Ricardo Lanier v. Justin Burns

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Ricardo Lanier v. Justin Burns

Opinion

USCA4 Appeal: 23-7125 Doc: 24 Filed: 12/13/2024 Pg: 1 of 5

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 23-7125

RICARDO EDWIN LANIER,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

JUSTIN BURNS; ZANE CAPPS,

Defendants - Appellees.

No. 23-7188

RICARDO EDWIN LANIER,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

JUSTIN BURNS; ZANE CAPPS,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Asheville. Martin K. Reidinger, Chief District Judge. (1:22-cv-00078-MR)

Submitted: November 14, 2024 Decided: December 13, 2024 USCA4 Appeal: 23-7125 Doc: 24 Filed: 12/13/2024 Pg: 2 of 5

Before THACKER and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Ricardo Edwin Lanier, Appellant Pro Se. Sean Francis Perrin, WOMBLE BOND DICKINSON (US) LLP, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:

In these consolidated cases, Ricardo Edwin Lanier appeals various orders entered

in his

42 U.S.C. § 1983

action. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s orders.

Specifically, as to Appeal No. 23-7125, we discern no error in the court’s threshold

order, issued on 28 U.S.C. § 1915A review, dismissing as legally insufficient Lanier’s

claims for false arrest and unlawful entry of his home. As the district court explained with

regard to Lanier’s false arrest claim, under the jurisdictional principles of abstention

established in Younger v. Harris,

401 U.S. 37

(1971), federal courts should refrain from

exercising otherwise-valid jurisdiction “if there is (1) an ongoing state judicial proceeding,

instituted prior to any substantial progress in the federal proceeding; that (2) implicates

important, substantial, or vital state interests; and (3) provides an adequate opportunity for

the plaintiff to raise the federal constitutional claim advanced in the federal lawsuit,”

Nivens v. Gilchrist,

319 F.3d 151, 153

(4th Cir. 2003). Here, Lanier’s underlying state

charges were still pending at the time of this action. The unlawful entry claim was legally

insufficient by virtue of Lanier’s own recognition that the Defendant Officers heard a

ruckus inside the home, to which Defendants responded after Lanier’s wife called 911

because of a domestic disturbance. See Georgia v. Randolph,

547 U.S. 103, 118

(2006)

(recognizing that the police have the authority “to enter a dwelling to protect a resident

from domestic violence; so long as they have good reason to believe such a threat exists, it

would be silly to suggest that the police would commit a tort by entering . . . to determine

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whether violence (or threat of violence) has just occurred or is about to (or soon will)

occur”).

Next, we have reviewed the summary judgment record materials—including the

body camera footage from the night in question—and, upon de novo review, see Caraway

v. City of Pineville,

111 F.4th 369

, 378 (4th Cir. 2024) (providing standard of review), we

agree with the district court that the Defendant Officers were entitled to qualified immunity

on Lanier’s excessive force claim, * cf. Yates v. Terry,

817 F.3d 877, 886

(4th Cir. 2016)

(explaining that an officer may deploy a taser only when he or she “is confronted with an

exigency that creates an immediate safety risk and that is reasonably likely to be cured by

using the taser,” which includes being “an immediate threat to [the arresting officer] or

anyone else” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Finally, as to Appeal No. 23-7188, we

hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Lanier’s Fed. R. Civ. P.

59(e) motion to alter or amend the court’s prior judgment because the motion did not raise

appropriate grounds for such relief. See Robinson v. Wix Filtration Corp. LLC,

599 F.3d 403, 407

(4th Cir. 2010) (explaining that Rule 59(e) relief is proper only “if the movant

shows either (1) an intervening change in the controlling law, (2) new evidence that was

not available at trial, or (3) that there has been a clear error of law or a manifest injustice”).

* The body camera footage clearly establishes that: the Defendant Officers were on the scene in response to Lanier’s wife’s 911 call in which she reported a physical disturbance with Lanier, who was reportedly intoxicated; Lanier was loud, argumentative, and combative with Defendants and his wife; Lanier was uncooperative with the officer’s efforts to put him in handcuffs after the disturbance escalated; and Defendants were familiar with Lanier and his wife because they were called to the marital home with some regularity.

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Accordingly, we affirm the appealed-from orders. Lanier v. Burns, No. 1:22-cv-

00078-MR (W.D.N.C. May 27, 2022; Sept. 29, 2023; Nov. 6, 2023). We dispense with

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the

materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

5

Reference

Status
Unpublished