United States v. Norman Bowers

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

United States v. Norman Bowers

Opinion

USCA4 Appeal: 23-4488 Doc: 40 Filed: 10/28/2024 Pg: 1 of 5

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 23-4488

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

NORMAN SENEKA BOWERS,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 23-4489

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

NORMAN SENEKA BOWERS,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder, District Judge. (1:13-cr-00458-TDS-1; 1:22-cr- 00216-TDS-1)

Submitted: October 16, 2024 Decided: October 28, 2024 USCA4 Appeal: 23-4488 Doc: 40 Filed: 10/28/2024 Pg: 2 of 5

Before NIEMEYER, KING, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Seth A. Neyhart, LAW OFFICE OF SETH A. NEYHART, Durham, North Carolina, for Appellant. Sandra J. Hairston, United States Attorney, Julie C. Niemeier, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:

In these consolidated appeals, Norman Seneka Bowers appeals the 18-month

sentence imposed after he admitted violating conditions of supervised release (No. 23-

4488), and the 51-month sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to distribution of cocaine

base, in violation of

21 U.S.C. § 841

(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) (No. 23-4489). We affirm.

Bowers contends that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the supervised

release violations. Questions about a district court’s jurisdiction over a defendant’s

supervised release are reviewed de novo. United States v. Thompson,

924 F.3d 122, 127

(4th Cir. 2019). Bowers argues that the district court’s jurisdiction to revoke supervised

release or to sanction violations ends when the term of supervised release expires. A

court’s authority to enter a revocation judgment, however, “extends beyond the expiration

of the term of supervised release for any period reasonably necessary for the adjudication

of matters arising before its expiration if, before its expiration, a warrant or summons has

been issued on the basis of an allegation of such a violation.”

18 U.S.C. § 3583

(i). Here,

the warrant or summons was issued before the expiration of supervised release and the

district court found the delay to be reasonably necessary. We have reviewed the record

and find no error in the court’s decision to exercise jurisdiction over the supervised release

violations. Accordingly, we affirm the 18-month sentence.

Bowers was sentenced to 51 months’ imprisonment, an upward variance, and three

years’ supervised release for the drug distribution conviction. Bowers asserts that the

district court should have applied an amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines that, if

applicable, would have reduced Bowers’s criminal history category from IV to III. But the

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court had no occasion to consider that amendment because it was not going to be effective

for several months. See

18 U.S.C. § 3553

(a)(4)(A)(ii) (instructing courts to use Guidelines

in effect on day of sentencing).

Bowers also contends that the district court did not adequately explain the upward

variant sentence. We review “sentences—whether inside, just outside, or significantly

outside the Guidelines range—under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v.

United States,

552 U.S. 38, 41

(2007). We “first ensure that the district court committed

no significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the

Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the [18 U.S.C.]

§ 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to

adequately explain the chosen sentence—including an explanation for any deviation from

the Guidelines range.” Id. at 51. If there is no significant procedural error, then we

consider the sentence’s substantive reasonableness under “the totality of the

circumstances.” Id.

To allow for meaningful review by this Court, the district court “is required to

provide ‘an individualized assessment’ based on the facts before the court, and to explain

adequately the sentence imposed.” United States v. Lewis,

958 F.3d 240, 243

(4th Cir. 2020) (quoting Gall,

552 U.S. at 50

). An “explanation is sufficient if it, ‘although

somewhat brief[ly], outline[s] the defendant’s particular history and characteristics not

merely in passing or after the fact, but as part of its analysis of the statutory factors and in

response to defense counsel’s arguments’” in mitigation. United States v. Blue,

877 F.3d 513, 519

(4th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Lynn,

592 F.3d 572, 584

(4th Cir. 2010)

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(internal quotation marks omitted)). When the court imposes a variance, it must consider

the extent of the variance and adequately explain the chosen sentence to allow for

meaningful review. United States v. King,

673 F.3d 274, 283

(4th Cir. 2012). We have

reviewed the record and the district court’s imposition of an upward variance and find that

the court adequately explained the sentence by relying on the § 3553(a) factors.

Accordingly, we affirm the 51-month sentence.

We thus affirm both sentences. We dispense with oral argument because the facts

and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this Court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

5

Reference

Status
Unpublished