S. Senators from South Carolina and Georgia wrote the Corps complaining about the

proposed pool, referring to its level. The letter noted, “On February 15, 2019, the Corps

halted the drawdown simulation after effects of the river drawdown resulted in instability

of the Georgia riverbank in the residential neighborhood of Goodale Landing. In addition,

the simulation resulted in numerous docks becoming useless for recreational activities

while they sat in the mud given the reduced pool level. Clearly, these results do not reflect

the intent of Congress.” (Emphasis added). The letter went on to note that “the Corps must

23 USCA4 Appeal: 21-1085 Doc: 50 Filed: 04/19/2023 Pg: 24 of 30

maintain the river conditions that were in place on the date of enactment” and that “the

recent drawdown test has proven [that] Alternative 2-6d [the weir] does not appear to meet

the requirement of the plain text of the legislation or the intent of Congress when it passed

the WIIN Act.”

Thus, over the years, the pool behind the Savannah River Dam has consistently been

at the center of discussion, and all involved parties have always described the pool by its

NGVD29 level.

This is certainly a rational approach, if not the necessary one, when describing a

pool. The level of a pool determines the area that it covers and thus its impact on its

surroundings. Moreover, a measurement by reference to the NGVD29 level is based on a

constant. The other most obvious way to describe a pool would be to describe it by its

depth, as would be relevant for navigation. But the depth of a pool would not be as practical

a measure for defining it, as that measurement might not remain constant. The bottom of

a pool could change because of the aggregation of silt or the removal of silt from dredging.

Thus, it is not surprising that the pool behind the Savannah River Dam has, over the years,

consistently been defined by the elevation of its surface. And, more importantly, it has

never been defined by its purpose or its impact on its surroundings.

Not only is this context of the pool’s definition important to understanding whether

a proposed replacement structure would “maintain” the pool within the meaning of the

WIIN Act, but it also serves to show how the pool effects the Act’s purposes, whether they

be navigation, power, water supply, or recreation. Lowering the pool level by only a few

feet can materially alter the pool’s usefulness for those purposes. This was indeed

24 USCA4 Appeal: 21-1085 Doc: 50 Filed: 04/19/2023 Pg: 25 of 30

demonstrated in this case when the Army Corps conducted a test in February 2019 to

simulate the effects of reducing the pool level to that which its proposed weir would create.

The States claim that the test showed that reducing the pool level by only a few feet would

be incompatible with the continued functioning of existing facilities for water supply and

opportunities for recreational activities. As they describe the test:

On or about February 9, 2019, the Corps began a simulated drawdown test in order to demonstrate the effects of Weir Alt 2-6d on pool level. The drawdown test was an unmitigated failure, and the Corps was forced to halt the drawdown simulation on February 15, 2019. The field test left hundreds of feet of shoreline for the 17-mile long pool dry, recreational facilities such as docks, rowing facilities, marina, boat houses were on mudflats and without water, and the drawdown threatened Augusta’s N. Max Hicks water intake. Pool levels during the field test were so low that subsidence of property and damage to structures was observed.

The States support that description with numerous photographs taken by the Army Corps

of the conditions created. The amici describe the situation similarly, noting that the

simulation “so reduced the pool level as to expose mudflats and to cause a retaining wall

to buckle in the absence of water holding it in place.”

These observations confirm that evaluating whether the Army Corps’ proposed plan

complies with the WIIN Act’s directive that the Army Corps maintain the pool as it existed

on the date of the Act’s enactment necessitates reference to the pool’s NGVD29 level.

In this context, the district court found as fact that, with the construction of the

proposed weir, the pool behind the Savannah River Dam would not be maintained as it

existed on December 16, 2016. That finding should end the debate. But unfortunately it

hasn’t because the majority has ignored the relevant context.

25 USCA4 Appeal: 21-1085 Doc: 50 Filed: 04/19/2023 Pg: 26 of 30

II Without reference to the WIIN Act’s context, the majority opinion concludes that

the WIIN Act requires only a pool sufficient to serve as a water supply and for recreational

activities, regardless of the pool’s level. It reaches this conclusion by two methods. First,

it construes the text of the Act contrary to some basic principles of grammar and usage.

Second, it characterizes the States’ position inaccurately, enabling it to conclude that their

position would lead to absurdity. Neither method, however, is sound or fair.

The operative language of the Act permits a replacement structure so long as it “is

able to maintain the pool for water supply and recreational activities, as in existence on the

date of enactment of this Act.” WIIN Act § 1319(c)(1)(A)(ii)(I). Thus, the proposed weir

must maintain “the pool,” which in turn is modified by two elements of the sentence: (1)

the prepositional phrase “for water supply and recreational activities,” and (2) the clause

“as in existence on the date of enactment of this Act.” The phrase “for water supply and

recreational activities” describes the purpose of the pool, which is indicated by the

preposition “for.” And the “as in existence” clause refers back to the pool that must be

maintained. The fact that a comma precedes the “as in existence” clause indicates that the

clause relates to an earlier element in the sentence, rather than to its immediate antecedent,

which is the prepositional phrase. Grammatically, the comma here indicates omission, see

U.S. Government Printing Office, Style Manual, 130 (2000) (noting the use of commas

“[t]o indicate the omission of a word or words”), and thus supplants the suppressed

conjunctive “and,” which, if included, would obviate the need for the comma and also

relate back to “the pool.” To be sure, if the comma were omitted without including the

26 USCA4 Appeal: 21-1085 Doc: 50 Filed: 04/19/2023 Pg: 27 of 30

suppressed “and,” then the “as in existence” clause would modify the nearest antecedent,

the prepositional phrase “for water supply and recreational activities.” This is the approach

taken by the majority. But the grammatical function of the comma in the text here is instead

very similar to that recognized by the Supreme Court in Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver County

Employees Retirement Fund,

(2018), where the Court noted that the

phrase, “The woman dressed to the nines carrying an umbrella, as shown in the picture,”

means that “the picture” would be referring to “the woman” and not “an umbrella.” See

also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts

161 (2012).

