LeAnthony Winston v. Chadwick Dotson

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

LeAnthony Winston v. Chadwick Dotson

Opinion

USCA4 Appeal: 23-6727 Doc: 30 Filed: 12/10/2024 Pg: 1 of 3

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 23-6727

LEANTHONY T. WINSTON,

Petitioner - Appellant,

v.

CHADWICK DOTSON,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Robert G. Doumar, Senior District Judge. (2:18-cv-00577-RGD-RJK)

Submitted: November 26, 2024 Decided: December 10, 2024

Before KING and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

LeAnthony T. Winston, Appellant Pro Se. Timothy Joseph Huffstutter, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 23-6727 Doc: 30 Filed: 12/10/2024 Pg: 2 of 3

PER CURIAM:

LeAnthony T. Winston seeks to appeal the district court’s orders accepting the

recommendation of the magistrate judge, denying relief on Winston’s

28 U.S.C. § 2254

petition, and denying his postjudgment motions. The orders are not appealable unless a

circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. See

28 U.S.C. § 2253

(c)(1)(A).

A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right.”

28 U.S.C. § 2253

(c)(2). When the district court denies relief on the

merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists could find

the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong. See Buck v.

Davis,

580 U.S. 100

, 115-17 (2017). When the district court denies relief on procedural

grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is

debatable and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional

right. Gonzalez v. Thaler,

565 U.S. 134, 140-41

(2012) (citing Slack v. McDaniel,

529 U.S. 473, 484

(2000)).

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Winston has not

made the requisite showing. Because Winston failed to sufficiently explain why he did not

present several of his claims to the state courts, we conclude that reasonable jurists could

not debate the district court’s denial of those claims as procedurally barred. See Gray v.

Zook,

806 F.3d 783, 798

(4th Cir. 2015) (explaining that “[w]hen a petitioner fails to

comply with state procedural rules . . . the claim is procedurally defaulted and federal

review is generally foreclosed”). Nor could reasonable jurists debate the district court’s

denial of Winston’s claims challenging the conditions of his now-completed confinement

2 USCA4 Appeal: 23-6727 Doc: 30 Filed: 12/10/2024 Pg: 3 of 3

in state prison. See Spencer v. Kemna,

523 U.S. 1, 7

(1998) (holding that challenge to

“now-ended incarceration or parole” is moot unless “some collateral

consequence . . . exist[s]” that court can redress (internal quotation marks omitted)). And

although Winston argues that an evidentiary hearing on his claims was warranted, we

conclude that the district court did not err in declining to order such a hearing. See

Juniper v. Zook,

876 F.3d 551, 563

(4th Cir. 2017);

28 U.S.C. § 2254

(e)(2).

Accordingly, we deny as moot Winston’s motion to expedite, deny his remaining

pending motions, deny a certificate of appealability, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the

materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED

3

Reference

Status
Unpublished