USCA4 Appeal: 22-4727 Doc: 31 Filed: 12/21/2023 Pg: 1 of 3

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 22-4727

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

MALIK SHROPSHIRE,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney, District Judge. (3:15-cr-00025-FDW-1)

Submitted: December 19, 2023 Decided: December 21, 2023

Before HARRIS, QUATTLEBAUM, and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Charles R. Brewer, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellant. Dena J. King, United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, Amy E. Ray, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 22-4727 Doc: 31 Filed: 12/21/2023 Pg: 2 of 3

PER CURIAM:

In 2016, Malik Shropshire pleaded guilty to conspiracy to impede the Internal

Revenue Service, in violation of

; and making false statements on a loan

application, in violation of

, 1014. The district court sentenced Shropshire

to 51 months of imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release. After

Shropshire was released onto supervision, his probation officer filed a petition and

amended petitions seeking revocation of his supervised release based on several violations

of the conditions of his supervised release, including new criminal conduct. Pursuant to a

plea agreement with the Government, Shropshire pleaded guilty to the new criminal

charges that formed the basis of two of the charged supervised release violations, and

admitted to committing four violations of his supervised release. The district court

therefore revoked Shropshire’s supervised release and sentenced him, below the advisory

Sentencing Guidelines policy statement range, to 28 months of imprisonment, with no

period of supervised release to follow. Shropshire appeals, arguing that the petitions

seeking revocation of his supervised release erroneously cited a nonexistent count of

conviction—“Count 7”—and thus improperly calculated the Guidelines policy statement

range, and that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance for failing to raise this issue

before the district court. Finding no error, we affirm.

“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a sentence upon revocation of

supervised release. [We] will affirm a revocation sentence if it is within the statutory

maximum and is not plainly unreasonable.” United States v. Patterson,

(4th Cir. 2020). To determine whether a revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable, we

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“first determine whether the sentence is procedurally or substantively unreasonable.”

“A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court adequately explains

the chosen sentence after considering the Chapter Seven policy statement range and

application [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) sentencing factors.” Id. With respect to Shropshire’s

claim that counsel rendered ineffective assistance, “[u]nless an attorney’s ineffectiveness

conclusively appears on the face of the record, such claims are not addressed on direct

appeal.” United States v. Faulls,

(4th Cir. 2016).

Shropshire’s claims on appeal are based on an erroneous reading of the supervised

release revocation petitions. The petitions properly cited the statutes of Shropshire’s

underlying conviction,

, 1014; in the indictment to which Shropshire

pleaded guilty, the offense of making false statements on a loan application was charged in

Count 7. Moreover, the petitions further properly calculated the policy statement range

and statutory maximum terms for the violations of Shropshire’s supervised release based

on these convictions. We therefore conclude that the district court did not commit

procedural error in sentencing Shropshire for his supervised release violations and counsel

did not render ineffective assistance for failing to raising a meritless challenge to the

revocation petitions.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and contentions are adequately presented in the materials before

this court and argument would not aid in the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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