To avoid this grammatically grounded construction of the WIIN Act, the majority

finds it necessary to add words to support its own construction. Under its construction, the

Act means that the Corps must maintain the pool that supports water supply and

recreational activities that were in existence on the date of the enactment. Supra at 12–13.

This reading changes the obvious meaning of the statutory text by failing to recognize that

the definite article in “the pool” anticipates a clause introduced by a restrictive term such

as “that” or “as” — thus, “the pool that” or “the pool as in existence” on December 16,

2016. To convert the text to one that supports its desired outcome, the majority adds “that

supports” before “water supply and recreational activities” in order to change that clause

from one that is descriptive to one that is restrictive. The word “for” in the text indicates

description — “the pool for water supply and recreational activities” — whereas the phrase

“that supports” converts description to a restriction of the meaning of “the pool.” That is

a material change. Without such editing, the statutory text defines “the pool” as the one

27 USCA4 Appeal: 21-1085 Doc: 50 Filed: 04/19/2023 Pg: 28 of 30

“in existence” at enactment. Thus, both my reading and the majority’s treat the meaning

of “pool” to be restricted. But whereas my reading adheres to the text of the statute as

written, such that “the pool” that must be maintained is the pool as in existence at the Act’s

enactment (i.e., having a certain water level), the majority refuses to take the text as is, and

instead adds words to derive an entirely different meaning — that the Corps is obliged

merely to maintain a pool that supports use as a water supply and recreational area. This

is an unnatural twisting of the meaning of the statute, effected only by adding words to the

language that Congress chose to express its intent.

The majority also argues that if the “as in existence” clause modifies “the pool,”

then the prepositional phrase “for water supply and recreational activities” would provide

no service and would be mere surplusage. This conclusion, however, overlooks the natural

descriptive function of the prepositional phrase that distinguishes the function of “the pool”

in this subsection from the function of “the pool” in the previous subsection. If the

Army Corps had elected to “repair” the Savannah River Dam, as authorized by

§ 1319(c)(1)(A)(i), it would have had to maintain the pool “for navigation, water supply,

and recreational activities” (emphasis added), which would indicate that “the pool” should

be maintained not only at the level as in existence when the Act was enacted but perhaps

also at a depth that would be consistent with “navigation.” But in electing to replace the

Savannah River Dam, the Army Corps was not required to consider navigational uses, but

only water supply and recreational activities.

The prepositional phrase in each alternative thus describes the purpose of the pool,

but not its existential properties. The language describing its existential properties requires

28 USCA4 Appeal: 21-1085 Doc: 50 Filed: 04/19/2023 Pg: 29 of 30

that the structure be able to maintain the pool as it existed on the date of the Act’s

enactment.

In addition to sidestepping applicable rules of grammar and word usage, the

majority also attacks the States’ interpretation by attributing to both the district court and

the States an argument that it finds absurd — that the WIIN Act requires that the Army

Corps maintain the pool at “precisely” 114.76 feet NGVD29, the level that existed on the

date of the WIIN Act’s enactment. But this attribution is unfair. First, the district court

prohibited construction of the weir because it did “not ‘maintain the pool’ that was in

existence on the date of the Act’s enactment, which was 114.76 feet NGVD29.” The level

identified in the order was descriptive of the level at the time of enactment and fell within

the targeted range at which the Army Corps was maintaining the pool. Indeed, the Corps

was quite precise in seeking to adjust the pool’s level throughout each day, targeting 114.5

to 115 feet NGVD29. Consistent with this, the court’s directive was to maintain the pool

as it was in existence earlier, not at a level defined to the hundredth of a foot.

Moreover, it is clear that the States do not advocate reading the WIIN Act in the

way that the majority attributes to them — that the Act mandates the maintenance of a

precise, unachievable level of 114.76 feet NGVD29. Indeed, the States call this a

“strategically-set up strawman” argument attributed to it by the Corps. They note that the

word “precisely” is not in the statute. Rather, they argue that the pool had to be maintained

as the Corps had maintained it over the years, including on the date of the WIIN Act’s

enactment. And it was undisputed that the Corps maintained the pool by targeting 114.5

to 115 feet NGVD29 and that the level at the date of enactment fell within that range.

29 USCA4 Appeal: 21-1085 Doc: 50 Filed: 04/19/2023 Pg: 30 of 30

Finally, the States note that the statutory text requires a “structure” “that is able to

maintain” the pool as it existed on the WIIN Act’s enactment date. In short, they point out

that the structure must have the capacity to achieve the 114.76 foot NGVD29 level, as the

statute requires, not that the pool be maintained at the precise level. By itself, this

observation by the States fully responds to the majority’s absurdity argument.

* * *

In sum, the weir proposed by the Army Corps would not be able to maintain the

pool at the level as it existed under the Army Corps’ own maintenance of the Savannah

River Dam on the date that the WIIN Act was enacted, and the Corps concedes this.

Therefore, the weir would not comply with the Act’s clear requirement. The Corps’

defense is a rationalization that the weir would nonetheless serve the statutory purposes of

the pool. This argument, however, does not absolve the Corps’ noncompliance.

Also, I would note that at oral argument, the Army Corps did not dispute that it

could modify the plans of the proposed weir so that the pool would remain at the preexisting

level, and I believe that it should do so. Much anxiety and future litigation could thereby

be avoided.

I would affirm the judgment of the district court.

30