USCA4 Appeal: 23-2164 Doc: 71 Filed: 11/20/2024 Pg: 1 of 19

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 23-2164

SIDDHANTH SHARMA,

Plaintiff – Appellant,

v.

ALAN HIRSCH, Chairman of NCBOE, in his official capacity; KAREN BRINSON BELL, in his official capacity; JEFF CARMON, in his official capacity; SIOBHAN MILLEN, in his official capacity; STACY EGGERS, IV, in his official capacity; KEVIN LEWIS, in his official capacity; STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA,

Defendants – Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina at Raleigh. Richard E. Myers, II, Chief District Judge. (5:23−cv−00506−M−BM)

Argued: September 25, 2024 Decided: November 14, 2024 Amended: November 20, 2024

Before WILKINSON, RICHARDSON, and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part; vacated and remanded in part by published opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote the opinion in which Judge Richardson and Judge Rushing joined.

ARGUED: Madelyn Strohm, Peyton Mitchell, WAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant. Nicholas Scott Brod, NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: John J. Korzen, Maxwell J. Anthony, C. Isaac Hopkin, Luul Y. USCA4 Appeal: 23-2164 Doc: 71 Filed: 11/20/2024 Pg: 2 of 19

Lampkins, Appellate Advocacy Clinic, WAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant. Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, Terence Steed, Special Deputy Attorney General, Mary Carla Babb, Special Deputy Attorney General, NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellees.

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WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:

The plaintiff here lodges a challenge to the felony-disclosure requirement for a

candidate running for federal office in North Carolina. This state law requires that

candidates check a box indicating if they have any felony convictions and then submit a

short supplemental form with basic information regarding such convictions and the

restoration of citizenship rights. The district court upheld the statute. Because the felony-

disclosure requirement falls within the Constitution’s broad grant of authority to the states

to regulate elections, we now affirm. We remand appellant’s challenge to a separate

address-disclosure requirement to the district court with directions to dismiss that claim as

moot.

I. Siddhanth Sharma (“Sharma”) is a twenty-seven-year-old convicted felon who

currently resides in Wake County, North Carolina. In September 2023, Sharma announced

his candidacy for North Carolina’s Thirteenth Congressional District seat in the State’s

2024 Republican primary election. Sharma’s full citizenship rights had been restored on

September 3, 2023, and he registered to vote on September 5. J.A. 233.

Prospective candidates seeking the nomination of a political party in a primary

election must submit a notice of candidacy. See

(a); J.A. 91-92.

Among other inquiries, the notice form asks, “Have you ever been convicted of a felony?”

§ 163-106(e). Candidates who check “yes” must submit a supplemental form which

requires them to list “the name of the offense, the date of conviction, the date of the

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restoration of citizenship rights, and the county and state of conviction.” Id. Failure to fully

complete the forms results in the “individual’s name [] not appear[ing] on the ballot,” and

the voiding of all votes cast for that individual. Id.

On September 14, 2023, without having submitted his notice of candidacy, Sharma

filed suit against members of the North Carolina State Board of Elections (“the State” or

“the Board”). He challenged the felony-disclosure requirement as violative of the

Qualifications Clause of the U.S. Constitution and challenged both the felony-disclosure

requirement and an additional address-disclosure requirement as violative of the First

Amendment. He also sought an injunction requiring the State to adopt a notice-of-

candidacy form without a felony-disclosure requirement, and another injunction requiring

the State to remove all voters’ addresses from the voter-search database. J.A. 16-17, 52.

The State moved to dismiss his claims for lack of standing and failure to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted. J.A. 119.

The district court granted the motion to dismiss. While acknowledging that Sharma

had not yet filed his notice-of-candidacy form, the court nonetheless found standing to

challenge the felony-disclosure requirement because Sharma alleged a sufficient pre-

enforcement injury connected to a constitutional interest. Sharma v. Hirsch, No. 23-CV-

00506-M,

, at *9 (E.D.N.C. Oct. 30, 2023). However, the district court

concluded that felony disclosure did not constitute an additional qualification because it

did not render any candidate “ineligible for ballot position.”

at *10 (quoting U.S. Term

Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,

(1995)).

