USCA4 Appeal: 23-4729 Doc: 40 Filed: 08/26/2024 Pg: 1 of 7

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 23-4728

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

DEWAYNE LAMONT RICHMOND,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 23-4729

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

DEWAYNE LAMONT RICHMOND,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Loretta C. Biggs, District Judge. (1:22-cr-00336-LCB-1; 1:13-cr-00055- LCB-1)

Submitted: August 22, 2024 Decided: August 26, 2024 USCA4 Appeal: 23-4729 Doc: 40 Filed: 08/26/2024 Pg: 2 of 7

Before WILKINSON, WYNN, and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges.

No. 23-4728, affirmed in part and dismissed in part; No. 23-4729, affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Sandra Payne Hagood, LAW OFFICE OF SANDRA PAYNE HAGOOD, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, for Appellant. Jacob Darriel Pryor, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:

In 2013, Dewayne Lamont Richmond pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by

a felon, in violation of

(g). The district court sentenced Richmond to 115

months’ imprisonment, followed by three years’ supervised release. In 2023, while on

supervised release, Richmond pleaded guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to

possession with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of

(a)(1), and

possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of § 922(g)(1). The district court sentenced

Richmond to a total of 160 months’ imprisonment, followed by three years’ supervised

release.

Based on his new convictions and other conduct, Richmond admitted to violating

the terms of his supervised release. The district court therefore revoked his supervised

release and sentenced him to a term of 24 months’ imprisonment, to run consecutively to

the sentence for the new criminal offenses. Richmond appealed both judgments and

counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California,

(1967), asserting

that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning in No. 23-4729 whether

the court abused its discretion in finding Richmond violated the terms of supervised release

and whether the sentence for the supervised release violations was reasonable, and in No.

23-4728 whether Richmond’s appeal waiver was valid and whether there are any

meritorious issues falling outside the cope of the waiver. The Government has moved to

dismiss Richmond’s appeal of the new criminal convictions in No. 23-4728 as barred by

Richmond’s waiver of his appellate rights contained in the plea agreement. For the

following reasons we affirm in part and dismiss in part.

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With respect to Richmond’s appeal of the supervised release revocation judgment

in No. 23-4729, a district court may revoke supervised release if it “finds by a

preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a condition of supervised

release.”

(e)(3). We review a district court’s decision to revoke

supervised release for abuse of discretion and its factual findings underlying the revocation

for clear error. United States v. Padgett,

(4th Cir. 2015). We conclude

that the district court did not err in revoking Richmond’s supervised release based on his

admission to the violations and guilty plea to the new criminal conduct.

With respect to Richmond’s revocation sentence “[a] district court has broad

discretion when imposing a sentence upon revocation of supervised release.” United States

v. Webb,

(4th Cir. 2013). Thus, we will “affirm a revocation sentence

so long as it is within the prescribed statutory range and is not plainly unreasonable.”

United States v. Coston,

(4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks

omitted). When reviewing whether a revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable, we first

determine “whether the sentence is unreasonable at all.”

(internal quotation marks

omitted).

“A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court adequately

explains the chosen sentence after considering the Sentencing Guidelines’ nonbinding

Chapter Seven policy statements and the applicable

(a) factors,”

(internal quotation marks omitted), and the explanation indicates “that the court considered

any potentially meritorious arguments raised by the parties,” United States v. Patterson,

(4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A court need

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not be as detailed or specific when imposing a revocation sentence as it must be when

imposing a post-conviction sentence, but it still must provide a statement of reasons for the

sentence imposed.” United States v. Thompson,

(4th Cir. 2010) (internal

quotation marks omitted). “A revocation sentence is substantively reasonable if, in light

of the totality of the circumstances, the court states an appropriate basis for concluding that

the defendant should receive the sentence imposed.” Coston,

(internal

quotation marks omitted).

We conclude that Richmond’s revocation sentence is both procedurally and

substantively reasonable. When imposing its sentence, the district court correctly

calculated the policy statement range, considered the relevant statutory factors, imposed a

sentence within the statutory maximum, gave sufficiently detailed reasons for its decision,

and addressed Richmond’s arguments for a lesser sentence. Specifically, in imposing a

sentence within the policy statement range, the court explained that Richmond had

committed several violations starting only a year after he had been released onto

supervision.

Next, we conclude that Richmond has waived his right to his sentence for the new

criminal conduct in No. 23-4728. As we have explained, a defendant may, in a valid plea

agreement, waive the right to appeal under

. See United States v. Wiggins,

(4th Cir. 1990). This court reviews the validity of an appellate waiver de

novo and will enforce the waiver if it is valid and the issue appealed is within the scope

thereof. United States v. Blick,

(4th Cir. 2005).

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An appeal waiver is valid if the defendant knowingly and intelligently agreed to the

waiver.

. “To determine whether a defendant knowingly and voluntarily agreed

to waive his appellate rights, we look to the totality of the circumstances, including the

defendant’s experience, conduct, educational background and knowledge of his plea

agreement and its terms.” United States v. Carter,

(4th Cir. 2023).

“Generally, . . . if a district court questions a defendant regarding the waiver of appellate

rights during the [Fed. R. Crim. P.] 11 colloquy and the record indicates that the defendant

understood the full significance of the waiver, the waiver is valid.”

(internal quotation

marks omitted).

Based on the totality of circumstances, we conclude that Richmond knowingly and

voluntarily entered his guilty plea and understood the appeal waiver. Moreover,

Richmond’s appeal waiver included his right to appeal his convictions and sentence on any

grounds except for a sentence in excess of the statutory maximum or based on an

impermissible factor. We therefore grant the Government’s motion in part and dismiss

Richmond’s appeal in No. 23-4728 as to all issues within the scope of the appellate waiver.

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in these appeals and

have found no meritorious grounds for appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s

revocation judgment in No. 23-4729, affirm Richmond’s convictions in No. 23-4728, and

dismiss the remainder of the appeal in No. 23-4728. This court requires that counsel inform

Richmond, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for

further review. If Richmond requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such

a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw

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from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on

Richmond.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

No. 23-4728, AFFIRMED IN PART AND DISMISSED IN PART; No. 23-4729, AFFIRMED

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