James Christian v. Merrick Garland
James Christian v. Merrick Garland
Opinion
USCA4 Appeal: 23-1311 Doc: 63 Filed: 10/16/2024 Pg: 1 of 2
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 23-1311
JAMES JOSHUA CHRISTIAN,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals.
Submitted: September 17, 2024 Decided: October 16, 2024
Before HARRIS, HEYTENS, and BERNER, Circuit Judges.
Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Steffanie Jones Lewis, THE INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LAW FIRM PC, Washington, D.C., for Petitioner. Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Melissa K. Lott, Senior Litigation Counsel, Rebekah Nahas, Senior Litigation Counsel, Criminal Immigration Team, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 23-1311 Doc: 63 Filed: 10/16/2024 Pg: 2 of 2
PER CURIAM:
James Joshua Christian, a lawful permanent resident, was convicted of four counts
of rape of a child under Massachusetts law. An immigration judge concluded Christian was
removable because those convictions were aggravated felonies under the Immigration and
Nationality Act.
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Christian filed a motion to reconsider, which
the immigration judge denied. Christian appealed the order denying reconsideration—but
not the underlying removal order—to the Board of Immigration Appeals. The Board
dismissed Christian’s appeal, and Christian filed a petition for review.
We deny the petition for review. First, we conclude the Board did not err when it
declined to disturb the immigration judge’s denial of Christian’s motion to reconsider an
already made decision in which the immigration judge applied on-point precedent holding
that this specific state offense was an aggravated felony. Second, the Board did not err in
rejecting Christian’s argument that he was eligible for a waiver under
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(7). That provision permits the Attorney General to “waive the application of ” a
particular statute—8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)—in certain circumstances. See
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(7)(A). But Christian was not found removable under subsection (a)(2)(E); he
was found removable under subsection (a)(2)(A)(iii). Thus, Christian is not eligible for a
waiver under Section 1227(a)(7).
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the briefs and argument would not aid the decisional process.
PETITION DENIED
2
Reference
- Status
- Unpublished