USCA4 Appeal: 23-4346 Doc: 35 Filed: 08/26/2024 Pg: 1 of 6

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 23-4346

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JARRELL RAESHON BORDEAUX,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Richard E. Myers, II, Chief District Judge. (5:20-cr-00428-M-1)

Submitted: August 22, 2024 Decided: August 26, 2024

Before WILKINSON, WYNN, and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Louis H. Lang, CALLISON, TIGHE & ROBINSON, LLC, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. David A. Bragdon, Assistant United States Attorney, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 23-4346 Doc: 35 Filed: 08/26/2024 Pg: 2 of 6

PER CURIAM:

Following a three-day trial, a jury convicted Jarrell Raeshon Bordeaux of conspiracy

to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 100 grams or more of heroin and 400

grams or more of fentanyl, in violation of

(a)(1), 846, ten substantive

counts of distributing unspecified quantities of heroin and fentanyl, in violation of

(a)(1), possession with intent to distribute 100 grams or more of heroin and

40 grams or more of fentanyl, in violation of

(a)(1), and possession of a

firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of

(c)(1)(A).

The district court subsequently imposed an aggregate 248-month downward variant

sentence. On appeal, Bordeaux’s counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California,

(1967), conceding that there are no potentially meritorious issues for appeal,

but questioning several aspects of the proceedings below. Although advised of his right to

file a pro se supplemental brief, Bordeaux has not done so. The Government has declined

to file a response brief. For the reasons explained below, we affirm the district court’s

judgment.

First, counsel argues that the superseding indictment was legally insufficient as to

the conspiracy count because it did not specifically allege that Bordeaux had an agreement

to distribute narcotics with two or more persons. In considering this argument, the district

court relied on our unpublished decision in United States v. Black,

,

, at *1 (4th Cir. 1997) (table), to hold that the indictment was sufficient because it

alleged a conspiracy to distribute drugs; the relevant time frame, place, and drugs involved;

and cited the statute allegedly violated. “We review the district court’s factual findings on

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a motion to dismiss an indictment for clear error, but we review its legal conclusions de

novo.” United States v. Perry,

(4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

Upon review, we agree with the district court’s legal holding as it is consistent with

the rationale expressed in Black. Notably, the conspiracy count charged Bordeaux with

violating

(a)(1), 846 by conspiring and agreeing to distribute and possess

with intent to distribute certain quantities of heroin and fentanyl, in the Eastern District of

North Carolina and elsewhere, from October 2019 through on or about June 30, 2020. The

court’s rationale is also supported by persuasive sister circuit authority. Specifically, as

the district court explained, the indictment was not legally insufficient—despite not

alleging that Bordeaux “conspired with persons known and unknown”—because “the word

‘conspiracy’ incorporates within its definition an agreement with another person.” (E.R.

1842) *; see United States v. Thomas,

(5th Cir. 2003) (holding that

indictment was sufficient “because the involvement of another person acting in concert

with [the defendant] is implicit in the use of the words ‘combine, conspire, and

confederate’” as stated in the indictment, and the evidence at trial showed that the

defendant conspired with another person). We thus reject this assignment of error.

Bordeaux next questions whether sufficient evidence supports his conspiracy

conviction. “We review the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal de novo.” United

States v. Savage,

(4th Cir. 2018). In assessing the sufficiency of the

* Citations to the “E.R.” refer to the compiled Electronic Record.

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evidence, we determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the conviction

when viewed in the light most favorable to the Government.

“Substantial evidence is

evidence that a reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to support

a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v.

Rodriguez-Soriano,

(4th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up). In making this

determination, we may not resolve conflicts in the evidence or evaluate witness credibility.

Savage,

. “A defendant who brings a sufficiency challenge bears a heavy

burden, as appellate reversal on grounds of insufficient evidence is confined to cases where

the prosecution’s failure is clear.”

(internal quotation marks omitted).

To convict Bordeaux of conspiracy to distribute the specified quantities of heroin

and fentanyl, the Government had to prove each of the following elements beyond a

reasonable doubt: (1) there was an agreement between two or more persons to possess

with intent to distribute the charged narcotics; (2) Bordeaux knew of this agreement or

conspiracy; and (3) Bordeaux knowingly and voluntarily participated in or became a part

of this agreement or conspiracy. United States v. Green,

(4th Cir. 2010);

United States v. Burgos,

(4th Cir. 1996) (en banc).

As to the first element—which is (and was) the only element in dispute—the trial

transcript confirms that, during the underlying investigation, Bordeaux made statements to

both the involved confidential informant and the lead detective that proved that Bordeaux

received the drugs he sold from an unidentified third party. Moreover, evidence of a

defendant buying or selling a substantial quantity of drugs over a short period of time is

enough to raise an inference of a distribution conspiracy, United States v. Reid,

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310, 317 (4th Cir. 2008), and the Government’s evidence established that Bordeaux sold

approximately 260 grams of heroin and fentanyl to the confidential informant over the

charged period. On this record, we readily conclude that the Government satisfied its

burden of proof as to the conspiracy count.

Finally, Bordeaux assigns error to the court’s rejection of his motions to suppress

evidence seized from his residence and a storage unit pursuant to search warrants and for

reconsideration of that ruling, both of which posited that police officers made false

statements in their warrant applications. In evaluating the denial of a motion to suppress,

“we review that court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error,

considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the government.” United States v.

Kolsuz,

(4th Cir. 2018).

A defendant is entitled to attack an otherwise facially valid search warrant affidavit

under the “narrow exception” created in Franks v. Delaware,

(1978). “To

obtain a Franks hearing, a defendant must make a substantial preliminary showing that the

affiant made (1) a false statement (2) knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless

disregard for the truth that was (3) necessary to the finding of probable cause.” United

States v. White,

(4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). Upon

review of the orders, we agree with the district court that nothing in either motion justified

a Franks hearing because, at bottom, Bordeaux did not explain the basis for his multiple

assertions of falsity or make a sufficient showing that the officers acting knowingly or

intentionally or with a reckless disregard for the truth. We thus affirm the denial of

Bordeaux’s initial motion to suppress and find no abuse of discretion in the court declining

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to reconsider that ruling. See United States v. Dickerson,

(4th Cir.

1999) (providing standard of review for denial of motion to reconsider previously

adjudicated motion to suppress), rev’d on other grounds,

(2000).

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case for any

potentially meritorious issues and have found none. We therefore affirm the district court’s

judgment. This court requires that counsel inform Bordeaux, in writing, of the right to

petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Bordeaux requests

that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then

counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s

motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Bordeaux.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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