USCA4 Appeal: 24-4010 Doc: 20 Filed: 10/23/2024 Pg: 1 of 4

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-4010

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JONATHON DEWAYNE EADS,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Charleston. Joseph R. Goodwin, District Judge. (2:23-cr-00115-1)

Submitted: September 30, 2024 Decided: October 23, 2024

Before WILKINSON and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Wesley P. Page, Federal Public Defender, Jonathan D. Byrne, Appellate Counsel, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. William S. Thompson, United States Attorney, Judson C. MacCallum, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 24-4010 Doc: 20 Filed: 10/23/2024 Pg: 2 of 4

PER CURIAM:

Jonathon Dewayne Eads appeals from the sentence imposed following his guilty

plea to distributing methamphetamine and aiding and abetting the same, in violation of

(a)(1) and

. Eads maintains that his sentence is procedurally

unreasonable. A presentence investigation report (PSR) attributed roughly 2.83 pounds of

methamphetamine to Eads based on his claim, which was recorded by a confidential

informant, that he had spent “ten bands”—or $10,000—to purchase the drugs to sell (the

“ten bands comment”). At sentencing, Eads argued in mitigation that, for various reasons,

his claim should be disregarded as unreliable puffery. The district court found the PSR

accurate and reliable and sentenced Eads to 132 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Eads

challenges his sentence as procedurally unreasonable, arguing that the court did not address

his mitigation argument. We affirm.

We review sentences “under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v.

United States,

(2007). “A district court is required to provide an

individualized assessment based on the facts before the court, and to explain adequately

the sentence imposed to allow for meaningful appellate review and to promote the

perception of fair sentencing.” United States v. Lewis,

(4th Cir. 2020)

(internal quotation marks omitted). “The court’s explanation should set forth enough to

satisfy the appellate court that it has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned

basis for exercising its own legal decisionmaking authority.” United States v. Lozano,

(4th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). Thus, the “court must address or consider all

non-frivolous reasons presented for imposing a different sentence and explain why it has

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rejected those arguments.” United States v. Webb,

(4th Cir. 2020)

(cleaned up). While “it is sometimes possible to discern a sentencing court’s rationale from

the context surrounding its decision,” we “may not guess at the district court’s rationale,

searching the record for statements by the Government or defense counsel or for any other

clues that might explain a sentence.” United States v. Ross,

(4th Cir.

2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). Where the court addresses the defendant’s

“central thesis” in mitigation, it need not “address separately each supporting data point

marshalled on its behalf.” United States v. Nance,

(4th Cir. 2020).

Eads contends that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the district

court did not directly address Eads’ mitigation argument that his “ten bands comment”

should not have been considered in the attribution of drug quantity. Even assuming that

the district court’s explanation of Eads’ sentence was insufficient because it did not directly

address the argument, we hold that any error was harmless.

For a procedural error to be harmless, the Government must show that the error “did

not have a substantial and injurious influence on the result.” United States v. Boulware,

(4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The

Government bears the burden of showing that the error was harmless.

It can do so by

showing that it is “simply unrealistic” to think that the district court would have changed

its mind if it had to correct its error.

. To determine whether a court’s failure to

sufficiently explain a sentence was harmless error, we may consider the strength or

weakness of a party’s unaddressed argument and whether the record indicates that the court

considered that argument.

.

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Here, even if the district court erred in not addressing the “ten bands” quantity

mitigation argument directly, any error was harmless. First, Eads’ mitigation argument

was weak, as a preponderance of the evidence established that 2.83 pounds of

methamphetamine at issue could be reliably attributed to Eads based on his claim of having

purchased $10,000 worth of that drug. In setting up transactions, he quoted

methamphetamine prices in one-pound increments. He also sold methamphetamine to

confidential informants in eighth-, quarter-, and half-pound increments. And, in addition

to claiming that he purchased $10,000 worth of methamphetamine, he also asserted he was

given two pounds for free. Indeed, confidential informants observed in plain view one to

two pounds of methamphetamine in Eads’ home. Further, the record indicates that the

court, by finding the PSR reliable, rejected Eads’ argument that his boast was unreliable.

Considering these facts, we can say with “fair assurance” that the district court

would not impose a different sentence if it were forced to explain its reasoning, and any

deficiency in the court’s explanation did not have had a “substantial and injurious

influence” on Eads’ sentence. See Boulware,

(internal quotation marks

omitted). Thus, any error was harmless.

We affirm Eads’ sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument

would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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