USCA4 Appeal: 23-4668 Doc: 24 Filed: 10/29/2024 Pg: 1 of 4

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 23-4668

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

TOMMY CARNEL GENERAL,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever III, District Judge. (5:99-cr-00068-D-3)

Submitted: October 22, 2024 Decided: October 29, 2024

Before NIEMEYER, GREGORY, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: G. Alan DuBois, Federal Public Defender, Andrew DeSimone, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Michael F. Easley, Jr., United States Attorney, David A. Bragdon, Assistant United States Attorney, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 23-4668 Doc: 24 Filed: 10/29/2024 Pg: 2 of 4

PER CURIAM:

Tommy Carnel General appeals the 24-month sentence imposed upon the

revocation of his supervised release. The district court revoked General’s supervised

release after finding that he violated the conditions of supervised release by engaging in

new criminal conduct and by leaving the judicial district without permission. The sentence

imposed was within the properly calculated 21- to 24-month policy statement range. On

appeal, General argues that the revocation sentence is procedurally plainly unreasonable.

We affirm. 1

“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a sentence upon revocation of

supervised release. This [c]ourt will affirm a revocation sentence if it is within the statutory

maximum and is not plainly unreasonable.” United States v. Patterson,

(4th Cir. 2020). Before deciding “whether a revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable,

[we] must first determine whether the sentence is procedurally or substantively

unreasonable,”

applying “the same procedural and substantive considerations that

guide our review of original sentences,” but taking “a more deferential appellate posture

than we do when reviewing original sentences,” United States v. Padgett,

(4th Cir. 2015) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). “Only if a sentence

is either procedurally or substantively unreasonable is a determination then made as to

1 The Government contends that General failed to preserve his challenge to his revocation sentence and therefore the issue is subject to plain error review. Even assuming arguendo that the issue was preserved, we conclude that General is not entitled to relief.

2 USCA4 Appeal: 23-4668 Doc: 24 Filed: 10/29/2024 Pg: 3 of 4

whether the sentence is plainly unreasonable—that is, whether the unreasonableness is

clear or obvious.” Patterson,

(internal quotation marks omitted).

When fashioning an appropriate revocation sentence, “the [district] court should

sanction primarily the defendant’s breach of trust, while taking into account, to a limited

degree, the seriousness of the underlying violation and the criminal history of the violator.”

U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ch. 7, pt. A, introductory cmt. (3)(b) (1998), p.s.; see

United States v. Webb,

(4th Cir. 2013). While the court also must

consider certain enumerated factors under

(a), excluded from that list is

“the need for the sentence . . . to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect

for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense.”

(a)(2)(A);

see

§ 3583(e).

We have recognized, however, that “the factors listed in § 3553(a)(2)(A) are

intertwined with the factors courts are expressly authorized to consider under § 3583(e).”

Webb,

. Consequently, although the district court may not base a revocation

sentence “predominately” on the § 3553(a)(2)(A) factors, “mere reference to such

considerations does not render a revocation sentence procedurally unreasonable when

those factors are relevant to, and considered in conjunction with, the enumerated § 3553(a)

factors.” Id. at 642.

General argues that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the district

court repeatedly cited the serious and egregious nature of his new criminal conduct as the

basis for the revocation sentence. The Chapter 7 policy statements provides that the court

should “consider[] a violation resulting from a defendant’s failure to follow the court-

3 USCA4 Appeal: 23-4668 Doc: 24 Filed: 10/29/2024 Pg: 4 of 4

imposed conditions of . . . supervised release as a ‘breach of trust.’” USSG ch. 7, pt. A,

introductory cmt. 3(b), p.s. Here, the district court made clear its understanding that the

principal focus of a revocation sentence is to sanction a defendant’s breach of the court’s

trust. The court found that General breached the court’s trust by violating the supervised

release conditions prohibiting him from engaging in criminal conduct or leaving the

judicial district without prior permission. The court considered General’s argument that

he had no prior supervised release violations, but expressly declined his request for a

downward variant sentence because, in the court’s view, General’s revocation conduct was

an egregious breach of trust. While the seriousness of General’s revocation conduct

implicates § 3553(a)(2)(A), in this case the court’s focus was not on sanctioning General

for the seriousness of the offenses themselves; rather, the court’s emphasis was on its

determination that the revocation conduct was an egregious breach of trust. We therefore

conclude that General’s revocation sentence is not procedurally unreasonable, plainly or

otherwise. 2

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

2 General does not challenge—and therefore has not rebutted—the presumption of substantive reasonableness accorded his within-policy-statement-range revocation sentence. United States v. Gibbs,

(4th Cir. 2018).

4