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Likewise, the district court held that the felony-disclosure requirement did not

violate the First Amendment. Firstly, applying “exacting scrutiny,” the district court held

that felony disclosure served a substantial interest in promoting an informed electorate.

Secondly, the court found that the requirement posed only a modest burden, and thus the

State had significant leeway in light of its legitimate regulatory interests.

at *11 (citing

John Doe No. 1 v. Reed,

(2010)).

With regard to the address-disclosure requirement, the district court found that

Sharma lacked standing because his injury was insufficiently particularized. Rather, the

chilling effect he claimed to experience was “common to all members of the public.”

at

*13 n.5 (quoting Griffin v. Dep’t of Lab. Fed. Credit Union,

(4th Cir.

2019)).

Sharma appealed the district court’s dismissal of his challenges on November 2,

2023. J.A. 259. He subsequently submitted his notice of candidacy, correctly noting his

felony history, on December 7, 2023, shortly before the December 15 filing deadline. J.A.

22, 260-264. He appeared on the ballot on March 5, 2024, and ultimately lost the primary

election.

II.

We must, as an initial matter, set forth the federalist structure by which the

Constitution empowers regulation of elections. Article I’s Elections Clause provides that

[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.

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U.S. CONST. art I, § 4, cl. 1. Under this scheme, the states “have a major role to play in

structuring and monitoring the election process, including primaries.” Cal. Democratic

Party v. Jones,

(2000); see also Moore v. Harper,

(2023)

(“The Clause imposes on state legislatures the duty to prescribe rules governing federal

elections.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Supreme Court has defined

permissible state election laws broadly as “the numerous requirements as to procedure and

safeguards which experience shows are necessary in order to enforce the fundamental right

involved.” Smiley v. Holm,

(1932). “It cannot be doubted that these

comprehensive words embrace authority to provide a complete code for congressional

elections, [encompassing] . . . notices, registration, supervision of voting, protection of

voters, prevention of fraud and corrupt practices, counting of votes, duties of inspectors

and canvassers, and making and publication of election returns.”

While state discretion has the potential to lead to nonuniform practices in the

methods of selecting federal officers, such flexibility is an intended feature of the Elections

Clause, not a flaw. Indeed, in the years preceding ratification of the Constitution, states

traditionally held near absolute authority over the selection of delegates to nationally

relevant political bodies. For example, the colonies and states customarily selected

delegations to the First and Second Continental Congresses, the Congress under the

Articles of Confederation, and the Constitutional Convention. See, e.g., JACK N. RAKOVE,

THE BEGINNINGS OF NATIONAL POLITICS: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF THE

CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 30-31 (1979); ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. V,

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para. 3 (“Each state shall maintain its own delegates in a meeting of the states, and while

they act as members of the committee of the states.”); New York Assembly Resolution on

the Appointment of Delegates to the Constitutional Convention (Feb. 26, 1787), in 4 THE

PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 101-02 (Harold C. Syrett ed. 1962).

The Constitution thus reflected this American ethos of state influence over the

selection of national representatives. While the states would cede much of their sovereignty

to the federal government, they gained certain rights, including the “broad power” to

prescribe the “Times, Places, and Manner” of holding federal elections. Clingman v.

Beaver,

(2005) (quoting Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn.,

(1986)). This was a federalist compromise: the Constitution provided basic

qualifications which the states could not discard or alter, but otherwise afforded states

significant latitude to implement voter qualifications, ensure that elections ran smoothly,

that candidates met their constitutional requirements, and that voters were properly

informed. See Storer v. Brown,

(1974) (discussing states’

“comprehensive” election codes and that “there must be a substantial regulation of

elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to

accompany the democratic processes”).

