James Christian v. Merrick Garland

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

James Christian v. Merrick Garland

Opinion

USCA4 Appeal: 23-1311 Doc: 63 Filed: 10/16/2024 Pg: 1 of 2

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 23-1311

JAMES JOSHUA CHRISTIAN,

Petitioner,

v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals.

Submitted: September 17, 2024 Decided: October 16, 2024

Before HARRIS, HEYTENS, and BERNER, Circuit Judges.

Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Steffanie Jones Lewis, THE INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LAW FIRM PC, Washington, D.C., for Petitioner. Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Melissa K. Lott, Senior Litigation Counsel, Rebekah Nahas, Senior Litigation Counsel, Criminal Immigration Team, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 23-1311 Doc: 63 Filed: 10/16/2024 Pg: 2 of 2

PER CURIAM:

James Joshua Christian, a lawful permanent resident, was convicted of four counts

of rape of a child under Massachusetts law. An immigration judge concluded Christian was

removable because those convictions were aggravated felonies under the Immigration and

Nationality Act.

8 U.S.C. § 1227

(a)(2)(A)(iii). Christian filed a motion to reconsider, which

the immigration judge denied. Christian appealed the order denying reconsideration—but

not the underlying removal order—to the Board of Immigration Appeals. The Board

dismissed Christian’s appeal, and Christian filed a petition for review.

We deny the petition for review. First, we conclude the Board did not err when it

declined to disturb the immigration judge’s denial of Christian’s motion to reconsider an

already made decision in which the immigration judge applied on-point precedent holding

that this specific state offense was an aggravated felony. Second, the Board did not err in

rejecting Christian’s argument that he was eligible for a waiver under

8 U.S.C. § 1227

(a)(7). That provision permits the Attorney General to “waive the application of ” a

particular statute—8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)—in certain circumstances. See

8 U.S.C. § 1227

(a)(7)(A). But Christian was not found removable under subsection (a)(2)(E); he

was found removable under subsection (a)(2)(A)(iii). Thus, Christian is not eligible for a

waiver under Section 1227(a)(7).

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the briefs and argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED

2

Reference

Status
Unpublished