United States v. Jimmie Haney
United States v. Jimmie Haney
Opinion
USCA4 Appeal: 23-4726 Doc: 29 Filed: 10/15/2024 Pg: 1 of 3
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 23-4726
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JIMMIE LEE BENJAMIN HANEY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles, Chief District Judge. (1:23-cr-00074-CCE-1)
Submitted: October 10, 2024 Decided: October 15, 2024
Before WILKINSON and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, Ira Knight, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Sandra J. Hairston, United States Attorney, Angela H. Miller, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 23-4726 Doc: 29 Filed: 10/15/2024 Pg: 2 of 3
PER CURIAM:
Jimmie Lee Benjamin Haney pled guilty to one count of destruction by fire of a
building used in interstate commerce, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 844(i), and two counts of
bank robbery, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). The district court sentenced Haney to
156 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Haney argues that the district court abused its
discretion when it denied his request for a downward variant sentence, because he asserts
that his sentence is greater than necessary given his history and characteristics, and his
designation as a career offender overrepresents his criminal history. Finding no error, we
affirm.
“We review all sentences for reasonableness, applying a deferential abuse-of-
discretion standard.” United States v. McCain,
974 F.3d 506, 515(4th Cir. 2020) (cleaned
up). In doing so, “[o]ur inquiry proceeds in two steps.” United States v. Friend,
2 F.4th 369, 379(4th Cir. 2021). First, we must “ensure that the district court committed no
significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the
[Sentencing] Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider
the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or
failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
“Only if we determine that the sentence is procedurally reasonable do we then
proceed to substantive reasonableness.” Id. In considering the substantive reasonableness
of a sentence, we “take[] into account the totality of the circumstances to determine whether
the sentencing court abused its discretion in concluding that the sentence it chose satisfied
the standards set forth in § 3553(a).” United States v. Nance,
957 F.3d 204, 212(4th Cir.
2 USCA4 Appeal: 23-4726 Doc: 29 Filed: 10/15/2024 Pg: 3 of 3
2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A]ny sentence that is within or below a
properly calculated Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable.” United States v.
Gillespie,
27 F.4th 934, 945(4th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). A
defendant can rebut that presumption only “by showing that the sentence is unreasonable
when measured against the . . . § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Bennett,
986 F.3d 389, 401(4th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted).
We find Haney’s within-Guidelines sentence to be both procedurally and
substantively reasonable. Review of the record reveals no procedural flaws in Haney’s
sentencing, and, indeed, he makes no assertion that his sentence was tainted by procedural
error. Substantively, the district court expressly considered Haney’s history and
characteristics, as well as the § 3553(a) factors, and adequately explained its rejection of
his request for a downward variance and its reasons for imposing the 156-month sentence.
Therefore, Haney has not overcome the presumption of reasonableness applied to his
sentence.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
3
Reference
- Status
- Unpublished