This compromise did not serve to appease all concerns over the loss of state

sovereignty, but it was an acknowledgement that state governments were well equipped to

respond to the needs of their electorates. No uniform system of elections would suit both

Rhode Island and Virginia equally. For the Founders or Congress to attempt to delve into

every minutia of federal elections would be folly. State governments operated closer to the

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ground and could devise electoral regulations responsive to the different geographic and

demographic character of their populaces. See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, THE LAW OF

THE LAND 165-280 (2015) (highlighting how these differences impacted constitutional

interpretation and lawmaking).

While states are afforded great berth in devising proper electoral processes, they are

not without limit in this field. States must yield to other constitutional provisions that

protect the rights of voters and candidates. Beyond their inability to create new

qualifications for officeholding, states cannot discriminate against candidates or voters on

the basis of race, nor can they attempt to dissuade or compel political affiliation with

specific groups. See, e.g., Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party,

(2008); Clingman,

. Regulation of elections within the states

proceeds, for example, subject to the First, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. State

authority, while broad, is not absolute.

When states do not otherwise violate constitutional rights and requirements, only

Congress may supersede their discretionary authority. Perhaps the chief congressionally

imposed limit on the states is the Voting Rights Act, but this statute is not at issue today.

Congress in this case has been silent. “The [Elections] Clause is a default provision; it

invests the States with responsibility for the mechanics of congressional elections” insofar

as “Congress declines to preempt state legislative choices.” Foster v. Love,

(1997); see also Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc.,

(2013).

And even then, Congress’s authority cannot be considered apart from its historical

purpose. The Elections Clause’s “grant of congressional power was the Framers’ insurance

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against the possibility that a State would refuse to provide for the election of representatives

to the Federal Congress.” Inter Tribal Council of Ariz.,

; see also Ariz. State

Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n (“AIRC”),

, 815 (2015). As

Alexander Hamilton put it, Congress should possess the basic power to “regulate, in the

last resort, the election of its own members.” FEDERALIST NO. 59 (1788) (C. Rossiter ed.

1961) (emphasis added); see also 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION

OF THE CONSTITUTION 437 (Merrill Jensen et al. eds., 1976) (“Sir, let it be remembered

that this power can only operate in a case of necessity, after the factious or listless

disposition of a particular state has rendered an interference essential to the salvation of the

general government.” (quoting Pennsylvania Ratification Convention Debates (Nov. 30,

1788) (statement of Jasper Yeates))).

The nuanced balance of congressional and state authority over electoral procedures

provides no green light for federal courts to devise preferences of their own. Indeed, a

“dominant purpose of the Elections Clause” was to create a possible pathway for

congressional preemption and not to otherwise “restrict the ways States enact legislation.”

AIRC, 576 U.S. at 814-15. We cannot strain the intent and meaning of state election laws

to find constitutional violations where there are none. As the constitutional text highlights,

the proper venue for debates over discretionary state election policies remains with

Congress, more so than with the federal courts. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1; see also

Alexander v. S.C. State Conf. of the NAACP,

, 1258 (2024) (Thomas, J.,

concurring in part) (“The Framers’ considered choice of a nonjudicial remedy is highly

relevant context to the interpretation of the Elections Clause.”).

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III.

A.

The above analysis of state electoral authority provides the context for addressing

the central question in this appeal: does a requirement for the public disclosure of

candidates’ felony histories, which will not appear on the ballot, constitute an

impermissible qualification for office.1 For the following reasons, we must answer that

question in the negative.

The federal Constitution provides an exclusive list of the qualifications for

congressional office. “No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to

1 The issue here is one that is “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” S. Pac. Term. Co. v. ICC,

(1911). “Election-related disputes qualify as ‘capable of repetition’ when ‘there is a reasonable expectation that the challenged provisions will be applied against the plaintiffs again during future election cycles.’” Lux v. Judd,

(4th Cir. 2011) (quoting N.C. Right to Life Comm. Fund for Indep. Political Expenditures v. Leake,

(4th Cir. 2008)). And the Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed that the exception is especially appropriate when mootness would have otherwise been the result of a completed election cycle. See Storer v. Brown,

