Anthony Gunter v. Alutiiq Advanced Security Solutions, LLC

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Anthony Gunter v. Alutiiq Advanced Security Solutions, LLC

Opinion

USCA4 Appeal: 23-1229 Doc: 16 Filed: 08/27/2024 Pg: 1 of 4

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 23-1229

ANTHONY C. GUNTER,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

ALUTIIQ ADVANCED SECURITY SOLUTIONS, LLC,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. Julie R. Rubin, District Judge. (1:20-cv-03410-JRR)

Submitted: June 27, 2024 Decided: August 27, 2024

Before THACKER and RUSHING, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Anthony C. Gunter, Appellant Pro Se. Alexander V. Cranford, Kathleen A. McGinley, Larry Robert Seegull, JACKSON LEWIS PC, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 23-1229 Doc: 16 Filed: 08/27/2024 Pg: 2 of 4

PER CURIAM:

While defending a lawsuit filed by one of its former employees, Alutiiq Advanced

Security Solutions, Inc. (“Alutiiq”) discovered that the plaintiff, Anthony C. Gunter, had

altered certain text message evidence and failed to produce other evidence. Alutiiq moved

for sanctions, seeking both dismissal of the case and reimbursement for costs associated

with uncovering Gunter’s misconduct. District Judge Bennett held an evidentiary hearing

and found that Gunter had indeed doctored evidence. However, Judge Bennett denied

Alutiiq’s request to dismiss. Instead, Judge Bennett prohibited Gunter from using the

altered messages at trial; permitted Alutiiq to use the same for impeachment purposes; and

directed Gunter to reimburse Alutiiq, unless he was unable to pay.

Thereafter, the case was transferred to District Judge Rubin. Upon getting

acquainted with the case, Judge Rubin questioned whether the sanctions imposed by Judge

Bennett were adequate. After notifying the parties that she was contemplating

reconsideration, Judge Rubin concluded that dismissal with prejudice was warranted.

Further, she ordered Gunter to pay Alutiiq $10,000—short of what Alutiiq requested, but

the maximum Gunter could afford.

Gunter now appeals, primarily challenging Judge Rubin’s decision to reconsider

Judge Bennett’s sanctions ruling. Gunter also disputes the imposition of monetary

sanctions and faults Judge Rubin for not granting his motion to recuse. For the reasons

that follow, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.

We review Judge Rubin’s decision to reconsider Judge Bennett’s ruling for abuse

of discretion. U.S. Tobacco Coop. Inc. v. Big S. Wholesale of Virginia, LLC,

899 F.3d 236

,

2 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1229 Doc: 16 Filed: 08/27/2024 Pg: 3 of 4

256 (4th Cir. 2018). “Under [Fed. R. Civ. P.] 54(b), a district court retains the power to

reconsider and modify its interlocutory judgments at any time prior to final judgment when

such is warranted.”

Id.

(cleaned up). However, the power to reconsider “is not limitless.”

Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, “we have cabined revision pursuant to Rule

54(b) by treating interlocutory rulings as law of the case.”

Id. at 257

(internal quotation

marks omitted). “Accordingly, a court may revise an interlocutory order under the same

circumstances in which it may depart from the law of the case: (1) a subsequent trial

producing substantially different evidence; (2) a change in applicable law; or (3) clear error

causing manifest injustice.”

Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). And “where, as here,

the order was entered by one judge and then reviewed by another, the latter judge should

be hesitant to overrule the earlier determination.”

Id.

(cleaned up).

Our review of the record reveals no substantially different evidence or change in

law that warranted reconsideration. Nor do we detect clear error in Judge Bennett’s ruling.

See

id. at 258

(“[A] prior decision does not qualify for the third exception by being just

maybe or probably wrong; it must strike us as wrong with the force of a five-week-old,

unrefrigerated dead fish. It must be dead wrong.” (cleaned up)). So, while we appreciate

Judge Rubin’s well-founded concerns about submitting this case to a jury in light of

Gunter’s egregious misconduct, we are constrained to conclude that Judge Rubin abused

her discretion when reconsidering Judge Bennett’s decision not to dismiss this case.

Next, we review the imposition of sanctions for abuse of discretion and related

factual findings for clear error. Harvey v. Cable News Network, Inc.,

48 F.4th 257

, 276

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(4th Cir. 2022). We discern no abuse of discretion in either the decision to impose

monetary sanctions or the amount awarded.

Finally, we review the denial of a motion to recuse for abuse of discretion. United

States v. Cherry,

330 F.3d 658, 665

(4th Cir. 2003). “Any justice, judge, or magistrate

judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his

impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”

28 U.S.C. § 455

(a). “However, judicial

rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.” United

States v. Lentz,

524 F.3d 501, 530

(4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Furthermore, a judge need not recuse herself “simply because of unsupported, irrational or

highly tenuous speculation.” Cherry,

330 F.3d at 665

(internal quotation marks omitted).

There is absolutely no indication in the record that Judge Rubin harbored any bias

against Gunter. Thus, we conclude that Judge Rubin properly exercised her discretion in

denying Gunter’s motion to recuse.

Accordingly, we affirm the part of Judge Rubin’s order awarding monetary

sanctions to Alutiiq, vacate the part of the order dismissing the action with prejudice, and

remand to the district court for further proceedings. In addition, we affirm the order

denying the motion to recuse, deny Gunter’s motion for a transcript, and deny as moot

Gunter’s motion for a stay. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would

not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED

4

Reference

Status
Unpublished