, 737 n.8 (1974); Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc.,

(2007); Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n,

(2008). It is unusual that a plaintiff comes before our court having already established repetition, but Sharma has done so. He brought nearly identical claims in a case about the 2022 Republican primary election for the same seat in the U.S. House of Representatives. See Sharma v. Circosta, No. 22-CV-59,

, at *1 (E.D.N.C. May 11, 2023), aff’d in part, appeal dismissed in part, No. 23-1535,

(4th Cir. Feb. 26, 2024) (per curiam). Where repeated conduct is before the court in the present, the prospect of future repetition becomes all the more likely. And now, Sharma has publicly declared his intent to run again in the next congressional election. Siddhanth Sharma, X (formerly TWITTER) (Mar. 6, 2024), https://perma.cc/UT37-CBW3 (“I bet you will not see 14 candidates on the ballot next time, but you WILL see me.”). At that time, he will face the same felony-disclosure requirement and the same dilemma of fully litigating this challenge before the December notice-of-candidacy filing period ends.

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the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who

shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen.” U.S.

CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2. And, since Powell v. McCormack, the Supreme Court has

continually affirmed the “Framers’ understanding that the qualifications for members of

Congress had been fixed in the Constitution.”

(1969); see also U.S. Term

Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,

(1995); JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 623-628 (1833) (“It would seem but fair

reasoning upon the plainest principles of interpretation, that when the [C]onstitution

established certain qualifications, as necessary for office, it meant to exclude all others, as

prerequisites.”).

States have no authority under the Elections Clause to pass qualifications

masquerading as time, place, and manner regulations. See Thornton,

;

STORY, supra, § 624. However, the Framers were concerned primarily with the categorical

exclusion of certain citizens from officeholding, including religious qualifications and

district residency qualifications. STORY, supra, §§ 623, 628. The Qualifications Clause was

not designed to restrict states from passing reasonable procedural measures that individuals

must complete to formalize their candidacy.

Today, courts read the Qualifications Clause with a slightly broader lens to cover

two types of government regulations: (1) laws that exclude or effectively exclude a

candidate from the ballot, see, e.g., Thornton,

, and (2) laws that publicly

disadvantage certain political viewpoints on the face of the ballot, see, e.g., Cook v.

Gralike,

(2001).

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Even under this more capacious framework, the felony-disclosure requirement is

not a disqualification at all. If prospective candidates possess a felony history, they may

still appear on the federal ballot, regardless of whether their full citizenship rights have

been restored. See J.A. 127 & n.4. In this respect, the felony-disclosure requirement could

not be more different than the term-limit requirement held unconstitutional in United States

v. Thornton. There, Arkansas had amended its constitution to preclude any individual who

had previously served two or more terms in the U.S. Senate from appearing on the ballot

for that same position. Thornton,

. While the Supreme Court acknowledged

the possibility that a former senator or two-term incumbent could still be reelected with

write-in ballots, it held that precedents supporting “manner” regulations did not enable

states to completely eliminate all avenues to “ballot access.”

. To comply with

the Arkansas Constitution necessarily meant, in Thornton’s view, exclusion from the

ballot. However, Sharma’s compliance with the felony-disclosure requirement—a simple

checkbox and half-page form—enabled him to appear on the ballot.

Likewise, the felony-disclosure requirement did not derogatorily brand Sharma for

his political viewpoints. The Court in Cook v. Gralike held that Missouri exceeded its

power under the Elections Clause when it required that ballots include candidates’

positions and congressional voting histories on proposed term limits.

.

“Adverse [ballot] labels handicap candidates ‘at the most crucial stage in the election

process—the instant before the vote is cast,’” and thus seek to impermissibly “dictate

electoral outcomes.”

(first quoting Anderson v. Martin,

(1964); then quoting Thornton, 514 US. at 833-34).

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North Carolina’s felony-disclosure requirement in no way disadvantages political

viewpoints. The disclosure is the mere repetition of a simple fact contained in the public

record. See State v. Sharma, No. COA19-591,

, at *1, 5 (N.C. Ct. App.

Dec. 15, 2020). Unlike the disclosure in Cook, the felony disclosure does not reveal

anything about Sharma’s personal philosophy or opinions on public policy. And

significantly, the felony disclosure does not appear on the ballot. To view it, voters must

solicit the completed notice-of-candidacy form, which does not appear to be downloadable

from the State’s website. Thus Sharma cannot claim that North Carolina seeks to influence

voters at the “instant before the vote is cast.” Cook,

(quoting Martin,

).

Being no form of unconstitutional qualification, the felony-disclosure requirement

is a proper exercise of North Carolina’s “time, place, and manner” regulatory power.

Thornton and Cook explicitly permit “manner” regulations that “encompass[] matters like

‘notices, registration, . . . protection of voters, [and] prevention of fraud and corrupt

practices.” Cook,

-24 (quoting Smiley,

); see Thornton,

. Disclosing past histories of lawbreaking in a prospective lawmaker falls

within the ambit of permissible safeguards necessary to “ensur[e] that elections are ‘fair

and honest,’ and ‘that some sort of order, rather than chaos is to accompany the democratic

process.’” Cook,

(quoting Storer v. Brown,

(1974)).

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B.

Sharma also claims that North Carolina’s felony-disclosure requirement is a form

of compelled speech violative of the First Amendment. Under Anderson/Burdick,

determining the appropriate standard of review requires that we examine the “character and

magnitude” of the burden on Sharma’s First Amendment rights:

[W]hen those rights are subjected to “severe” restrictions, the regulation must be “narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance.” But when a state election law provision imposes only “reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions” upon the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of voters, “the State’s important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify” the restrictions.

Anderson v. Celebrezze,

(1983); Burdick v. Takushi,

(1992) (first quoting Norman v. Reed,

(1992); then quoting Anderson,

); accord Fusaro v. Cogan,

(4th Cir. 2019).

The felony-disclosure requirement imposes only the lightest burden on Sharma’s

rights. Why? Because the speech this disclosure compels is relatively innocuous. The

disclosure does not cover candidates’ personal beliefs, policy preferences, or political

affiliations. Sharma remains free to speak as he pleases and on any topic he selects. If the

felony-disclosure requirement compromised political expression, Sharma would be right

in insisting that we apply “exacting scrutiny,” see Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta,

(2021); however, no such issue is at play here. As discussed above,

(e) only requires disclosure of a simple historical fact illustrative

of nonpolitical activity. A fact already available to the public to boot.

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Thus we ask only whether the felony disclosure requirement is sufficiently justified

by “the State’s important regulatory interests.” Burdick,

. Our precedent is

clear that “[t]here can be no question about the legitimacy of the State’s interest in fostering

informed and educated expressions of the popular will.” Anderson,

;

Tashjian,

; Wash. State Grange,

(“The State’s asserted

interest in providing voters with relevant information about the candidates on the ballot is

easily sufficient to sustain I–872.”). Here, the state is making already available public

information more accessible to voters upon inquiry—an element beneficial to maintaining

an educated electorate.

Informing and educating voters with relevant information about the candidates is

thus a recognized state interest, and the felony disclosure may be viewed as a reasonable

assist to that endeavor. The state is using the requirement to emphasize in a modest and

restrained manner that lawmaking and lawbreaking are, to put it gently, in tension. North

Carolina is not passing judgment on whether the electorate should ultimately vote for

Sharma or indeed for any candidate with a comparable history. The felony-disclosure

requirement simply allows voters to reach their own conclusions on a distinction that is, at

its core, the very essence of the rule of law. We therefore hold that the felony-disclosure

requirement survives Anderson/Burdick balancing.

IV.

We need not reach the merits of Sharma’s challenge to the address-disclosure

requirement as we lack jurisdiction over this claim. Our court may raise jurisdictional

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questions sua sponte at “any stage of proceedings.” United States v. Springer,

(4th Cir. 2013); see also North Carolina v. Rice,

(1971). Here,

we lack jurisdiction because the issue is now moot.

Upon registering to vote, Sharma, like all other North Carolina voters, disclosed the

address of his personal residence. See

(c)-(f) (detailing the

State’s address verification process). Once a voter is registered, their verified address is

stored in the State’s publicly accessible voter-search database. Thus any individual with

internet access can currently locate a registered voter’s address.

Our jurisdiction under Article III is limited to “live” cases and controversies.

Powell,

; accord Mellen v. Bunting,

(4th Cir. 2003). Even

assuming a litigant establishes standing at the outset of litigation, the “case is moot if, at

any point prior to the case’s disposition, one of the elements essential to standing, like

injury-in-fact, no longer obtains.” Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps. v. Off. of Special Couns.,

(4th Cir. 2021). If a plaintiff does not retain such a “‘personal stake in the

outcome of the lawsuit’ throughout the entire litigation,” this court lacks jurisdiction to

hear the case. United States v. Payne,

(2022) (quoting Campbell-Ewald

Co. v. Gomez,

(2016)).

Because the 2024 primary election cycle has already concluded, Sharma lacks a

“concrete interest” in this Court’s disposition on his address-disclosure requirement.

Chafin v. Chafin,

(2013) (quoting Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local

1000,

(2012)). While Sharma claims that the address-disclosure

requirement has a chilling effect on those running for office, he did indeed submit his notice

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of candidacy, run for office, and appear on the ballot. And on March 5, 2024, Sharma lost

the Republican primary election. Enjoining the state from publishing his address now will

not negate any past compelled speech or chilling effects, nor change the results of the

election. The deed has been done. Sharma “can no longer benefit from the relief he seeks.”

Payne,

.

The issue is also not “capable of repetition.” Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to

Life, Inc.,

(2007) (requiring “a reasonable expectation that the same

complaining party will be subject to the same action again” (quoting Spencer v. Kemna,

(1998))). Future candidates will not be compelled to reveal their address.

The Board conceded at oral argument that North Carolina will not and cannot mandate that

candidates for federal office be registered voters because such a requirement would

constitute an unconstitutional additional qualification on officeholding. Thus any candidate

who objects to providing his address may simply cancel his voter registration or avoid

registering altogether. If a candidate still voluntarily enters or remains within the voter-

search database, he cannot reasonably claim that such speech was compelled, given that he

had a reasonable and easily accessible alternative. Any potential “chilling effect” will be

“self-inflicted,” and thereby untraceable to the Board’s requirements. See Clapper v.

Amnesty Int’l USA,

(2013).

V.

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Over the past five years, North Carolina has been flooded with dozens of challenges

to the State’s electoral regulations. We understand that many of these challenges are

reasonably grounded in the law, and their gravity should not be understated. At the same

time, the constant pull to the courtroom leaves state election officials frequently operating

in a provisional state, never knowing if and when their procedures will be overturned.

This state of affairs is not conducive to the most efficient administration of elections.

“[R]unning a statewide election is a complicated endeavor. Lawmakers [] must make a host

of difficult decisions about how best to structure and conduct the election.” Democratic

Nat’l Comm. v. Wis. State Legislature,

, 31 (2020) (mem.) (Kavanaugh, J.,

concurring in denial of application to vacate stay). Often, a board of elections must either

choose to forego policies that serve significant governmental interests in preserving

electoral integrity, or risk enforcing potentially unconstitutional measures that could throw

a shadow over an entire federal election. Neither option is desirable. “When an election is

close at hand, the rules of the road should be clear and settled.”

And some modicum of

stability assists candidates in knowing when and where they will run, and voters in knowing

who would represent them. These lines of communication are important to representative

government, and their value is among those things that courts may keep in mind. Both the

stability of state electoral procedures and the place of state governments in the Article I

elections scheme are under challenge in these sorts of cases, but here again the courts may,

under law, take account of both.

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We affirm the district court’s holding that North Carolina’s felony-disclosure

requirement is constitutional. We vacate the judgment on the address-disclosure challenge

and remand that claim to the district court with instructions to dismiss it as moot.

AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART

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